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# ***ALMANAC OF CORRUPT & CORRUPTED AMERICAN JURISTS***

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U.S. Circuit Court Judges for the Seventh Circuit

## ***WILLIAM T. HART***
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U.S. District Court Judge, Northern District of Illinois

&

## ***RICHARD A. POSNER***

Chief Judge, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals



Chapter I

*Frank H. Easterbrook, William J. Bauer, Ilana D. Rovner & Richard A. Posner* are here challenged to publicly "*swear*", "*affirm*" or "*certify*" that the proceedings & dispositions made in ***Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association*** (33 F.3d 733 [7th Cir.- 1994]) are valid.

They will *all* refuse since, in addition to other lethal infirmities, *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*), "on its face", reveals a lack of "*subject matter jurisdiction*" which, in & of itself, renders the merit dispositions made to be "*null & void*", which no one has ever denied!

Part "A":

> "Jurisdiction over a case is the power to render a binding judgement in it; if there is no jurisdiction, there is no power" (*Disher v. Information Resources*, 873 F.2d 136, 139 [7th Cir.-1989], per Posner, J.).

1. No federal judge has been as prolific in writing on the issue of "*jurisdiction*" as has been or is U.S. Circuit Court Judge, now Chief Judge, *Frank H. Easterbrook*, who obviously was the panel member that authored *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*)!

A. Before *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*) was instituted, U.S. Circuit Court Judge *Frank H. Easterbrook* in *Sherman v. Community* (980 F.2d 437, 440 [7th Cir.-1992]), speaking for the Court, stated [with emphasis supplied]:

> "The Shermans overlook the *enduring principle* that judges ***must*** consider jurisdiction as the *first order of business* and that parties ***must*** help the courts to do so."

B. After *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*) was rendered, U.S. Circuit Court Judge *Frank H. Easterbrook*, speaking for the Court in *U.S. v. County of Cook, Ill.* (167 F3d 381[7th Cir.-1999]), stated [with emphasis supplied]:

> "*No* court may decide a case *without subject matter jurisdiction*, and neither the parties nor their lawyers may stipulate to [subject matter] jurisdiction or waive arguments that the court lacks [subject matter] jurisdiction. If the parties neglect the subject, a court ***must*** raise jurisdictional questions itself."

2. However, in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*), U.S. Circuit Court Judge *Frank H. Easterbrook* demonstrated that there is no limit to his *dishonesty* by *refusing* to address the issue of "*subject matter jurisdiction*" in rendering such decision, and his *stupidity* in causing it to be published in "*hard print*" so that *everyone* could read & confirm the incredible, "*legally impossible*", fact that he *refused* to address & adjudicate this threshold issue!

3. The absence of "*subject matter jurisdiction*" renders the merit dispositions made in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra)* to be "*null & void*", dispositions which are unaffected by the fact that the Court *refused* to adjudicate the issue (*Crawford v. United States,* 796 F.2d 924, 928 [7th-1986])!

Part "B-1":

> "However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned. by Congress" (*Reeside v. Walker, Secy of Treasury of the U.S.*, 52 U.S. 272, 291 [1851]).

1. Appearing "on the face", of *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*), a proceeding wherein ***William H. Rehnquist*** & ***Janet Reno*** were money damage tort defendants, there appears a "*legally impossible*" judicial scenario which, in and of itself, rendered the dispositions made in that action to be "*null & void*", since it reads:

> "James B. Burns, Office of U.S. Atty., Chicago, IL, for William H. Rehnquist. Charles E. Ex, Asst. U.S. Atty., Crim. Div., Chicago, IL, for Janet Reno."

2. It was and is "*legally impossible*" for *William H. Rehnquist* or *Janet Reno* to be sued in tort, for money damages, and be defended by Federal attorneys, as the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court (*Snodgrass v. Jones*, 957 F.2d 482 [7th Cir.-1992]; *Sullivan v. Freeman*, 944 F.2d 234 [7th Cir.-1991]), and *every* Article III federal court & jurist *knew* & *knows* (see, *e.g.*, *Kelley v. United States*, 568 F.2d 259 [2nd Cir.-1978] cert. den 439 U.S. 830 [1978]).

A. In their "*official capacities*" *Rehnquist-Reno* could *not* be "*sued*" in *any* court, federal, state or local, in tort, for money damages, since they had and still have "*sovereign immunity*". In instances where the United States has waived "*sovereign immunity*", the *Federal Tort Claims Act* ["FTCA"] is the "*exclusive*" remedy & the *United States* is the "*exclusive*" defendant (28 *U.S.C.* §2679).

