

United States District Court

4/18/88

NEW JERSEY

DISTRICT OF

GEORGE SASSOWER, individually and as
a Chapter 13 debtor, and on behalf of
PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD.,

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

v.

CASE NUMBER: 88-1562
NICHOLAS M. PULLEN

LEE FELTMAN; FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN:
ET AL
(SEE ATTACHED LIST)

TO: (Name and Address of Defendant) TO ALL NAMED DEFENDANTS EXCEPT:

CLAPP & EISENBERG, ROTHBART, ROTHBART, & JOHN; JOHN J. SCURA; HUGH LEONARD;
SILLIS, CUMIS, ZUCKERMAN, RADIN, TISHMAN, EPSTEIN & GROSS, P.C.; BERLIN, KAPLAN
DEMBLING & BURKE, P.C.

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to file with the Clerk of this Court and serve upon

PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY ~~(name and address)~~ PRO SE

GEORGE SASSOWER
16 Lake St.
White Plains, NY 10603

an answer to the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 35 days after service of
this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.

APR 8 1988

CLERK WILLIAM T. WALSH
WILLIAM T. WALSH

DATE

BY DEPUTY CLERK AURORA BELL

ORIGINAL FILED

APR 4 1988

WILLIAM T. WALSH, CLERK

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

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GEORGE SASSOWER, individually and as a Chapter
13 debtor, and on behalf of PUCCINI CLOTHES,
LTD.,

Docket No.
88 --
[]

Petitioners,

-against-

LEE FELTMAN; FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN;
KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C.; JEROME H. BARR;
CITIBANK, N.A.; CHARLES ZANGARA; NACHAMIE,
KIRSCHNER, SPIZZ & LEVINE, P.C.; RASHBA &
POKART; IRA POSTEL; HOWARD M. BERGSON;
SCHNECK & WELTMAN; CLAPP & EISENBERG, P.C.;
ROTHBART, ROTHBART, & KOHN; JOHN J. SCURA;
SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR.; HUGH LEONARD; SILLS,
CUMIS, ZUCKERMAN, RADIN, TISHMAN, EPSTEIN &
GROSS, P.C.; ROBERT ABRAMS; DAVID S. COOK;
JEFFREY I. SLONIM; HYMAN RAFFE; EUGENE DANN;
ROBERT SORRENTINO; A.R. FUELS, INC.; DENIS
DILLON; ANTHONY MASTROIANNI; REISMAN, PEIREZ,
REISMAN, & CALICA; BERLIN, KAPLAN, DEMBLING &
BURKE, P.C.; CAHN, WISHOD, WISHOD, & LAMB;
JEFFREY L. SAPIR; and HAROLD JONES,

Respondents.

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Petitioner, individually and as a Chapter 13
debtor, and on behalf of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., as and for his
petition, respectfully sets forth and alleges:

1. On December 23, 1987, petitioner commenced a case,
by filing a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of
Title 11, United States Code ("case filing"), which "case filing"
now pends in a District of New Jersey, and petitioner brings this
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343, §1408, §1409, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1964, 1965; 42 U.S.C. §1983, and rights which arise directly
from the United States Constitution.

2. On information and belief, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. ["K&R"] and NACHAMIE, KIRSCHNER, SPIZZ & LEVINE, P.C. ["NKL&S"], were and are professional corporations, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.

3. On information and belief, CLAPP & EISENBERG, P.C. ["C&E"]; SILLS, CUMIS, ZUCKERMAN, RADIN, TISHMAN, EPSTEIN & GROSS, P.C. ["Sills"]; and BERLIN, KAPLAN, DEMBLING & BURKE, P.C. ["Berlin"], were and are professional corporations, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New Jersey.

4. On information and belief, CITIBANK, N.A. ["Citibank"], was and is a national banking corporation, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the United States.

5. At all of the times hereinafter mentioned the defendant, A.R. FUELS, INC. ["A.R."], was and still is a New York Corporation.

6a. PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. ["Puccini"], was a corporation, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York.

b. On June 4, 1980, Puccini was involuntarily dissolved by Order of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, upon the application of JEROME H. BARR, Esq. ["Barr"] and CITIBANK, N.A. ["Citibank"], as the Executors of the ESTATE of MILTON KAUFMAN ["Kaufman Estate"].

c. The aforementioned Order of Dissolution, thereafter signed, was prepared by K&R, as the attorneys for Barr and Citibank.

7. The petitioner, GEORGE SASSOWER, Esq. ["Sassower"], and/or his Chapter 13 Estate have substantial interests in Puccini, which include:

a. A wholly unsatisfied judgment against Puccini in the sum of \$27,912.42, with interest from April 29, 1982.

b. A filed claim against Puccini for the sum of \$3,000,000.

c. An attorney's lien on the 25% stock interests of HYMAN RAFFE ["Raffe"] in Puccini.

d. An attorney's lien on a judgment in favor of Raffe against Puccini in the approximate sum of more than \$500,000, inclusive of interest.

e. An attorney's lien on a claim in favor of Raffe against Puccini in the approximate sum of almost \$40,000, inclusive of interest.

f. A legal and/or equitable lien on the stock interests in Puccini by EUGENE DANN ["Dann"] and Robert Sorrentino ["Sorrentino"], by reason of (1) the aforementioned judgment of \$27,912.42, which includes Dann and Sorrentino, as judgment debtors, and (2) attorney's liens by virtue of various judgments and claims against them by Raffe.

AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

8. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "7" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

9. On June 4, 1980, the assets and affairs of Puccini became custodia legis, under color of law, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

10a. Under the New York statutory scheme, the Attorney General of the State of New York ["AG"] became the statutory fiduciary for such involuntarily dissolved corporation, with extensive discretionary powers (e.g. Bus. Corp. Law §1214[a]), and mandatory obligations (e.g. Bus. Corp. Law §1216[a]).

b. ROBERT ABRAMS, Esq. ["Abrams"], was on June 4, 1980, and continuously ever since, has been the AG.

c. A mandatory, non-discretionary, obligation imposed upon the AG is to make application for an accounting and distribution if such accounting and distribution is not voluntarily made within the period of eighteen (18) months (Bus. Corp. Law §1216[a]).

d. Furthermore, the receiver of an involuntarily dissolved corporation must, by February 1 of each and every year, file with the AG and the County Clerk of the county wherein he was appointed, a verified statement, which statement must include the "assets" of such involuntarily dissolved corporation Bus. Corp. Law §1207[A][3]).

e. Additionally, state court mandatory rule provides that a receiver must account each and every year, which is initiated by the filing of such "accounting" in the County Clerk's Office (22 NYCRR §202.52, §202.53).

