In The SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1992 No. 92-

GEORGE SASSOWER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

-against-

U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT,

Respondent-Appellee.

In the Matter of a Grand Jury
Application by
GEORGE SASSOWER individually and on
behalf of the GRAND JURY FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-against-

MICHAEL D. CRITES, U.S. Attorney, Defendant-Appellee.

In the Matter of the Application of GEORGE SASSOWER,

Petitioner-Appellant,
-against-

.....x

D. MICHAEL CRITES and WILLIAM P. BARR,

Respondent-Appellee.
For a Writ of Mandamus and
Prohibition

_____x

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT

RULE 23 STAY APPLICATION

This affirmation, made under penalty of perjury, is in support of a motion: (1) to stay the dismissal of affirmant's appeal against respondent, U.S. Attorney MICHAEL D. CRITES ("Crites") by reason of affirmant's inability to pay the appeal fee of \$105; (2) to stay the dismissal of affirmant's appeal against respondents, U.S. Attorney "Crites" and Attorney

General of the United States WILLIAM P. BARR ["Barr"] by reason of affirmant's inability to pay the appeal fee of \$105; (3) to mandamus respondent, the U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ["CCA6"] to issue a writ of mandamus to the U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO (Cincinnati), directing it to process affirmant's complaint and his unopposed application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, dated June 15, 1992, which requests, inter alia:

"ORDERED, that on or before July 1, 1992, and each and every month thereafter, until further Order of this Court, as a preliminary mandatory injunction, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of \$500, as the estimated cost for litigating his matters in this [Sixth] Circuit, debiting plaintiff's money judgment against PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. for such payment, unless within ten days after service of these papers, there is a showing made to this Court that they neither KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. nor FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs., are liable to plaintiff for such monies, and it is further

ORDERED that unless FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND shows a valid discharge of its obligations to the court-appointed receiver of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., free of fraud and corruption, with jurisdiction over plaintiff, then FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND shall be liable for any and all payments directed to made under this temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and it is further

ORDERED, that on or before July 1, 1992, as a preliminary mandatory injunction, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. shall turn over to the Clerk of this Court all monies, together with the appropriate interest, which were payable 'to the federal court' but which were diverted to itself and/or its clients, and it is further

ORDERED, as a preliminary injunction, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. are enjoined from making any demands upon HYMAN RAFFE for any part of the above payments or for any litigation in this matter."

(4) to mandamus CCA6 to resort to affirmant's collectable assets to pay for all filing fees due that Court by affirmant; (5) to have independent counsel appointed to represent the rights and interests of the grand jury in Sassower v. Crites; (6) to have the independent counsel represent the rights and interests of the United States in this Court, in the event the Solicitor General of the United States defaults or opposes, the recapture of monies in favor of the United States which were diverted to the private pockets of KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. ["K&R"] and its client and defaults or opposes the collection of fees due CCA6 from affirmant from his assets; (7) an inquiry into the corrupt state of judicial affairs in the Sixth Circuit including the participation of Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge GILBERT S. MERRITT ["Merritt"] in such conspiratorial corruption; (8) together with such other, further and/or different relief as to this Court may seem just and proper in the premises.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

- 1. This application is the first of several interrelated applications from Sixth Circuit, to be considered in tandem with each other, and with repetition avoided where feasible.
- 2. In view of the serious charges contained herein, something more than a "short as possible" statement is warranted, with service being made on everyone named herein or their attorney, and their response specifically solicited.

THE FACTS.