B. In their "*personal capacities*", *Rehnquist-Reno* and all other federal judges, officials and employees, could be "*sued*" in *any* court, federal, state or local, for money damages, in tort or any other cause, but in those instances they could *only* be defended by non-Federal attorneys, at non-Federal cost & expense.

C. Thus, *every* Article III jurist who saw *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*) *knew* that: (1) *Rehnquist/Reno* & *Burns/Ex* were *felons*, liable for fines & terms of incarceration (31 *U.S.C.* §§ 1341, 1342, 1350); (2) the merit dispositions were "*null & void*", as lacking in "*subject matter jurisdiction*", and (3) they were obligated to "*reimburse*" the *United States* for the *unauthorized* expenditures made of monies and services.

3. When the U.S. Seventh Circuit of Appeals *refused* to address the issue of "*subject matter jurisdiction*", caused by this *unauthorized & unconstitutional* defense representations, as was its *sua sponte* obligation, in the words of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court (at p. 735):

> "Sassower insists that he is suing the federal employees in their personal rather than official capacities. .... Sassower has peppered this court with motions--motions to disqualify opposing counsel".

It is *not* that "Sassower insists", as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, but the "*The Law*" that *Rehnquist-Reno* could *only* be "*sued*" in tort for money damages in their "*personal capacity*", whether Sassower insisted or not!

Would *any* judge, lawyer or law student have believed that the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals *refused* to adjudicate the absence of "*subject matter jurisdiction*", had not that Court *stupidly* reduced the matter to "*hard published print*"???

However, despite the *refusal* to adjudicate the absence of "*subject matter jurisdiction*", the dispositions made are "*null & void*" (*Crawford v. United States, supra*).

4. Since the defense representation of *William H.* Rehnquist & *Janet Reno* were *unauthorized*, federal books were "*cooked*" to conceal these *unauthorized* federal expenditures from Congress, which has "*exclusive*" control of the federal purse, as a response to a *Freedom of Information Act* ["FOIA"] request confirms [FOIA #04-2237]. This FOIA response states that there is *no* record of this litigation in Washington or at the U.S. Attorney's Office in Chicago.

Obviously, federal financial books would *not* have been "*cooked*", which is a *felony* (18 *U.S.C.* §1001), had this defense representations & expenditures made been authorized & lawful!

Part "B-2":

1. The Court, the other parties and their attorneys, having possession copies of the Complaint in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*), *knew* that the conduct of *Rehnquist-Reno*, by dragooning the *unauthorized* defense representation of *Burns-Ex,* was "*arrogance run amok*"!

2. The *undenied & uncontroverted* allegations in the Complaint in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*) includes the following [emphasis in original]:

> "2b(1) This is a personal capacity action against, *inter alia*, federal officials, who are intentionally acting contrary to legitimate federal interests to satisfy personal interests, and clearly not in the `scope' of their offices.
>
> (2) This is not an action against the federal government, or any of its officers in their official capacities; *no* allegation is being made that any 28 *U.S.C.* §2675 notice of claim has been filed for the causes of action alleged herein; no judgment is sought by plaintiff against the United States, *nor* does plaintiff seek to impose any financial burden upon the United States for any defense representation."

*Only* the most *arrogantly corrupt* federal judge or official, would dragoon or accept federal defense representation, in view of the above allegations!!!

3. The ultimate paragraph of the Complaint in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*) reads:

> "WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment, racketeering and otherwise, *punitive* and otherwise, for the sum of $1,000,000,000, together with costs and disbursement of this action."

A. The *United States* did *not* waive "*sovereign immunity*" for money damage tort actions arising from "*racketeering*" activities.

Thus, neither the *United States*, nor any of its judges, officials or employees could be "*sued*" in their "*official capacities*".

In short: In *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*), Federal attorneys were *not* authorized by Congress to defend anyone!

B. Furthermore, neither the *United States*, nor its judges, officials or employees could be "*sued*" for "*punitive*" damages (28 *U.S.C.* §2674).

Therefore, as Court, the other parties & their attorneys *knew*, any appearance by Federal attorneys for *Rehnquist/Reno* was *unauthorized*!