11a. Petitioner, and his Chapter 13 Estate, are among those for whom the AG and Abrams are given power and/or the mandatory direction to act.

b. The discretionary powers given to the AG, and mandatory obligations imposed upon him, are for the benefit of, inter alia, "shareholders, creditors or other persons interested in the assets of any corporation, for which a receiver has been appointed" (Bus. Corp. Law §1214[a]).

c. Puccini, albeit a dissolved corporation and helpless, is nevertheless a "person" within the XIV Amendment, and the power and direction for the AG to act, is also for its benefit.

12. Respondent, Senior Attorney, DAVID S. COOK, Esq. ["Cook"] is the principal attorney who acts on behalf of Abrams in the New York City area, with respect to Abrams obligations and duties with respect to involuntarily dissolved corporations, with respondent, Assistant Attorney General, JEFFREY I. SLONIM, Esq. ["Slonim"], serving simply as Cook's alter ego.

13. Abrams, Cook, Slonim, and their staff, have actual knowledge that the judicial trust assets of Puccini, for which they are the statutory fiduciaries, was made the subject of massive larceny and unlawful plundering.

14. LEE FELTMAN, Esq. ["Feltman"], is and has been the judicially appointed receiver for Puccini for more than six (6) years, and the aforementioned notwithstanding, he has never filed an "accounting" or a statement of "assets", with the AG or the County Clerk, as mandated by multiple statutes and court rules.

15. By reason of the aforementioned, a writ of mandamus should be issued, or order entered, against Abrams, who is involved in litigation concerning Puccini in New Jersey, to make application to the appropriate tribunal to compel Feltman to file such mandated accounting and statement of assets, and otherwise comply with the mandatory, non-discretionary, ministerial directives imposed upon him and his office.

AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

16. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "15" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

17. By reason of petitioner's interest in Puccini, as aforementioned, vested and otherwise, as a matter of law, statutory (Bus. Corp. Law §1216[a]) and otherwise, petitioner and/or his Chapter 13 Estate have the right to demand an accounting, which petitioner hereby demands.

18. By reason of the aforementioned, a writ of mandamus should be issued, or order entered, against Feltman, Puccini's receiver, functioning under "color of law", to render such accounting and statement of assets on behalf of Puccini, and directing distribution.

AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

19. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "18" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

20. As a matter of law and public policy, on a judicial trust, an accounting must be rendered, except possibly where every possible interest voluntarily, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly waives same, and beyond any peradventure of doubt, the judicial estate has been properly administered.

21a. On information and belief, neither Raffe, Dann, Sorrentino, nor those who have legitimate interests in their assets, including petitioner individually and/or as a Chapter 13 debtor, has ever voluntarily, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly waived such accounting, which when rendered would inure substantially to the legitimate interests of all mentioned in this paragraph.

b. Furthermore, beyond a peradventure of a doubt, Puccini's judicial trust assets were made the subject of massive larceny and plundering, including by those who were acting under "color of law", state and federal.

22. By reason of the aforementioned, a writ of mandamus should be issued, or order entered, against Feltman, Puccini's receiver, functioning under "color of law", to render such accounting and statement of assets on behalf of Puccini, and directing distribution.

AS AND FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

23. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "22" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

24. Petitioner's judgment and monetary claims against Dann and Sorrentino, as aforementioned, are such which, on information and belief, they cannot fully satisfy, except insofar as they have financial interests in Puccini.

25. By reason of the aforementioned, a writ of mandamus should be issued, or order entered, against Feltman, Puccini's receiver, functioning under "color of law", to render such accounting and statement of assets on behalf of Puccini, and directing distribution.

AS AND FOR A FIFTH CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

26. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "25" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

27a. AG is a "public entity" within the meaning of §1-7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

b. The aforementioned rule, as applicable herein, provides:

"A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client ... (and) that a public entity cannot consent to any such (conflicting) representation".

28. Abrams is an attorney, indeed he is the highest law enforcement official in the State of New York, and is prohibited from any representation conflicting with his fiduciary obligations to Puccini, a "person" within the meaning of Amendments V and XIV of the Constitution of the United States.

29. By reason of the aforementioned, a writ of prohibition should be issued, or order entered, against Abrams, the AG, enjoining him, or anyone under his control, including Cook and Slonim, from acting contrary to Puccini's interests in this and related actions and/or proceedings.

AS AND FOR A SIXTH CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

30. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "29" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

31. Abrams, Cook, and Slonim, are attorneys, subject to the legal canons of ethics, which universally provide, in sum and substance, that the role of a fiduciary and attorney are of an undivided and uncompromising allegiance.

32. Abrams, as well as Cook and Slonim, are Puccini's statutory fiduciaries and must be ordered to act in the undivided and uncompromising manner on behalf of Puccini.

33. By reason of the aforementioned, a writ of prohibition should be issued, or order entered, against Abrams, the AG, enjoining him, or anyone under his control, including Cook and Slonim, from acting contrary to Puccini's interests in this and/or any other action or proceeding.

AS AND FOR A SEVENTH CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

34. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "33" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

35. Likewise, Feltman, Puccini's receiver, is an agent of the court, and as such, must act with respect to his judicial trust with undivided and uncompromising allegiance.

36. By reason of the aforementioned, a writ of prohibition should be issued, or order entered, against Feltman enjoining him, from acting contrary to Puccini's interests in this and/or any other action or proceeding.

AS AND FOR A EIGHTH CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

37. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "36" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

38. CHARLES ZANGARA ["Zangara"], a vice-president of Citibank, associated with its fiduciary department, as a continuous pattern and scheme of racketeering, involving interstate commerce in a very substantial degree, was and is involved in the unlawful practice of "estate chasing".

39a. "Estate Chasing", as practiced by Zangara, is a procedure wherein attorneys, whose clients name Citibank as their executor or trustee, are unlawfully compensated, almost invariably from the estate and/or trust, which are "persons" within the meaning of Amendments V and XIV of the United States Constitution.

b. Thus, Zangara and/or Citibank, who owe fiduciary obligations to their estates and trusts, betray such fiduciary obligations by unlawfully siphoning assets from such estates or trusts to unlawfully "pay-off" attorneys for "estate chasing".

c. Unlike the unlawful practice of "ambulance chasing" where the attorney involved generally underwrites such activity from his own assets, in the more egregious "estate chasing" Zangara and Citibank, make their "pay offs" from generally helpless estates and trusts.

d. Without condoning "ambulance chasing", the judicial system is not generally imposed upon by added activity, wherein in "estate chasing" the judicial forums are employed as "enterprises" for the purpose of needless litigation as a pretext for the "siphoning process".

e. Such continuous patterns of racketeering practices caused extensive injuries to the property of Puccini, and those interested in its assets and affairs, including to the petitioner and his Chapter 13 Estate.

