In the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1992 No. 92-8934

GEORGE SASSOWER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC.; JAMES L. OAKES;
GEORGE C. PRATT; CHARLES L. BRIEANT;
WILLIAM C. CONNER; EUGENE H. NICKERSON;
GERARD L. GOETTEL; FRANCIS T. MURPHY; 16
LAKE STREET OWNERS, INC.; LAWRENCE J.
GLYNN; KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C.; CITIBANK,
N.A.; FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN;
ROBERT ABRAMS, and DENIS DILLON,
Respondents-Appellees.

- 1a. This affirmation, made under penalty of perjury, is in support of this Rule 21.1[b] motion which, if granted, will be entirely dispositive of this matter.
- b. Incorporated by reference, without needless repetition, is affirmant's simultaneously submitted motion under Application of Sassower (Docket No. 92-8933).
- 2a. Obviously, the grant of affirmant's motion under Application of Sassower (supra), will cause the automatic grant of this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
- b. However this dispositive motion rests on its own independent grounds, and its significance lies in the exposure of the means employed to corrupt and pervert judges and the machinery of justice.

- 3a. The modus operandi of the New York Second Circuit judiciary is to publish fabricated and deceptive opinions, lacking subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and/or due process, causing constitutional injuries, and then have them republished and distributed by MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC. ["Lexis"] and WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY ["West"/"Westlaw"] to facilitate the corruption of other courts and judges.
- b. In order to protect these jurisdictionally and constitutionally infirm opinions, entitled to no legal respect in any jurisdiction, the victims are then effectively denied access to the courts, state and federal, in the New York Second Circuit courts, even when relief is constitutionally and ministerially compelled (e.g., habeas corpus, coram nobis, FRCivP Rule 60(b)[4][6]).
- c. To insure that such infirm decisions are given "full faith and credit", albeit not entitled to any, "the robe" is employed as an emolument of office to fix and corrupt other jurists and circuits.
- the New York Second Circuit judiciary and effectively denied access to those courts, commenced an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, ["SD Oh"] the principal place of business of Lexis, in order to enjoin its republication and distribution of constitutionally injurious false material and/or where those published defamatory decisions lack subject matter and personal jurisdiction and due process.

b. At no time did Lexis, whose republishing activities can be fairly attributed to the judicial branch of government, claim any First Amendment rights or privileges, or claim immunity from equitable relief (cf. <u>Doe v McMillan</u>, 412 U.S. 306 [1973]).

THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

- with non-summary criminal contempt with respect to PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. ["Puccini"], with results other than guilty, each attempt triggering "double jeopardy" constitutional and/or statutory double jeopardy prohibitions.
- b. Since there was no possible legal way that affirmant could be found guilty, if he were afforded any due process, during a three (3) week period in June 1985, in an attempt to silence affirmant and others with respect to the larceny of Puccini's judicial trust assets by the judiciary and its cronies, affirmant was convicted three (3) times by the by the New York Second Circuit judiciary, with substantial fines and/or terms of incarceration imposed.
- without the opportunity for a trial, without any confrontation rights, in absentia, without due process, without the right of allocution, without any live testimony in support thereof, and without any constitutional or legal waiver of any right by affirmant.

- (2) As a matter of blackletter law, the aforementioned trialess, without live testimony, convictions, are legal nullities entitled to no respect in any court of the United States.
- d. However the records of Lexis and West/Westlaw do not contain any of the vindications of affirmant, but do report the aforementioned convictions, omitting the constitutional and jurisdictional infirmities, and the clear lack of legal power of the particular jurists involved in such convictions (Crosby v. U.S., 506 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 748 [1993]; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 [1968]; Nye v. U.S., 313 U.S. 33 [1941]; U.S. v. Gompers, 233 U.S. 604, 610 [1914]).
- e(1) When affirmant refused to participate in the criminal racketeering activities of the New York Second Circuit judiciary, which in addition to the larceny of judicial trust assets, also included diverting monies payable "to the federal court" to private pockets, extortion, and other similar activities, convictions which, if valid, were no more than "offenses", were elevated, ex post facto, to "serious" crimes, affirmant was not permitted to controvert their validity, and affirmant was disbarred (Grievance Comm. v. G. Sassower, 125 A.D.2d 52, 512 N.Y.S.2d 203 [2d Dept.-1987]; Matter of Sassower, 700 F. Supp. 100 [SDNY]).