4. The *undenied & uncontroverted* allegations in the Complaint also *meant* that *Rehnquist-Reno* were confident that: (1) the Seventh Circuit was "*fixable*", and would tolerate such lethally infirm judicial scenario; (2) that the *American Bar Association*, the sponsor of the Judicial & Professional Code of Conduct, with its mandatory "*whistle-blowing*" provisions, and everyone else, except for affirmant, would remain silent about their misconduct! They were correct!

5. *Rehnquist-Reno* by dragooning the services of *Burns-Ex*, albeit *unlawful*, effectively "*immunized*" themselves against criminal & civil liability since *Burns-Ex* were obviously *not* going to prosecute or sue those they were representing, or could they!

Part "B-3":

1. *William McNeil*, sustained serious personal injuries by reason of the non-immune activities of the *United States*, but he will *never* be compensated by any Court, since the *FTCA* is the "*exclusive*" remedy!

2. In 1966, the provisions contained in 28 *U.S.C.* §2675 became mandatory, and the first complaint of *William McNeil* filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was "dismissed" because it was commenced *before* the administrative requirements had been exhausted.

The second complaint of *William McNeil* was also "dismissed" because it was filed *after* the time limitation set forth in the statute, although the equities were all in his favor and no prejudice had been sustained by the *United States*.

These complaints were "dismissed" by U.S. District Court Judge *James H. Alesia*, on January 24, 1991 (*McNeil v. U.S.*, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 843).

On May 20, 1992, U.S. Circuit Court Judge *Frank H. Easterbrook*, speaking for himself and another panel member, affirmed the disposition made by U.S. District Court Judge *James H. Alesia*, despite the "equities" and "lack of prejudice" holding, in essence, that when Congress says "*No*, it *means No*"(*McNeil v. U.S.*, 964 F.2d 647 [7th Cir. - 1992])!

On May 17, 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States, unanimously affirmed, holding that *every* branch of the federal government desired the change who, along with the injured party, were intended to benefit by the 1966 Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States held when *all* branches of the federal government say "*No*, it *means No*" (*McNeil v. U.S.*, 508 U.S. 106 [1003])!

4. On December 9, 1993, less than seven (7) months after the Supreme Court of the United States rendered *McNeil v. U.S.* (*supra*), *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* was filed in the same U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the action was assigned to U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart*, a seasoned jurist (Docket No. 93 Civ 7427).

The Complaint specifically alleged [with emphasis in the original]:

> "*no* allegation is being made that any 28 *U.S.C.* §2675 notice of claim has been filed for the causes of action alleged herein ...".

5. By dragooning the defense representation of U.S. Attorney *James B. Burns*, everyone in the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, including Assistant U.S. Attorney *Charles E. Ex*, were compelled to conclude that the criminal arrogance and corruption of Chief Justice of the United States, *William H. Rehnquist* and Attorney General of the United States, *Janet Reno*, was vertiginous & limitless!

*Rehnquist-Reno*, those that defended them & tolerated such judicial scenario are "hard-core crooks", whose activities included "*defrauding*" the United States (18 *U.S.C.* §371).

Part "B-4":

1. On June 24, 1994, the plaintiff's *undenied, uncontroverted & unopposed* motion addressed to the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, opened as follows:

> Affirmant, under penalty of perjury, cross-moves (#1) to: (I) Strike the papers filed by U.S. Attorney JAMES B. BURNS [`Burns'] and/or Assistant U.S. Attorney CHARLES E. EX [`Ex'] on June 21, 1994, as unauthorized (28 U.S.C. §547); (ii) Disqualify

Burns/Ex from representing the defendant, JANET RENO [`Reno'], who is being sued in her personal, not official, capacity, in a money tort action ... ".... 

Part "B-5":

1. The published decision in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*) reads:

"Sassower has peppered this court with motions--motions to .... and more. The `more' includes two bizarre filings that cannot be called motions and are apparently designed to edify us about the depths to which the judicial system has sunk. One is titled `*The Reno-Posner Fraud*' and another `*The Corruption of Chief Administrator Richard A. Posner*' ...".

2. "*The Reno-Posner Fraud*, whose allegations and assertions were *undenied, uncontroverted & unopposed* opens as follows:

Appellant, under penalty of perjury (28 U.S.C. §1746, FRCivP Rule 43[d]), with service on, inter alia, Janet Reno, cross-moves (#1) to: (I) Strike the papers filed by U.S. Attorney JAMES B. BURNS ["Burns"] and/or Assistant U.S. Attorney CHARLES E. EX ["Ex"] on June 21, 1994, as unauthorized (28 U.S.C. §547); (ii) Disqualify Burns/Ex from representing the defendant, JANET RENO ["Reno"], who is being sued in her personal, not official, capacity, in a money tort action ... .