40a. Barr as the attorney for the very wealthy MILTON KAUFMAN ["Kaufman"], caused or cooperated in the naming of Citibank in his last will and testament, which, on information and belief, Citibank aided in drafting, as is also its practice.

b. Kaufman at the time, like many others who name Citibank as their executor and/or trustee, had commercial obligations to Citibank at the time the will was executed and at the time of his death.

c. Barr, an associate of K&R, at the time the Kaufman will was drafted and executed, and at the time of Kaufman's death, was the sole and exclusive attorney for Puccini, for Kaufman, and with respect to Puccini, the personal attorney for Raffe, Dann, and Sorrentino.

d. Zangara, Citibank, and Barr knew that in the event of Kaufman's death there would be a conflict of interest between the commercial and fiduciary departments of Citibank by reason of the Kaufman guarantees for Puccini executed in favor of Citibank.

e. Zangara, Citibank, and Barr also knew that in the event of Kaufman's death there would be a conflict of interest by Barr, who was co-executor under the Kaufman will, and his attorney's obligations to Puccini, Raffe, Dann, and Sorrentino.

f. Zangara and Citibank also knew, before Kaufman's death, that there was a very strained and uncooperative relationship between the commercial department of Citibank, and Zangara's fiduciary department, at the same financial institution.

g. When Kaufman died on or about July 19, 1979, in applying for letters testamentary, neither Citibank nor Barr advised the Surrogate's Court of any conflict of interest.

41a. After Kaufman's death, petitioner was retained by Puccini by reason of the "Iraq-Iran style" situation that existed between the commercial and fiduciary departments at Citibank.

b. Zangara's fiduciary department clearly recognized Citibank's conflict and made arrangements so that Puccini's financing, under the Kaufman guarantees, would be assumed by another financial institution.

c. While the Puccini management and Citibank's fiduciary representatives were at this other financial institution to arrange for this substitute financing, they learned that Citibank's commercial department had struck, "Pearl Harbor fashion", by seizing Puccini's assets which were on deposit at Citibank.

42a. The commercial department of Citibank, refused to "roll over" a note of \$42,114.34, executed by Puccini, under a Kaufman guarantee, as previously was the practice, even after Kaufman's death, because, as the commercial department wrote "the Executors of the Estate of Milton Kaufman [Barr and Citibank]" failed to give "satisfactory concurrence".

b. To satisfy such small obligation which was due, fully collateralized, the commercial department of Citibank, attempted to seize Puccini's assets on deposit with its bank.

c. Unlike Pearl Harbor, petitioner, with some sense of prescience and exercising caution, had a few days previously, advised Puccini to withdraw all its cash on deposit at Citibank, except for a small amount, which it did, and place its monies in another bank.

d. The commercial department of Citibank, enraged that its seizure of Puccini's deposit only netted approximately \$1,000, and to the chagrin of the fiduciary department, the commercial department then seized not only the balance of \$41,053.80, but \$70,622.33 in addition thereto, from the assets of the Kaufman estate.

e. In short - Citibank's commercial department had declared war on its fiduciary department, and Puccini was the "1914 Belgium" on whose soil such internecine conflict would be fought.

43a. With the miniscule \$41,053.80 which the fiduciary department of Citibank could not rationally account for, Citibank and K&R, Barr's associate, conceived of a scenario of instituting, but not seriously pressing, a sham and needless lawsuit against Puccini for the \$41,053.80, which would serve the purpose of siphoning assets from the Kaufman Estate to K&R, for Barr's "estate chasing".

b. Petitioner rejected any participation in such fraudulent scenario.

c. Nevertheless, for the sole purpose of siphoning assets from the Kaufman Estate to K&R, on November 8, 1979, a CPLR §3213 proceeding was commenced against the solvent Puccini, for 100% indemnification, or \$41,053.80, and against Raffe, Dann, and Sorrentino, for 75% indemnification, or \$30,790.35, under the cross-guarantees executed by the Puccini stockholders at a time that everyone was represented by Barr, which had resulted from the aforementioned seizure by the commercial department of Citibank of Kaufman's assets, held by the fiduciary department.

d. Thereafter, on December 7, 1979, in an attempt to legitimize this seizure by the commercial department, Kaufman executors [Barr and Citibank] ex parte petitioned the Surrogate's Court for permission by the Estate to pay Citibank the sum of \$503,000.00 that they claimed was due from Puccini. The petition is marked by non-disclosure of the underlying relevant facts, if not outright perjury.

44a. Years thereafter, it was learned that for this CPLR §3213 action -- about the simplest know to law -- K&R, in October 1979, had 5 attorneys expend almost 58 hours, billing \$5,397, for simply preparing and mailing one pro forma claim letter.

b. In November 1979, according the K&R's records, 5 attorneys expended 111 hours, billing \$9,931 for preparing and serving a simple Summons, Notice of Motion, and CPLR §3213 affidavit, which Citibank's regular attorneys, as a matter of routine practice perform thousands of times each year, in minutes, by a computer operation.

c. In December 1979, K&R, according to K&R's records, had 8 attorneys, expend almost 223 hours, billing \$18,932, order to respond to petitioner's cross-motion.

d. Thus, in an attempt to recover \$41,053.80, even before submission to the court for judicial determination, the Kaufman estate expended \$34,260 for legal services to K&R.

e. K&R's motion and petitioner's cross-motion were marked submitted on January 8, 1980, a month wherein K&R had 9 attorneys expend almost 115 hours, billing \$12,734!

45a. The legal profession quickly learns of those institutions which compensate for "estate chasing", and the extent thereof.

b. Citibank is known to have a very liberal policy of compensation for "estate chasers", and it recognizes that ^{the} more siphoning it permits, the more it is named as executor and/or trustee.

46a. Consequently, in January 1980, recognizing that legal fees in excess of \$41,000, for a needless \$41,000 law suit, could not be justified, it authorized K&R to commence an involuntary, self-immolating, dissolution proceeding for Puccini.

b. Obviously, success in such involuntary dissolution proceeding would only diminish the value of Kaufman's 25% stock interest in such corporation, and there was not a single legitimate reason for such proceeding to have been initiated.

c. It was a proceeding where success was slim, and if it succeeded, it would be self-defeating.

d. It was, however, an opportunity for siphoning further assets from the Kaufman Estate to K&R, Barr's "associates", to unlawfully compensate for placing the Kaufman Estate in Citibank's estate portfolio, and encouraging other attorneys to name Citibank.

e. Years later an examination of K&R's records revealed that it had billed the Kaufman Estate the sum of \$136,226 for this five (5) month dissolution proceeding, whose result was that the equity of the Kaufman Estate was diminished thereby.

f. There was no trial nor hearing, the Court was simply convinced that the statements alleged by K&R and its clients were true and correct, when they were actually half-truths and outrightly perjurious.

g. As events thereafter disclosed it was clear that it was a dissolution proceeding whose success was not desired by either Citibank, Barr nor K&R.

h. The self-defeating nature of this proceeding was aggravated by the fact that the needless suit for \$41,053.80, wherein the fees of K&R were in excess of said amount, and had produced only \$30,790.35.