- la. Exhibit "A" is a copy of a wholly unsatisfied, contractually based, constitutionally protected, judgment in favor of affirmant against PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. ["Puccini"] which, with interest, exceeds \$50,000.
- b(1) Affirmant also has a contractually based, constitutionally protected, obligation in his favor, which is not Puccini related, where the corporate obligor is judicially estopped from disputing that less than \$120,000 is due affirmant.
- (2) The principal of this corporate obligor, HYMAN RAFFE ["Raffe"], has been threatened with incarceration, if he voluntarily pays affirmant such monies, or any part thereof.
- c. Affirmant has other very substantial assets, contractual and otherwise, in his favor.
- 2a. All of Puccini's assets were made the subject of larceny by the entourage of KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. ["K&R"] and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FELTMAN, Esqs. ["FKM&F"], which entourage includes a number of judges, state and federal, and in particular Chief U.S. District Court Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT ["Brieant"] of the Southern District of New York and N.Y. State Presiding Justice FRANCIS T. MURPHY ["Murphy"] of the Appellate Division, First Department.
- b(1) For resisting and exposing judicial corruption, including in the Puccini matter, an injunctive embargo has been placed against affirmant's access to the courts in the Second Circuit and elsewhere.
- (2) Indeed, for exposing the criminal racketeering activities of Chief Judge Brieant, without subject matter or

personal jurisdiction, or due process, affirmant has been physically excluded from the Federal Courthouse in White Plains
for more than three (3) years.

- c. Consequently, affirmant despite his substantial wealth, is caused to live in quasi-poverty, supported solely by Social Security payments, food stamps, and personal borrowing whose limits have long been exhausted.
- Ja. For more than two (2) months affirmant's complaint lies fallow in the U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO ["DC Ohio"], with its unopposed application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Exhibit "B"), which will provide affirmant, from his own assets, sufficient monies to pay filing fees and otherwise aid in vindicating his rights in the courts in the Sixth Circuit.
- b. Affirmant does not desire philanthropy from the United States or its courts in the form of in forma pauperis relief, but desires to pay the fees lawfully due from affirmant's own constitutionally protected asset, to wit., his money judgment against Puccini, whose assets were made the subject of larceny by the K&R-FKM&F entourage.
- c. As set forth in the recital clause of the aforementioned unopposed application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (Exhibit "B"):

"It appearing to the satisfaction of this Court that plaintiff has substantial, contractually based, assets, including a money judgment against PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., in the sum, with interest, of more than \$50,000, which asset is constitutionally protected by Article 1 \$10[1] and Amendment V of the United States Constitution; and it further appears that KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR &

FARBMAN, Esqs. have made all of the judicial trust assets of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. the subject of larceny, leaving nothing for its legitimate creditors, including plaintiff; and it further appears that in additional to other criminal activities, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. diverted monies payable "to the federal court" to private pockets, including monies paid on behalf of plaintiff; and it further appears that plaintiff is without liquid assets to pay necessary filing fees in the Courts of the Sixth Circuit, including the Circuit Court of Appeals, and that it would be unfair and inequitable, if not a fraud upon the federal purse to permit plaintiff to litigate his matters without paying the required filing fees due from all litigants; and due notice having been given to all the defendants named herein, it is".

- d. Until comparatively recently, the Sixth Circuit chose to defraud the federal purse of fees due it rather than deprive K&R and/or FKM&F of their criminal gains, by permitting affirmant to file without payment of any fees.
- e. Recently this policy has changed, and the Sixth Circuit, nisi prius and appellate, have demanded the payment of fees from affirmant (Exhibits "C" and "D"), while simultaneously preventing access by affirmant to his contractually based, constitutionally protected, money judgment against Puccini.
- f(1) When affirmant learned that his complaint in the SD Ohio was not being processed, and his unopposed application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was lying fallow, he commenced a mandamus proceeding in the Sixth Circuit, and the pertinent portions of the Court's decision of August 14, 1992 reads as follows (Exhibit "E"):

"In Case No. 92-8331, the petitioner once again seeks an order directing two New York law firms to pay the fees and expenses of his litigation in this court. This identical relief was rejected as frivolous by this court in two prior mandamus petitions -- Case Nos. 92-8314/8316 -- nearly a month before the present

petition was filed. Again, this petition is repetitive, frivolous and vexatious.