3. `*The Corruption of Chief Administrator Richard A. Posner*", whose allegations and assertions were *undenied & uncontroverted*, are discussed in subsequent chapters.

Part "B-6":

1. On June 27, 1994, as a matter of right, I filed a petition for a *Grand Jury* Inquiry (*Geo. Sassower v. Burns* [*Grand Jury*], ND Ill - 94-3485 [WRA]) which proceeding was assigned to U.S. District Court Judge *Wayne R. Andersen*.

2. Copies of such filing was served on: Attorney General *Janet Reno*; Chief Judge *Richard A. Posner*; U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart* and U.S. Attorney *James B. Burns*, who did *not* deny or controvert anything stated therein, including the following:

"I bring to your attention, some of the criminal activities which are occurring in the Courthouse itself, quantum leaps more egregious than the `Greylord' judicial scandal in Chicago, of a few years ago.

1a. U.S. Attorney James B. Burns is defrauding the federal purse by representing, openly and by stealth, federal judges and officials, at federal cost and expense, who have not been certified as `acting within the scope of his office'.

b. As Chief Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the author of Sullivan v. Freeman (944 F.2d 334 [7th Cir.-1991]), the statute and all reported cases, hold that without a 28 U.S.C. §2679[d] `scope' certificate, which U.S. Attorney Burns is authorized to issue (28 CFR §15.3), no federal judge, official, employee or serviceman can be represented, at federal cost and expense, unless such `scope' certificate is issued or a court determines that the judge, official, employee or serviceman was `was acting within the scope of his office ... at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose'.

. . . . . The Worst Is Still To Follow

Part "C":

> "the rule .... is inflexible and without exception .... the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of [the appellate] court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it." (*Mansfield v. Swan* (111 U.S. 379, 382 [1884]).

1. There being a lack of "*subject matter jurisdiction*" at the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which no one ever denied, that court was precluded from making any further merit dispositions (*Simpkins v. District of Columbia Government*, 108 F.3d 366 [CDC-1997]).

However, the "*fixed*" and "*corrupted*" U.S. Seventh Circuit Court, ignored the lethal jurisdictional infirmities in that Court, although its invalidity was unaffected thereby!

2. Thus, the next subject of judicial inquiry by the Circuit Court was the "*jurisdiction*" of the U.S. District Court and of U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart*, since if they did not have "*jurisdiction*", neither did the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals (*Maxwell v. Swan*, *supra*).

3. The uncontroverted documentary reveals U.S. District Court & U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart* were "*divested*" of "*jurisdiction*" when: (1) Assistant New York State Attorney General ["NYSAG"] *David Monachino* appeared for the New York State money damage tort defendants (*Pennhurst v. Halderman* (465 U.S. 89, 121 [1984]); and (2) upon the filing of a "*timely & sufficient*" *recusal affirmation*" (28 *U.S.C.* §144).

Part "D-1":

> "[a] federal court *must* examine *each* claim in a case to see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment (*Hans v. Louisiana.* 134 U.S. 1 [1890]) ." (*Pennhurst v. Halderman*, *supra*)

1. The New York State defendants in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*) were *Judith S. Kaye*, *Francis T. Murphy*, *Xavier C. Riccobono* and *William C. Thompson.*

2. On May 5, 1994, plaintiff received a copy of a letter from Assistant NYSAG *David Monachino* addressed to U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart* which stated that he:

> "represent(s) Honorable [NY Appellate Division, Presiding Justice] Francis T. Murphy, [Chief NY State] Judge Judith S. Kaye, [NY State Appellate Division] Justice Thompson and former New York Attorney General Robert Abrams".

3. This appearance by Assistant NYSAG *David Monachino*, absent its unequivocal rejection by U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart*, "*divested*" him & his Court of "*subject matter jurisdiction*" (*Pennhurst v. Halderman* (*supra*).

Likewise, such appearance, also "*divested*" the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals of "*subject matter jurisdiction*" (*Maxwell v. Swan*, *supra*).