47a. On June 4, 1980, as a matter of law, upon entry of the Order of Involuntary Dissolution, the assets and affairs of Puccini becoming custodia legis.

b. Where assets do exist, the law and practice is for the appointment of a private person as the receiver, who acts as the agent of the court.

c. The Order of June 4, 1980, prepared by K&R, provided, inter alia:

"ORDERED, that the officers, agents and persons in control of the corporation ... are directed to forthwith turnover to the receiver upon his request, and the receiver be and he hereby is authorized and directed to take possession of all the property and effects ...

ORDERED, that the corporation, its officers, directors, and shareholders, agents and employees are enjoined and restrained from transferring or disposing any property of the corporation, except with the approval of the receiver ... " [emphasis supplied]

48a. Hon. John V. Lindsay ["Lindsay"], the former mayor of the City of New York was designated by Hon. MICHAEL J. DONTZIN ["Dontzin"] in accordance with 22 NYCRR §660.24.

b. 22 NYCRR §660.24 was enacted by the APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT ["AD1st"] and Presiding Justice FRANCIS T. MURPHY ["Murphy"], as a result of the "25th Street massacre", wherein four (4) jurists were compelled to resign because of their appointment practices (see Spector v. State Commission, 47 N.Y.2d 462, 418 N.Y.S.2d 565).

c. Lindsay's obligation was either to promptly qualify as receiver [file his oath of office and bond] or promptly decline the appointment.

d. Although Lindsay had intended to qualify, ex parte, K&R communicated with Lindsay, made false representations concerning the matter, including that the Puccini matter was settled or about to be settled, and as a result thereof, neither Lindsay nor his law firm, WEBSTER & SHEFFIELD, Esqs. ["W&S"] did anything with respect to such appointment, including notifying other interested parties or the court of their inaction.

e. Such interference with a court appointment receiver, by blackletter law, is a criminal and civil contempt of the first magnitude.

49a. Those not part of the K&R fraud simply assumed that Lindsay and his prestigious law firm were performing their task in a most exemplary fashion, while the K&R entourage deceived all others, including the Court.

b. In late December 1980, Raffe, petitioner's client, received a notice, which did not originate from Lindsay, concerning some transfers to be made from Puccini to K&R's clients.

c. Petitioner petitioned the Court to stay such transfers, and by Order of the Court, dated January 5, 1980, Hon. EDWARD J. GREENFIELD held that, in view of the receivership, such transfer would be of "no [legal] effect".

d. Thus, although there is no question about the propriety of the holding, as a matter of res judicata, K&R, its clients, and those who engaged themselves with them in such "thievery" of judicial trust assets, cannot relitigate such issue.

50a. As a result of the judicial skirmish before Hon. EDWARD J. GREENFIELD petitioner concluded that Lindsay had never taken control of Puccini's trust assets.

b. This was confirmed by Lindsay's firm, and the obvious conclusion was that the K&R entourage had engaged themselves in the larceny of Puccini's trust assets.

c. Despite vigorous denials by K&R, Lindsay at that point, seven and one half months after his appointment, declined the nomination.

d. It took the bailiwick of Administrator XAVIER C. RICCOBONO ["Riccobono"] more than one (1) year to appoint a successor receiver.

e. During this period of time K&R and its clients simply inundated the judicial forum with perjurious affidavits and statements to the effect that Puccini's trust assets had not been dissipated in any respect.

f. Petitioner was singularly unconvinced, and events thereafter disclosed proved him correct.

51. By reason of the Order of Mr. Justice EDWARD GREENFIELD of January 5, 1980 (supra), the Order of June 4, 1980, prepared by K&R, which provided, inter alia, that Puccini, "its officers, directors, and shareholders, agents and employees are enjoined and restrained from transferring or disposing any property of the corporation, except with the approval of the receiver" all such assets transferred, by whatever means, between June 4, 1980 and February 1, 1982, are without legal effect, are assets of Puccini, and restitution afforded, as provided by law, insofar as petitioner's interests warrant.

AS AND FOR A NINTH CAUSE OF COMPLAINT

52. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "51" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

53a. It is now known that shortly after the designation by Dontzin of LEE FELTMAN, Esq. ["Feltman"] as Puccini's successor receiver, Feltman entered into a corrupt agreement with K&R that he would betray Puccini, his judicial trust, in exchange for the balance of Puccini's assets being transferred to his law firm, FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. ["FKM&F"].

b. Two (2) incidents are paradigmatic of the concerted corruption practiced by K&R, FKM&F, and NKL&S -- "the criminals with law degrees".

54a. K&R renewed its motion for summary judgment in a second guarantee action based on the Barr prepared stockholders cross-guarantee agreement, knowing beforehand that Raffé was again going to assert the dissipation of Puccini's judicially entrusted assets as a defense.

b. There was never any question that whatever K&R's clients recovered against Raffé, Raffé was entitled to full recovery from Puccini, and two-thirds recovery as against Dann and Sorrentino, in his third party complaint.

In short, what was good for Raffé in this action, was good for Puccini, Dann and Sorrentino!

c. Obviously, K&R knew beforehand that neither Feltman, FKM&F, nor NKL&S, representing the third party defendants, would reveal the truth, although success by K&R against Raffé, meant a judgment over against Puccini, the judicial trust, and also against Dann and Sorrentino, the clients of NKL&S.

d. In controverting Raffé's assertion of the unlawful dissipation of Puccini's judicial trust assets, impairing his right of subrogation and indemnification, K&R submitted three (3) affidavits.

(1) The perjurious Zangara affidavit, on behalf of Citibank, reads as follows:

"... Raffé claims that the plaintiffs [Barr and Citibank] and the [attorneys for the] third-party defendants [NKL&S] have entered into some unspecified agreement ... and pursuant to which the 'assets [of Puccini] have been dissipated for the benefit of plaintiffs'. Once again, no documentary evidence is offered in support of this groundless

assertion. The unsupported and baseless charge that the Estate [of Milton Kaufman] has dissipated the assets of Puccini Clothes, Ltd. is totally false. The Estate has received no monies whatsoever from Puccini Clothes, Ltd."

(2) There was the Barr affidavit, the "associate" of K&R, which falsely swore:

"Unfortunately, it is necessary to correct some of the incredible misstatements and outright falsehoods contained in the Raffe affidavits. ... The Estate of Kaufman has received no monies from Puccini Clothes, Ltd. ... [He and Citibank] do not have any access to it['s assets], nor have they received any monies from Puccini."