- imposed on SAM POLUR, Esq. ["Polur"], by a similar elevation of a trialess conviction, when he began to expose the criminal activities of the cronies of the judiciary in the Puccini matter (Matter of Polur, 173 A.D.2d 82, 579 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept.-1992]).
- f. Consequently, affirmant barred by the New York-Second Circuit courts, commenced at action in SD Oh and moved:
 - "(1) permanently enjoining MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC. from publishing, republishing and/or distributing Raffe v. Citibank (84 Civ. 305 [EDNY-1984], aff'd without opinion 755 F.2d 914 [2nd Cir.-1985]); Raffe v. Riccobono (113 A.D.2d 1038, 493 N.Y.S.2d 70 [1st Dept.-1985]); Raffe v. Feltman, Karesh & Major (113 A.D.2d 1038, 493 N.Y.S.2d 70 [1st Dept.-1985]) ... wherever these decisions or citations might appear, unless it is stated that the aforementioned non-summary criminal contempt convictions were rendered without a trial, without the opportunity for a trial, without any live testimony in support thereof, and stating that by reason of the aforementioned, and for other reasons, the aforementioned determinations are legally null, void, and of no legal effect."
- g. Instructively, in the trialess convictions in Raffe v. Citibank (supra), the fine monies which were payable "to the federal court" were diverted to private pockets, which is also omitted in the republication of that decision by Lexis and West/Westlaw.

- h. Further concealed in the republications by Lexis and West/Westlaw is the basis for such non-summary criminal contempt convictions, since non-summary criminal contempt is not a remedy for the exercise of First Amendment rights (Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, [1968]), or for exercising a professional obligations (Holt v Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 [1965]; Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 609 N.E.2d 105 [1992]).
- i. The equitable relief requested by affirmant, although never opposed, law or fact, was never adjudicated by the corrupted Sixth Circuit courts, after they were, exparte, communicated with by the Second Circuit judiciary.
- ["Conner"], as he actually knew, had neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction over affirmant when he issued his non-due process injunctive edict in Raffe v. Doe (619 F. Supp. 891 [SDNY-1985]).
- b. Members of the judiciary and their cronies, made and intended to make, all of Puccini's judicial trust assets the subject of larceny, leaving nothing for any legitimate creditor, including affirmant, who held, inter alia, a contractually based, constitutionally protected, money judgment.

- c. HYMAN RAFFE ["Raffe"], affirmant's client, in order to avoid incarceration under a trialess conviction, was compelled to discharge affirmant as his attorney about three (3) months prior to such Judge Conner decision, consequently Judge Conner, insofar as affirmant was concerned, was acting in clear absence of all jurisdiction when he issued his injunction.
- d. Furthermore, even if personal jurisdiction existed, the injunction was a transparent nullity, since no judge has the power to dispense with the requirement that a courtappointed receiver account for his stewardship, immunize those who made the judicial trust the subject of larceny, or impair a private contractual obligation.
- e. Raffe v. Doe (supra) was the product of fraud and corruption, in addition to the lack of jurisdiction, as revealed by the annexed Proposed Preliminary Injunction Staying Enforcement (Exhibit "A").
- f. The "marching orders" given to a cooperative Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge GILBERT S. MERRITT ["Merritt"] by Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge THOMAS J. MESKILL ["Meskill"] and former Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge JOHN L. OAKES ["Oakes"] was not to permit any inquiry into the legality of any New York-Second Circuit opinions, including Raffe v. Doe (supra), and dismiss affirmant's action without any trial, hearing, pre-trial disclosure or discovery, or any due process.

- g. The equitable relief with respect to the republishing and distribution of Raffe v. Doe (supra) by Lexis, was never opposed, law or fact, nevertheless such issue was never adjudicated by the corrupted Sixth Circuit courts, after they were, ex parte, corrupted by the Second Circuit judiciary.
- Ja. In <u>Sassower v. Sheriff</u> (651 F. Supp. 128 [SDNY-1986]), the District Court sustained a federal writ of habeas corpus based upon a Report of N.Y. State Referee DONALD DIAMOND ["Diamond"] who attempted to justify, ad nauseam, the trialess scenario, by-the following buffoonery:

"a plea of 'not-guilty' in a criminal proceeding is tantamount to a general denial in a civil action, and raises no triable issue of fact warranting a trial."