Part "D-2":

1. In view of the *undenied & uncontroverted* allegations in the Complaint in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*), the appearance by Assistant NYSAG *David Monachino*, plaintiff was compelled to conclude that he and his clients had been assured that U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart*: (1) had been "*fixed*", and (2) would not address the Amendment XI (*Hans v. Louisiana, supra*) lethal infirmity, although mandatory.

2. The *undenied & uncontroverted* allegations in the complaint included:

"The misconduct of the federal defendants was performed jointly with state actors, acting under `color of law', consequently the federal defendants' misconduct also violated 42 *U.S.C.* §1983.

Similarly, this action is ***not*** against any state sovereign, directly and/or indirectly, and in view of the Eleventh Amendment to the *U.S. Constitution*, it could not be."

3. Presumably, Assistant NYSAG *David Monachino* and his clients also *knew* that the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had also been "*fixed*" and would not address this lethal infirmity in the U.S. District Court (*Maxwell v. Swan, supra*) which, was thereafter confirmed in "hard published print".(*Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association, supra*).

4. Consequently, on May 5, 1994, the ***same*** day that plaintiff received a copy of the letter of Assistant NYSAG *David Monachino* to U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart,* he executed a 28 *U.S.C.* §144 "recusal" affirmation which stated:

"Affirmant, under penalties of perjury, makes this 28 *U.S.C.* §144 application in good faith.

1a. The mandate of the statute is that this application be made: (1) promptly, (2) permits only one such application, and (3) that the `judge shall proceed no further therein'.

b. Since there is certain information relevant to this application which is presently not in affirmant's possession, leave is requested to supplement this affirmation until at least responses are received to his Notices to Admit, which will be served within the next few days.

2a. Today, May 5, 1994, affirmant (1) received a letter request addressed to the Court from *David Monachino*, Esq., Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York that he, obviously at state cost and expense: ....

3a. Affirmant's complaint in this action clearly and emphatically alleges, *inter alia*, that the state defendants are being sued in their personal, not official, capacities, and affirmant does not intend to, and cannot, constitutionally burden the state treasury even for litigation expenses.

b. Each and every federal Article III jurist knows of the XI Amendment constitutional and jurisdiction bar, and his/her *sua sponte* obligation thereunder.

c. Unless, NY Assistant Attorney General *David Monachino* can affirm under penalty of perjury that he is unaware of the XI Amendment subject matter infirmity, then he, and his purported clients, must have been informed, and verily believes, that this Court has been or could be `fixed' and `corrupted'.

4a. Obviously, the same conclusion is irresistibly compelled by the simultaneous representation of the statutory fiduciary and those involved in the larceny of judicial trust his trust assets by NY Assistant Attorney General *David Monachino*.

b. Here again, the obligation of the Court is *sua sponte* (*Wood v Georgia*, 450 U.S. 261, 265 n. 5 [1981]), for no court in any civilized country can permit attorneys or fiduciaries to represent adverse interests or act contrary to the interests of their clients or trusts, as NY Assistant Attorney General *David Monachino* must be aware.

c. Considering the draconian sanctioning powers of the federal courts, NY Assistant NY Attorney General *David Monachino*, must have been informed that this Court could be or has been `fixed' and `corrupted'."

5. Since this 28 *U.S.C.* §144 "recusal" affirmation" was unquestionably "timely & sufficient", U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart* "could proceed no further"!

However, this "*fixed*" & "*corrupted*" federal jurist did, further confirming his corruption!

Part "D-3":

1. The Fourth Cause of Complaint in *Geo. Sassower v. American Bar Association* (*supra*) reads, *in haec verba*, as follows:

> " 23a. By complaint dated June 14, 1993, plaintiff commenced an action in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts (*Geo. Sassower v. Fidelity*, Docket No. 93-11335Y), and when *Citibank, N.A.* failed to answer or move, plaintiff made request that the Clerk note the default and set the matter down for an assessment of damages, all of which was on notice, and which the Court granted.
>
> b. An *ex parte* corrupt arrangement was then made by, *inter alia*, Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge *Jon O. Newman* for the Second Circuit, Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge *Steven G. Breyer* for the First Circuit and U.S. District Court Judge *William G. Young* for the District of Massachusetts, after which by an *ex parte* letter from *Kreindler & Relkin, P.C.* ['K&R'] to the Court, without any notice whatsoever to plaintiff and which did not set forth any excuse for the default, U.S. District Court Judge *William G. Young*, still without notice to plaintiff, vacated the default and dismissed the action.
>
> Not reflected on the District Court Docket Sheet, as filed, was plaintiff's Notice of Appeal which he mailed directly to the District Court, his *FRCivP*, Rule 52[b] motion, his *FRCivP*, Rule 58 request, or any other document and motion mailed to the District Court by plaintiff -- they were all physically "hijacked" by, *inter alia*, U.S. District Court Judge *William G. Young*.
>
> Plaintiff's *FRCivP*, Rule 60(b) motion, made as a matter of right, under the aegis of *Comm. of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni* (601 F.2d 39, 42 [1st Cir.-1979], *cert.* denied 450 U.S. 912 [1981]) has not been acknowledge or adjudicated, and is believed also to have been "hijacked" by, *inter alia*, U.S. District Court Judge *William G. Young*.
>
> 24a. Eventually, plaintiff filed a new complaint (*Geo. Sassower v. West*, Docket No. 93- ), which, in substantial part, was a *Dennis v. Sparks* (449 U.S. 24 [1980]) complaint, and included *Jon O. Newman*, *Steven G. Breyer, Kreindler & Relkin, P.C.* and *Citibank, N.A.*, as "fixing" culprits, which was denying plaintiff due process.
>
> b. For ministerial misconduct, *William G. Young* was also made a party defendant.
>
> c. These papers have also been "hijacked", or at least have not, and will not, be processed, pursuant to still another "fix", by *Jon O. Newman*, *Steven G. Breyer,* and *Kreindler & Relkin, P.C.*
>
> 25. Under such "fix" by *Jon O. Newman,* the First Circuit has accepted the representation of an Assistant N.Y. Attorney General for thirteen (13) rogue state jurists and officials, including Attorney General *Robert Abrams*, at state cost and expense, all of whom are being sued in a personal capacity, for conduct contrary to state interests, and notwithstanding Amendment XI, with the approval, express or by sufferance, of, inter alia, Chief Administrator of the Administrative Board of the Courts of the State of New York, Judith S. Kaye."

2. In the plaintiff's 28 *U.S.C.* §144 "recusal" affirmation of May 5, 1994, in addition to basing the application upon the appearance of Assistant NYSAG *David Monachino* for the NY State defendants, he wrote:

"Also today, May 5, 1994, affirmant learned that *Kreindler &Relkin, P.C.* ["*K&R*"] made an *ex parte* letter communication to the Court, which should also be of some interest to, *inter alia*, Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge *Steven G. Breyer* of the First Circuit Court of Appeals.

K&R, as Chief Judge *Steven G. Breyer*, and others are aware, communicates, *ex parte*, with the Court, never serving affirmant, except when it knows that it is confronted with an honest judge or court, who will tolerate no such nonsense.

K&R and *Citibank, N.A.* engineered the larceny of the judicial trust assets of *Puccini Clothes, Ltd.*, most of which assets were employed to bribe and corrupt, leaving nothing for its nationwide creditors, including affirmant.

K&R's *ex parte* communications are inundated with false and misleading statements, and when in the form of affidavits or affirmations, are unquestionably perjurious.

However, as it openly flaunts, with its prime co-conspirator, *Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman*, Esqs. ["*FKM&F*"], they "control" "all" judges and courts.

Such flaunts have clearly not without merit, since they, with the aid of the judiciary, even divert monies payable "to the federal court" to their pockets and those of its clients.

Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge *Jon O. Newman*, U.S. District Court Judge *Charles L. Brieant* and Presiding Justice *Francis T. Murphy* are presently the principal "fixers" for the *K&R-FKM&F* criminal entourage." ...

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this application be granted, after affording *K&R-FKM&F-Monachino* with an opportunity to respond."

3. Although no one denied that this 28 *U.S.C.* §144 was both "timely & sufficient", compelling U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart* to proceed "no further", he denied the non-discretionary mandate of the statute.

4. Despite the mandate of *Maxwell v. Swan* (*supra*), the "*fixed*" Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also ignored the absence of jurisdiction by U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart* by reason of the appearance of the Assistant NY State Attorney General and the "*timely & sufficient*" 28 *U.S.C.* §144 recusal affirmation.

Part "D-4":

The failure of U.S. District Court Judge *William T. Hart* to recuse himself, as mandated by 28 *U.S.C.* §144, afforded ,*Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom*, Esqs. of the opportunity of confirming his corruption. . . . . The Worse Is Still To Come

Dated: May 13, 2011