(3) Robert J. Miller, Esq., of K&R, submitted a misleading affidavit [a motion for summary judgment automatically stays all pre-trial disclosure (CPLR 3214b)], which stated:

"... defendant (Raffe) may not argue that the automatic stay should be lifted, for discovery here is unnecessary and is simply a delaying tactic as the defendant, Hyman Raffe has absolutely no defense to this action."

e. Feltman, FKM&F, and NKL&S had actual knowledge that such K&R submitted affidavits were perjurious, and also had actual knowledge from an opinion of Hon. MARTIN STECHER that if such perjurious affidavits were believed, that Raffe would recover judgment over as against their clients and the judicial trust, to wit., Dann, Sorrentino, and Puccini, in indemnification, as well as subrogation.

f. The Court, understandably, could not conceive that K&R, Barr, Citibank, Feltman, FKM&F, and NKL&S would all perjure themselves, or conceal such larceny and perjury.

g. Consequently, without giving Raffe pre-trial disclosure, as he demanded, Barr and Citibank obtained summary judgment against Raffe, and granted Raffe summary judgment over as against Puccini for \$475,425.86, and against Dann and Sorrentino, for \$316,950.57.

55. Such judgments, insofar as it affects petitioner's interests are null and void, and should be so declared.

AS AND FOR A TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

56. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "55" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

57a. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, and much more, petitioner remained adamant, insisting that Puccini's judicial trust assets had been made the subject of larceny by K&R and NKL&S, and that nothing less than an inspection of its books and records would satisfy him.

b. Consequently, in order to sandbag such insistence by petitioner, Feltman, petitioned the Court for the appointment of RASHBA & POKART ["R&P"], Certified Public Accountants, to examine Puccini's financial books and records, for the purpose of answering four (4) simple questions, to wit:

(1) "whether the monies received [by him] are in fact all the monies due and owing to Puccini; (2) to determine whether the their assets set forth in the statement of June 30, 1980 have been properly accounted for; (3) whether an audit [was needed] ... in order to

determine whether the more than \$500,000 in inventory shown in a prior unaudited statement ... was disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner; and (4) whether the Receiver had all of Puccini's financial books and records".

c. A strong protest was registered concerning this proposed R&P appointment, with the claim that a pre-existing disqualifying relationship existed between R&P, K&R, and NKL&S.

d. On April 6, 1983, by Order of Hon. MARTIN H. RETTINGER, such appointment of R&P, as investigatory accountants was approved for the purpose of answering the aforementioned four (4) questions.

e. None of the involved parties disclosed, what was thereafter ascertained, to wit:

(1) K&R were clients of R&P.

(2) Prior thereto (a) there was an invoice outstanding against K&R in favor of R&P; (b) and in order to satisfy such indebtedness, NKL&S had unlawfully taken from Puccini's judicial trust assets the sum of \$10,000; (c) "laundered" such monies through its own bank account; (d) giving from such sum its own check in favor of R&P in satisfaction of such K&R indebtedness; (e) with NKL&S keeping for itself the sum of \$3,800, as a "laundering fee".

(3) Thereafter, to conceal such \$10,000 unlawful withdrawal from Puccini's trust assets, the disbursement was labelled "legal" by R&P.

f. Obviously, the appointment of R&P was made to conceal, not to reveal.

58. Such appointment of R&P to act, under "color of law", as investigatory accountants on behalf of Puccini, the helpless judicial trust, was and is a manifest nullity, should be so declared, and all monies paid to R&P or its attorneys, returned and/or the obligations cancelled.

AS AND FOR A ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

59. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "58" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

60. With petitioner and his client, Raffe, insisting that Feltman and FKM&F were engaged in criminal misconduct, "the criminals with law degrees" recognized that transfers of Puccini's remaining assets to FKM&F, in accordance with their corrupt agreement, faced obstacles.

61a. Consequently, under a corrupt Dennis v. Sparks (449 U.S. 24) arrangement with Judge DAVID B. SAXE, His Honor ordered that notwithstanding petitioner's and Raffe's vested interests in Puccini, they had no standing to oppose any application for fees and disbursements to FKM&F from Puccini.

b. Under the corrupt "Saxe scenario", FKM&F application for fees from Puccini, would be defended by Feltman, their senior partner.

c. Obviously neither Feltman, nor K&R, nor Barr, nor Citibank, nor NKL&S objected to any requests made by FKM&F for fees or disbursements from Puccini.

d. As a result of such corrupt judicial arrangement, all of Puccini's remaining assets were then or thereafter transferred to FKM&F, although it never did anything which inured or was intended to inure to Puccini's benefit.

62. Such transfer plundering or judicially staged larceny of assets from Puccini to FKM&F, or their co-conspirators, wherein petitioner was not permitted to participate in the proceedings, are for such and other reasons, void and of no effect as against petitioner, and should be so declared.

AS AND FOR A TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

63. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "62" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

64a. On November 7, 1983, three and one-half years after Puccini was involuntarily dissolved, petitioner, for the first time, was able to inspect a few of Puccini's books and records.

b. The few minutes of inspection revealed larceny of judicial trust assets far greater than petitioner ever conceived to have taken place.

c. Every category of Puccini's assets had been ravished and raped, with unabated arrogance, by the K&R conspirators.

d. Such larceny of Puccini's judicial trust assets did not cease on January 5, 1980, the date of the Order of Hon. EDWARD J. GREENFIELD, as petitioner had previously assumed, but continued for about another seven (7) months.

e. Instructively, the inspected records revealed that the K&R "criminals" were stealing and denying same had or was occurring at one and the same time.

65a. Citibank is a financial institution of great wealth, power, and clout, and Feltman, a judicial appointee, and/or his law firm, had friends in the judicial and/or political hierarchy.

b. They and their co-conspirators had clearly engaged themselves in base and arrogant criminal activities, compelling the irresistible conclusion, that if exposed they could rely upon high level assistance.

c. It was manifestly obvious from the disclosures of November 7, 1983, and those surfacing shortly thereafter, that Judge DAVID B. SAXE ["Saxe"], had clearly been corrupted.

d. The probability that Mr. Justice ALVIN F. KLEIN ["Klein"], Judge MARTIN H. RETTINGER ["Rettinger"], and others, had also been corrupted, were also manifestly evident.

e. The aforementioned jurists did not have significant power that the situation demanded.

66a. Petitioner and Raffe moved, in state and federal court, to rectify the damages caused to them by the Kreindler-Feltman conspiracy, which judicial actions inured to the benefit of Puccini, Dann, and Sorrentino.

b. The Kreindler-Feltman firms sought the protection of corrupt members of the judiciary, which in its initial stage included Administrator XAVIER C. RICCOBONO ["Riccobono"] of Supreme Court, New York County, and District Judge EUGENE H. NICKERSON, of the Eastern District of New York.