In Case No. 92-8336, the petitioner seeks an order directing the district court to grant a motion for a temporary restraining order in a new civil action submitted to that court. The purpose of the order would be to require the same two New York law firms to pay his fees and costs of litigation. This petition is frivolous and vexatious." [emphasis supplied]

- include the fact that affirmant desires K&R and FKM&F to pay the filing fees due, by debiting affirmant's own contractually based money judgment for such amount, under which they are liable by virtue of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (see Form 13, FRCivP).
- (3) When a bank check is tendered to a court for the payment of filing fees, it is true that the bank pays from its own monies when it honors such check, but it simultaneously debits the depositor's account for same.
- (4) As a filing from the Second Court will reveal, CCA6 is operating in conspiratorial consort with CCA6 in not permitting affirmant to liquidate his assets.
- makes g(1) Thus, affirmant faces dismissal of his appeals for his failure to pay the \$210, which he does not have, while simultaneously he is effectively being deprived of access to the court in order to liquidate his constitutionally protected money judgment.
- (2) Even if the Sixth Circuit concludes that it is estopped from demanding fees due affirmant under the aforementioned circumstances, that Circuit would be and has been

defrauding the federal purse, a right and power that affirmant has repeatedly stated the courts do not have.

- 4a. In affirmant's proceeding against U.S. Attorney Crites (Sassower v. Crites), affirmant has contended that he has a First Amendment, statutory, and common law right of access to the grand jury to petition that body and convey to it affirmant's evidence of criminal conduct.
- b. Concomitantly, affirmant asserts, the grand jury has the right to be informed of affirmant's information and evidence of criminal conduct, which it will not have if affirmant's appeal is dismissed for the lack of \$105.
- of conveying such information to the grand jury body, since he himself is involved in such criminal activity, as partially set forth hereinafter, and has gone to extreme lengths to prevent such access.
- d. Thus, if the grand jury is a pre-constitutional independent body, as this Court has held, they are entitled to independent representation on this application.
- e. Instructively, as the title of the proceeding indicates, the proceeding was brought by affirmant on his own behalf and "on behalf of the Grand Jury".
- 5a. Included in affirmant's complaint and injunction, which lies fallow in SD Ohio, is the following:

"ORDERED, ... KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. shall turn over to the Clerk of this Court all monies, together with the appropriate interest, which were payable 'to the federal court' but which were diverted to itself and/or its clients ...".

- b. It is a scandalous spectacle to witness U.S. Attorney Crites not supporting or opposing affirmant's efforts to have K&R turn over to the federal court monies, which includes monies paid on behalf of affirmant, payable "to the federal court" but diverted to private pockets.
- c. It is similarly scandalous if the Solicitor General of the United States does not support affirmant's efforts in this respect in this Court.
- d. The failure of the Solicitor General to actively support monetary relief in favor of the United States, compels this Court to appoint an attorney to protect the interests of the federal sovereign.
- In order to avoid incarcerations under criminal convictions, as suffered by affirmant and SAM POLUR, Esq. ["Polur"], Raffe paid and promised to pay very substantial considerations, monetarily and otherwise, to the K&R-FKM&F entourage.
- b. As independently investigated, reported and published by Mr. Jonathan Ferziger of United Press, International:
 - "By signing three extraordinary agreements in 1985, however, Raffe agreed to foot all legal costs incurred by Feltman's firm and Citibank's lawyers, Kreindler & Relkin, for defending against Sassower. In exchange, the court agreed to let him go free. The tab so far has come to more than \$2.5 million, paid to both the Feltman and Kreindler firms. Raffe continues to pay with checks from his A.R. Fuels Co. business. ... Attorney General Abrams ... saw copies of the checks. Abrams is the statutory watchdog over court-appointed receivers like Feltman." [emphasis supplied]

Thus, Raffe keeps paying in order not to be incarcerated, and so the <u>written</u> agreement reads.

