

(supra) or not afforded ^{the victim} a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal ^{to defend the false charges} in order to controvert (Toker v. Pollak, (supra).

2. The constitutional right of "due process" is basically a concept of fair play, i.e., notice and opportunity to respond. Prohibiting me from responding to the published defamation of Signorelli or the ^{republished} Assistant Attorney General, with my decisive evidence on the subject, ^{is} ^{repugnant to our Anglo-Saxon} plainly violates procedural and substantive concepts of due process.

3a. The immunity to defame third persons in the judicial forum has received authoritative evaluation in (Wels v. Rubin, 280 N.Y. 233; Moore v. Manufacturers, 123 N.Y. 420; Battu v. Smoot, 211 App. Div. 1011, 206 N.Y. Supp. 780 [1st Dept.]; Rusciano v. Mihalyfi, 165 Misc. Rep. 932, 1 N.Y.S.2d 787 [Sup., Bx.]; Anonymous v. Trenkman, 48 F.2d 571 [2d Cir.]; Potter v. Troy, 175 F. 128 [2d Cir.]; Union v. Thomas, 83 F. 803 [9th Cir.]; Laun v. Union, 350 Mo. 572, 166 SW2d 1065, 144 ALR 622).

Unquestionably, I was legally a third person, ^{not a} ^{third party named wherein} in the litigation ^{are plaintiffs} involving my wife and daughter in Supreme Court, Westchester County, since in some of the forementioned cases a substantially similar nexus existed. In Moore, the third party was one who allegedly

do
not
understand
what your
point is
here