67a. At the time that Administrator Riccobono determined to involve himself and his office as an active conspirator to the Kreindler-Feltman "criminals" there was pending in Supreme Court motions and proceedings which would have essentially rectified the wrongdoing that had been committed by the "criminals with law degrees"

b. Such motions included those which were pending before Acting Supreme Court Justice ETHEL B. DANZIG ["Danzig"], Acting Supreme Court Justice RICHARD S. LANE ["Lane"], and Supreme Court Justice ALFRED M. ASCIONE ["Ascione"], all of which had irresistible compelling relief.

68a. Administrator Riccobono's assignment in this criminal adventure was to stonewall all restitution to the victims of the Kreindler-Feltman conspiracy, including to Puccini, the judicial trust.

b. For that purpose Administrator Riccobono had to (1) abort all of the aforementioned pending motions and proceedings by petitioner and Raffe; (2) corrupt various justices of the Supreme Court, New York County, and other courts; (3) and neutralize or render inert the mandatory and discretionary functions of Abrams and his office.

c. For that purpose Administrator Riccobono -- "Corruption Incarnate" -- by ex parte ukase designated Referee DONALD DIAMOND ["Diamond"], who at best, had very limited authority (CPLR §4317[b]).

69a. Pending unopposed before Hon. ETHEL DANZIG was a motion which sought to cancel the aforementioned judgment in favor of Barr and Citibank against Raffe, and also, as part thereof, Raffe's judgment over against Puccini of almost \$500,000, and his judgment against Dann and Sorrentino.

b. Referee Diamond, in corrupt cooperation with the "criminals with law degrees", invaded the sovereign bailiwick of Hon. ETHEL DANZIG, and directed Her Honor to abort such unopposed motion.

70a. Pending also was petitioner's motion seeking to cancel the judgment of Barr and Citibank against Raffe for approximately \$32,000, and as part thereof, Raffe claim over as against Puccini, Dann, and Sorrentino.

b. The papers submitted by K&R stated no defense to such motion, and included an admission that Barr and Citibank had received seventeen (17) checks from Puccini's judicial trust assets after June 4, 1980, which were not authorized by any receiver.

c. Included in such papers destined for Hon. RICHARD S. LANE was the further fact that for about seven (7) months about twelve (12) employees had completely liquidated Puccini's inventory, and only \$512 gross was not diverted from Puccini.

d. These papers were destroyed and/or secreted by Referee DONALD DIAMOND and never reached Hon. RICHARD S. LANE.

71a. Hon. ALFRED M. ASCIONE order^{ed} a full and complete inquiry into the Puccini matter.

b. Such inquiry was never held, and Administrator Riccobono and Referee Diamond corruptly induced Judge Ascione to certify to the contrary.

72. In each and everyone of the aforementioned situations, although the proceedings inured to the benefit of Puccini, Dann, and Sorrentino, Feltman, FKM&F, and NKL&S opposed same.

73. By reason of the aforementioned, insofar as the interests of petitioner are concerned, the aforementioned motions should be deemed granted, and so declared.

AS AND FOR A THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

74. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "73" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

75a. In early January of 1984, petitioner, communicated with Puccini's statutory fiduciary, Abrams, and it was Cook, who responded on Abrams behalf.

b. Cook executed the statutory fiduciary responsibilities on behalf of Abrams with respect to involuntarily dissolved corporation, including with respect to Puccini.

c. Petitioner's and Abrams' interests in Puccini was exactly parallel with Cook, there was, during the months that followed, an intense and detailed exchange of information, confidential and otherwise.

d. Petitioner's right to complain to the appropriate governmental authorities concerning official misconduct is constitutionally protected (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1; N.Y.S. Constitution, Article 1 §9), and a professional obligation (N.Y. Disciplinary Rule 1-103).

e. Since judicial obedience to the mandatory provisions of 22 NYCRR §660.24[f] was a less draconian remedy to outright "whistle blowing" concerning judicial misconduct, petitioner initially opted for that route.

f. It happened that neither FKM&F nor R&P had been appointed pursuant to 22 NYCRR §660.24, petitioner moved the Appellate Division to mandate that the Justices of the Supreme Court give obedience to 22 NYCRR §660.24[f], which provided:

"Any appointment made without following the procedures provided in this section, shall be null and of no effect, and no person so appointed shall be entitled to recover any compensation for the services rendered or claimed to have been rendered."

g. Cook, after receiving approval from the OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION ["OCA"], essentially consented to petitioner's application, which proceeding was then focused on the activities of the corrupt Judge SAXE on behalf of the "criminals with law degrees".

h. Notwithstanding the mandatory, non-discretionary, nature of the rule, and the position taken by the OCA concerning its obedience, the corrupt Judge SAXE, awarded the requested fees to FKM&F and R&P, notwithstanding that FKM&F did absolutely nothing intended to advance Puccini's interests.

i. Thereafter when petitioner, on behalf of Puccini, commenced an action against Judge SAXE for violating the aforementioned mandatory rule, permitting no discretion whatsoever, Administrator RICCOBONO ["Corruption Incarnate"] dragooned Cook to represent Judge SAXE, while Cook was simultaneously acting as Puccini's statutory fiduciary, a representation approved by Abrams.

j. In such legal representation of Judge Saxe brought by Puccini, Cook took with him petitioner's confidential information concerning Saxe's corruption.

76a. Thereafter, Cook, or one of his alter egos, generally Slonim, exclusively represented members of the state judiciary, although in each instance such optional representation was contrary to Puccini's interests, while simultaneously Cook was acting as Puccini's statutory representative.

b. Such perfidious representation of Puccini by Cook, Slonim, or one of their other alter egos from Abrams office was thereafter extended to a representation of Presiding Justice Murphy, Chief Administrator, JOSEPH W. BELLACOSA ["Bellacosa"], and their thrall.

c. In each and every instance Abrams and his office overtly betrayed the helpless and voiceless Puccini, in favor of the vocal members of a corrupt state judiciary, both in the state and federal courts.

77. By reason of the aforementioned, all legal proceedings involving Puccini, since June 4, 1980, where Abrams and/or his office betrayed Puccini, is null, void, and of no legal effect insofar as petitioner is involved.