- c. Extortion payments made in any American court is simply unacceptable to say the least.
- 7a. In <u>Sassower v. Crites and Barr</u>, affirmant attempted to enjoin federal representation, at federal cost and expense, for federal judges and officials who have not been "scope" certified.
- b. Obviously, neither Attorney General Barr nor U.S. Attorney Crites will issue a 28 <u>U.S.C.</u> \$2679[d] (28 <u>CFR</u> \$15.3) certificate for judges involved in diverting monies payable "to the federal court" to private pockets.
- c. Despite the lack of "scope" certificate or "scope" status, Attorney Crites, qua private attorney, at federal cost and expense, is defending these perfidious officials and judges.
- 8. To conceal and advance these criminal racketeering adventures, including its participation in same, CCA6 has good, but illegal, cause to dismiss affirmant's appeals for non-payment of fees, while simultaneously preventing affirmant from liquidating his assets.
- 9a. Affirmant has made repeated and numerous attempts at CCA6 to have 28 <u>U.S.C.</u> \$1254[2] certifications and Rule 23.3 stays, but CCA6 avoids making any determinations with respect to same (see Exhibit "E"). Bad faith by CCA6 clearly exists.
- b. Exhibit "E" is subject to a motion for a rehearing, particularly since it is factually incorrect, but such rehearing does not involve the issues involved herein to any

significant extent, except as the issue of overbreadth is involved.

Providing affirmant is afforded his constitutional right to liquidate his contractually based assets, including his money judgment, he does not object to the provision (Exhibit "E") that:

"ORDERED that the clerk not accept for filing any future original action submitted by the petitioner unless it is accompanied by the payment of the fee required for such a filing."

To repeat, affirmant desires and prefers to pay all fees due from his in the Sixth Circuit.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this application be granted, after affording those named herein, an opportunity to respond to the serious charges made herein.

Dated: September 2, 1992

Respectfully/submitted,

SASSOWER Pet/itione/r, pro se 16 Lake Street,

White Plains, New York, 10603 (914) 949-2169

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

On September 2, 1992 I served a true copy of this application by mailing same in a sealed envelope, first class, with proper postage thereon, addressed to U.S. Solicitor General, Kenneth W. Starr, Department of Justice, 10th & Constitution Ave., Washington, D.C. 20530; Hon. Gilbert S. Merritt, 100 East 5th Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202; D. Michael Crites, 85 Marconi Blvd., Columbus, Ohio 43215; Kreindler & Relkin, P.C. 350 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, 152 West 57th Street, New York, New York 10019; Robert Abrams, The Capitol, Albany, New York 12224; and Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, Charles and Lexington Streets, Box 1227, Baltimore, Maryland 21203; that being their last known addresses.

Dated: September 2, 1992

GEORGE SASSOWER

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Exhibit "A"

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

CEODGE GAGGONED

GEORGE SASSOWER,

Plaintiff,

Docket No.

-againstGILBERT S. MERRITT; D. MICHAEL CRITES; KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C.; FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN; ROBERT ABRAMS; FIDELITY & DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND; FRANCIS T. MURPHY; JAMES L. OAKES; and CHARLES L. BRIEANT,

Defendants.

It appearing to the satisfaction of this Court that plaintiff has substantial, contractually based, assets, including a money judgment against PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., in the sum, with interest, of more than \$50,000, which asset is constitutionally protected by Article 1 \$10[1] and Amendment V of the United States Constitution; and it further appears that KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. have made all of the judicial trust assets of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. the subject of larceny, leaving nothing for its legitimate creditors, including plaintiff; and it further appears that in additional to other criminal activities, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. diverted monies payable "to the federal court" to private pockets, including monies paid on behalf of plaintiff; and it further appears that plaintiff is without liquid assets to pay necessary filing fees in the Courts of the Sixth Circuit, including the Circuit Court of Appeals, and that it would be unfair and inequitable, if not a fraud upon the federal purse to permit plaintiff to litigate his matters without paying the required filing fees due from all litigants; and due notice having been given to all the defendants named herein, it is