AS AND FOR A FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

78. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "77" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

79a. The assignment by Abrams of Cook to represent the state judiciary in opposition to the Puccini interests, after the dragooning request of such simultaneous and conflicting representation was made by the state judiciary only came after petitioner was informed by Cook that the entire fiduciary responsibilities by Abrams with regard to involuntarily dissolved corporations was a corrupt fraud.

b. As part of the entire process wherein petitioner informed Cook of the corrupt practices of "the criminals with law degrees" and their cadre of corrupt judges in the Puccini matter, as was petitioner's constitutional right and professional responsibility, Cook supplied petitioner with information concerning the practices and procedures of Abrams with respect to such trust assets in the "Riccobono bailiwick".

c. In short, statutes and rules notwithstanding, as a matter of agreed policy, Abrams and his office, as a pattern of continuous racketeering corruption never interfered with the practices in the "Riccobono court", no matter how egregious the situation or imposing the fiduciary responsibility.

d. Thus, as an example, at no time did Abrams or anyone on his behalf, including Cook, ever police the judicial trust assets of involuntarily dissolved corporations in order to determine if disbursements were being made in violation of 22 NYCRR §660.24[f].

e. Insofar as such mandatory, or other rules or statutes may be, they are disobeyed by Abrams and his office.

f. Indeed, as initially revealed in the forum of District Judge EUGENE H. NICKERSON, Abrams and his office will affirmatively cooperate in such pattern of racketeering practices when and where necessary.

80a. Superimposed on such confidential information was the fact that the Kreindler-Feltman "thieves" were openly boasting that they "controlled" the state and federal judiciary, and that such judiciary were giving obedience to their private desires and requests.

b. The objective evidence by various members of the judiciary, as well as other confidential information, confirmed the fact that such state of corruption existed, as a pattern of misconduct.

81. By virtue of the aforementioned the judicial proceedings involving Puccini, state and federal, are consequently null, void, and of no effect, insofar as petitioner's interests are concerned.

AS AND FOR A FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

82. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "81" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

83. The first federal jurist significantly involved in Puccini related litigation was District Judge EUGENE H. NICKERSON ["Nickerson"].

84a. In such §1983 complaint, which was commenced within a few months after the surfacing of the "hard evidence" concerning the larceny of Puccini's judicial trust assets, Raffae sued on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of Puccini.

b. Defendants, on opposing relief to, inter alia, Puccini ^{were} ~~was~~ those who owed this helpless judicial trust fiduciary obligations, to wit, Feltman, R&P, and Abrams.

c. Under the admitted facts revealed and known at that point in time, it was simply impossible to legitimately have dismissed such action summarily, which was the ultimate action taken by Judge Nickerson.

d. Justice and judges, as a pattern of racketeering activity are simply purchased and/or otherwise corrupted, at least within the bailiwick of the Second Circuit, federal and state, insofar as "the criminals with law degrees" and Citibank interests are concerned.

85. The general pattern of continuous racketeering activity, which includes mail and wire fraud as procedural vehicles, covers bribery and extortion, punishable by New York and New Jersey law by imprisonment for more than one year, obstructing of justice, obstructing of criminal investigation, federal extortion and racketeering proscribed by §§1951-1952, and title 11 fraud, are in part as follows:

a. The trust responsibilities, including those of a mandatory nature, are abandoned by Abrams and his office, to the point wherein they assume positions completely contrary to the interests of the trust involved.

b. Those who are appointed as agents or fiduciaries of the judicial system are generally the political and/or social cronies of the judiciary, and they are permitted, with impunity, to unlawfully siphon assets of such judicial trust for the eventual personal benefit of the judiciary, and/or their cronies.

c. In addition thereto, those associated with financial institutions, such as Citibank, make various financial contributions, whose^{se} purpose include the corruption and obstruction of justice.

d. Criminal investigation and prosecution is avoided, as an initial matter, by having the State Attorney General's Office and the U.S. Attorney represent the judiciary in the civil litigation.

e. The legitimate judicial remedies are perverted for purposes of blackmail and extortion, so as to impose on the victims draconian monetary fines and penalties, and even criminal convictions and incarcerations, without benefit of trial.

86a. By June 1985, from Cook and others, the "criminals with law degrees" and the more corrupt elements within the judiciary were aware that petitioner had within his knowledge the essential elements of the criminal and corrupt activity that was being practiced in the "halls of justice".

b. The "criminals with law degrees", Citibank, and their cadre of corrupt judges and officials, in order to blackmail and extort, were ready to impose a "parade of horrors" upon petitioner, Raffe, and SAM POLUR, Esq. ["Polur"]:

c. It is blackletter law one cannot be convicted and incarcerated without benefit of trial, absent a plea of guilty, including for non-summary criminal contempt in either the federal or state judicial systems (Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194).

d. Nevertheless, in a concerted federal and state judicial scenario, commencing with Judge Nickerson, in that one month, without benefit of trial, petitioner was convicted three (3) times, Raffe two (2) times, and Polur one (1) time.

87a. Petitioner refused to succumb to the extortion demands made by his private prosecutors (cf. Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 2124), and has been repeatedly convicted and incarcerated, each time without benefit of a trial or hearing, or opportunity for same.

b. Based upon such trialess convictions, which petitioner was not permitted to controvert, and his exposure of judicial corruption, which the judiciary called "frivolous litigation", petitioner was disbarred (Grievance Committee v. G. Sassower (125 A.D.2d 52, 512 N.Y.S.2d 203 [2d Dept.])).

88a. Polur refused to succumb, and he also was incarcerated.

b. When disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him, by the Murphy controlled Grievance Committee, based upon such trialess conviction, Polur left the scene.

89a. Raffe in exchange for paying millions in cash and other considerations to the "criminals with law degrees", Barr and Citibank, and to the state and federal jurists, was never incarcerated.

b. According to the signed agreement which he was blackmailed into signing, as long as he obeys the desires of FKM&F he will not be incarcerated.

90a. Since repeated incarcerations pursuant to trialess convictions, and other draconian plagues could not compel petitioner to succumb, attempts were instituted in 1985 to frustrate petitioner's efforts at revealing judicial corruption.

b. In 1986 such efforts reached vertiginous heights when repeated Orders were directed to the Sheriff of Westchester County directing him to "break into" petitioner's premises, "seize all word processing equipment" and "inventory" his possessions, which the Sheriff refused to obey.

c. The aforementioned "break in" Orders and other plagues visited upon petitioner were aborted when petitioner filed a petition in bankruptcy on October 27, 1986 in the Southern District of New York.

91. All of the aforementioned, manifestly unconstitutional procedures should be declared null, void, and without force and effect.

AS AND FOR A SIXTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

92. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "91" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

93a. In the aforementioned bankruptcy proceedings, Feltman, on behalf of Puccini and FKM&F; K&R, on behalf of itself and the Kaufman Estate; and IRA POSTEL, Esq. ["Postel"] on behalf of A.R. FUELS, INC. ["A.R."] filed Proofs of Claims of almost twenty-one million dollars (\$21,000,000), which included those based on the "phantom" judgments of Referee DONALD DIAMOND.

b. The aforementioned proofs of claims were executed and filed after the aforementioned were assured that for such fraudulent filings there would be no repercussions from Hon. HOWARD SCHWARTZBERG ["Schwartzberg"], JEFFREY L. SAPIR, Esq. ["Sapir"], the Chapter 7 trustee, or the office of the U.S. Attorney, RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI ["Giuliani"].

c. As a result of the "White Plains judicial massacre", where the "phantom" judgments proved to be non-existent, all of the aforementioned claims were withdrawn.

d. The withdrawal of such claims made the petitioner eligible for Chapter 13 relief, and he consequently converted the proceeding from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13.

e. As a Chapter 13 debtor, petitioner was able to file an involuntary petition against Puccini, which Sapir failed and refused to execute, and demand an accounting, which were assigned to Hon. HOWARD BUSCHMAN III ["Buschman"].

f. As a result thereof, "marching orders" were issued to Judge Schwartzberg, Judge Buschman, Sapir, and HAROLD JONES ["Jones"], the United States Trustee.

94a. In a corruptly secured pre-prepared "no notice" scenario, Judge Schwartzberg was "directed" to reconvert petitioner's Chapter 13 status to Chapter 7, which His Honor obeyed.

b. Similar "marching orders" were given to Judge Buschman, with respect to the Puccini litigation.

c. Petitioner, subsequently informed of such "marching orders" partially frustrated their manifest purpose by waiving discharge.

d. Supplemental "marching orders" were given to Jones, Sapir, and Judge Schwartzberg to close petitioner's estate by falsely executing documents stating that it was a "no asset" estate, which they all knew was a false certification.

e. In addition thereto, Chief Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT ["Brieant"], after District Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER ["Conner"] was caught in still another "fix", also issued "marching orders".

95a. Immediately upon the closing of petitioner's estate based upon the aforementioned false certification, petitioner refiled under Chapter 13, as was his absolute right.

b. On refiling, petitioner moved for a change of venue, based on the assertion and showing that the Southern District of New York was "Unfit for Human Litigation".

c. Sapir and Judge Howard Schwartzberg, obviously agreed!

96. The proceedings before Hon. Howard Schwartzberg should be declared a nullity, and without force or legal effect.

AS AND FOR A SEVENTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

97. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "96" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

98a. Notwithstanding the "marching orders" given to Hon. Howard Schwartzberg, the practice of extortion by FKM&F employing His Honor's judicial facilities, simply became intolerable, and His Honor disqualified FKM&F from representing multiple adverse interests at Raffe's expense.

b. The orders of Hon. Howard Schwartzberg notwithstanding, Raffe directly and/or indirectly is still compelled to pay extortion, aided and abetted in this unlawful adventure by Referee DONALD DIAMOND.

99. Raffe must be enjoined from making all payments for legal services which do not inure to his legitimate interests, and all monies so paid must be ordered returned.

AS AND FOR A EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

100. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "99" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

101. The claims on which proofs of claim were filed in the bailiwick of Hon. Howard Schwartzberg by Feltman, K&R, and Postel, as aforesaid, should be declared null and void, and no suit should be permitted in any state or federal court unless there validity can be demonstrated in this proceeding.

AS AND FOR A EIGHTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

102. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "101" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

103. Employing the mails and wire communication facilities, the fraudulent racketeering practices are being continued in New Jersey, and in the courtroom of Hon. DANIEL J. MOORE.

104a. With actual knowledge of the unlawfulness of the practice, C&E and ROTHBARD, ROTHBARD & KOHN, Esqs. ["RR&K"], are representing multiple parties, with inconsistent interests, and are being compensated by monies extorted from Raffe in New York.

b. Such purported services being performed by C&E and RR&K include the corruption of governmental officials, including those in the office of United States Trustee HUGH LEONARD ["Leonard"].

c. HOWARD M. BERGSON, Esq. ["Bergson"] has replaced Postel as the conduit for the extortion of such payments from Raffe.

105a. Howard and JOHN J. SCURA, Esq. ["Scura"] have fiduciary obligations to petitioner's Chapter 13 Estate, a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States and must be directed to advance, not defeat, the interests of such "person".

b. Similarly, SCHNECK & WELTMAN, Esqs ["S&W"] and Sills, as representatives of R&P, fiduciaries of Puccini, have legal and ethical obligations to candidly reveal the financial fraud being perpetrated in the Title 11 proceedings.

c. Furthermore, the United States Attorney, SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. ["Alito"], must recognize that his primary obligation is to enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and he must be enjoined from involving his office in civil litigation which may compromise his criminal enforcement obligations, particularly when they involved "criminal racketeering", within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961, et seq.

106. The proceedings before Hon. Daniel J. Moore have been so manifestly pervaded by fraud, corruption, and extrinsic fraud, they must be declared null, void, and of no legal effect.

AS AND FOR A NINETEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

107. Petitioner repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation of this petition marked "1" through "106" inclusive, with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein, and further alleges.

108a. In a depraved and manifestly unlawful scenario, orchestrated by the Office of DENIS DILLON ["Dillon"] and "the criminals with law degrees", receiving the tacit cooperation of Hon. Daniel J. Moore, the ability of petitioner to properly present his case, has been clearly obstructed.

b. In February and March 1988, without notice or warning, the petitioner was arrested in Westchester County, unlawfully taken to Nassau County, without being brought before a Westchester County judge, as legally required, and incarcerated in Nassau County.

c. Based upon a false and perjurious application, more than fifty (50) floppy discs, and many documents were seized from petitioner, none of which revealed any criminal activity by petitioner, and certainly not within the jurisdictional bailiwick of Dillon.

d. The intentional caused disarray of petitioner's papers has almost totally obstructed petitioner from properly functioning in the judicial forum, including in the forum of Hon. Daniel J. Moore, and is clearly an extrinsic fraud of the first magnitude.

109. Superimposed on the aforementioned is the almost total disobedience of the automatic stay provisions contained in 11 U.S.C. §362, and other intolerable administrative burdens placed on petitioner by Hon. Daniel J. Moore.


110. With knowledge that Hon. Daniel J. Moore will not take any measures against them, the firms of REISMAN, PEIREZ, REISMAN, & CALICA, Esqs. ["Reisman"]; Berlin; and CAHN, WISHOD, WISHOD & LAMB, Esqs. ["Cahn"], the aforementioned firms simply are disobeying directions of His Honor, advancing a judicial fraud by filing of papers in New York, with false affidavits of service, and otherwise advancing the criminal activities of the ANTHONY MASTROIANNI ["Mastroianni"], Suffolk County [N.Y.] entourage.

111. Everyone seems to accept the proposition that Hon. Daniel J. Moore has or will accept "marching orders" which have originated in New York.

112. Unless drastic equitable intervention is asserted, the Constitution of the United States will have been effectively modified so as to read that "judicial racketeering and corruption" is the "supreme law of the land".

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that relief be declared in accordance with this complaint.

Dated: April 3, 1988



GEORGE SASSOWER
Petitioner, pro se.