Echibi "B"

ORDERED, as temporary mandatory restraining relief, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. are directed to pay to the Clerk of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, on or before June 22, 1992, the sum of \$210 as and for the filing fees due from plaintiff on two notices of appeal in Sassower v. Mead (Docket Numbers 92-3536/7), debiting plaintiff's money judgment against PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., unless before that date a showing is made to this Court that they are not liable to plaintiff for such monies, and it is further

ORDERED, that on or before July 1, 1992, and each and every month thereafter, until further Order of this Court, as a preliminary mandatory injunction, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of \$500, as the estimated cost for litigating his matters in this Circuit, debiting plaintiff's money judgment against PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. for such payment, unless within ten days after service of these papers, there is a showing made to this Court that they neither KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. nor FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs., are liable to plaintiff for such monies, and it is further

ORDERED, that on or before July 1, 1992, as a preliminary mandatory injunction, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs., shall pay to the Clerk of this Court the sum of \$120, as the filing fee in this action, debiting plaintiff's money judgment against PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., unless within ten days after service of these papers, there

is a showing made to this Court that neither KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. nor FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. are liable to plaintiff for such monies, and it is further

ORDERED, that on or before July 1, 1992, as a preliminary mandatory injunction, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. shall turn over to the Clerk of this Court all monies, together with the appropriate interest, which were payable "to the federal court" but which were diverted to itself and/or its clients, and it is further

ORDERED that unless FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND shows a valid discharge of its obligations to the court-appointed receiver of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., free of fraud and corruption, with jurisdiction over plaintiff, then FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND shall be liable for any and all payments directed to made under this temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and it is further

ORDERED, as a preliminary injunction, KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. are enjoined from making any demands upon HYMAN RAFFE for any part of the above payments or for any litigation in this matter.

Dated: Cincinnati, Ohio , 1992 at .m.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED

AUG 17 1992

GEORGE SASSOWER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

LEONARD GREEN, Clerk

٧.

QRDER

MICHAEL D. CRITES, U.S. Attorney,

Defendant-Appellee.

This matter is before the court for consideration of plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this appeal from the district court's order dismissing his petition to compel the United States Attorney to present certain matters to the Grand Jury. In bringing this action, the plaintiff, George Sassower, purported to rely on 18 U.S.C. §§ 1504 and 3332(a). The district court determined that the statutory authorities on which Sassower relied did not apply in this case. The petition was dismissed.

Upon consideration, it is determined that an appeal in this case would be frivolous for the reasons stated by the district court. The motion for pauper status is denied. Sassower is advised that he must pay the filing fee within fourteen days of the entry date of this order or the appeal will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Georard Green, g' Clerk

Exhibit "C"

UNITED STATES COURT OF AFFERES

SIXTH CIRCUIT

LEONARD GREEN

538 U.S. POST OFFICE & COURTHOUSE BUILDING CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3088 TELEPHONE (513) 684-2953 FTS 684-2953

August 21, 1992

George Sassower 16 Lake Street White Plains, NY 10603

> RE: Case No. 92-3852 Sassower vs. Crites District Court No. 92-00151

We have today docketed the above-styled case and assigned it case number 92-3852 .

On 5/13/92 the district court denied your request for pauper status. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, you must now either pay the filing fee of \$105.00 to the Clerk of the District Court or renew in this court your motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis no later than 9/4/92. The motion must also include a copy of the completed financial affidavit filed in District Court or a completed affidavit showing your inability to pay fees or costs. Enclosed is a CJA 23 form for your use and/or reference. Please note that all the questions contained in the CJA form must be answered fully and must be signed and served on the opposing party.

Since the rules do not provide for extensions of time to properly execute a request for pauper status, no extensions will be granted. Accordingly, your attention to format and time is essential. Failure to comply with the above requirements will result in the dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution, without further notice.

Barbara J. Burns Case Supervisor

Enclosures: CJA 23

Rule 24, FRAP

Exhibir """

Nos. 92-8329/8331/8336

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

AUG 14 1992

LEONARD GREEN, Clerk

In re: GEORGE SASSOWER

Petitioner.

ORDER

BEFORE: KENNEDY and JONES, Circuit Judges; and CELEBREZZE,

Senior Circuit Judge.

The petitioner has submitted to this court three separate petitions for writs of mandamus seeking various directives to the district court in reference to civil actions he has filed or submitted therein. In response, the district court has submitted a partial response to the petition in Case No. 92-8329. No responses to the remaining petitions are necessary.

The petitioner seeks two forms of relief in Case No. 92-8329. He first asks this court to direct the district court to "expeditiously grant and prosecute" two complaints he has submitted therein, i.e., complaints against the Dayton Bar Association and the Columbus Bar Association, respectively. The complaint against the Dayton Bar Association was docketed as Dist. No. 3:92-MC-11 and remains on the docket, delayed by an interlocutory appeal taken by the petitioner. The district court states it will act upon the complaint once that delay is removed. The complaint against the Columbus Bar Association was received by the

Fighibil "E".

district court but has not been filed because the petitioner did not submit the proper forms. The matter remains in that posture. Neither of these situations calls for immediate intervention by this court.

In the second portion of the petition in Case No. 92-8329, the petitioner asserts that "no judicial action has resulted" from an application for a grand jury presentation he submitted to the district court. That is not true. The application was docketed as Dist. No. 3:92-MC-12 and denied on May 29, 1992. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal from that denial on June 10, 1992, i.e., nearly a month before he filed the present petition. This portion of the petition is frivolous and vexatious.

In Case No. 92-8331, the petitioner once again seeks an order directing two New York law firms to pay the fees and expenses of his litigation in this court. This identical relief was rejected as frivolous by this court in two prior mandamus petitions -- Case Nos. 92-8314/8316 -- nearly a month before the present petition was filed. Again, this petition is repetitive, frivolous and vexatious.

In Case No. 92-8336, the petitioner seeks an order directing the district court to grant a motion for a temporary restraining order in a new civil action submitted to that court. The purpose of the order would be to require the same two New York law firms to pay his fees and costs of litigation. This petition is frivolous and vexatious.

In an order of February 24, 1992, disposing of four mandamus petitions filed by the petitioner, we included the following warning:

We take judicial notice . . . of the petitioner's past abuse of legal process in other courts which have led to his disbarment as a practicing attorney, see In the Matter of George Sassower, F. Supp. 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), and to injunctions enjoining his filing of future actions without prior leave of court. See, e.g., Sassower v. Carlson, 930 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Sassower v. Sansverie, 885 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Because the present petitions border on the frivolous, we put the petitioner on notice that repeated abuse of this court's docket by the filing of multiple and/or vexatious original petitions can result in the permanent revocation of pauper status herein. See, e.g., Maxberry v. SEC, 879 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

In an order of June 10, 1992, this court repeated that warning in an order disposing of five more mandamus petitions and directed the clerk not to accept any future mandamus petitions relating to the three actions in which the district court had entered final orders. A tenth mandamus petition was denied by this court on June 23, 1992.

The present mandamus petitions are the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth the petitioner has filed in a seven month period. All have been without merit. Many, such as the petitions we address today, are repetitious, frivolous, and/or vexatious. Together, they constitute an undue burden upon and an abuse of this court's docket. Because all these petitions have been denied or dismissed summarily, the petitioner has not been required to pay the normal filing fee or to demonstrate his indigency. Instead, he has

repeatedly attempted to shift the burden of payment to third parties. This abuse must end.

It therefore is ORDERED that the present petitions for writs of mandamus are all denied. It is further ORDERED that the clerk not accept for filing any future original action submitted by the petitioner unless it is accompanied by the payment of the fee required for such a filing.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Glorard Green, in Clerk