- b. In reversing (Sassower v. Sheriff, 824 F.2d 184 [2d Cir.-1987]), a plainly corrupt Second Circuit Court of Appeals, concealed the fact that a mirrored Diamond Report against Raffe was not brought on for confirmation, in consideration for continuing "indulgence payments" by Raffe to the judicial "bag-men" -- which now is admittedly "in excess of \$2,000,000".
- c(1) Since an affirmance of the District Court Order would have terminated the Raffe "extortion" payments, exposed the larceny of the Puccini trust assets, and similar criminal racketeering activities, the Circuit Court reversed and wholly contrived, concocted and fabricated every essential fact including the following:

"Sassower refused to appear at a hearing before the court appointed referee" [p. 185] ... "Sassower was notified by the attorney for the receiver that he was required to appear before the referee for proceedings on the criminal contempt motion and crossmotions." [p. 187]... "[Sassower] failed to appear." [p. 187]... "the opportunity for a hearing that was afforded was appropriate under the circumstances" [p. 189]... "Sassower was ... given a reasonable opportunity to be heard" [p. 189] ... "Sassower ... waived that right [to a hearing] by failing to appear" [p. 190] ... "he [Sassower] has repeatedly refused to appear before Referee Diamond" [p. 190] ... "explicitly warned him [Sassower] of the consequences of his failure to appear before the referee" [p. 190]."

- (2) In imposing a fine of \$250 on affirmant, the Circuit Court also concealed that the "final accounting" intended to be "approved" by Referee Diamond, for the court-appointed receiver, which affirmant aborted, was 'phantom' and 'non-existent'.
- d. Thus, affirmant desired that Lexis be mandated, in its republications and distributions to publish corrective material, where neither fact nor law was controverted, which was causing affirmant constitutional injuries.
- e. A corrupted Sixth Circuit judiciary failed to adjudicate the matter.
- 4a. To belabor this Court with all the false, deceptive, jurisdictionally infirm opinions published by the New York Second Circuit judiciary, against which affirmant desired relief, would serve no useful purpose in this motion.

b. The judicial function is to adjudicate, and as expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia (19 U.S. [6 Wheat] 264, 404 [1821]):

"It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure ... With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case must be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty." [emphasis supplied]

c. The matter should be remitted, with a direction that the Circuit Court adjudicate the issues presented.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this

motion be granted in all respects, with costs.

Dated: June 24, 1993

GEORGE SASSOWER

Petitioner, pro se

16 Lake Street,

White Plains, NY 10603

914-949-2169

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

On June 25, 1993 I served a true copy of this Petition by mailing same in a sealed envelope, first class, with proper postage thereon, addressed to Chief Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, U.S. Post Office & Courthouse Bldg., 100 East 5th Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3988; Solicitor General of the United States, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530; U.S. Attorney Edmund Sargus, Att: AUSA Pamela Millard Stanek, Federal Building, 200 West Second Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402; Thompson, Hine and Flory, Esqs., 2000 Courthouse Plaza N.E., P.O. Box 8801, Dayton, Ohio 45401-8801; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 West 57th Street, New York, NY 10019; and Ass't N.Y. State Attorney General David B. Roberts, The Capitol, Albany, New York 12224, that being their last known addresses.

Dated: June 25, 1993

GEORGE SASSOWE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

GEORGE SASSOWER,

Petitioner,

-against-

Docket No. 93-

U.S. ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK; DONALD DIAMOND; XAVIER C. RICCOBONO; MICHAEL J. DONTZIN; Estate of THOMAS V. SINCLAIR, JR.; ROBERT ABRAMS; DAVID S. COOK; CITIBANK, N.A., and JEROME H. BARR, individually, and as executors of the Estate of MILTON KAUFMAN; KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C.; LEE FELTMAN; FELTMAN, KARESH, & MAJOR; ARUTT, NACHAMIE, BENJAMIN, LIPKIN & KIRSCHNER, P.C., and HYMAN RAFFE, Respondents.

Preliminary Injunction

It appearing to the satisfaction of this Court, after due notice having been afforded to all parties and/or their attorneys, and others, with opportunity to oppose, controvert, explain and/or justify, that the petitioner, qua attorney for HYMAN RAFFE, caused to be prepared and filed a complaint dated August 29, 1984, whose short title was Raffe v. Doe (84 Civ. 6272 (WCC)); and it further appears that except as the attorney for HYMAN RAFFE, U.S. District Court Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER by virtue of Raffe v. Doe (supra) did not have any jurisdiction over petitioner or any of his personal interests; and it further appears that from the Record on Appeal, prepared by FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. for the N.Y. Appellate Division, First Judicial Department (Exhibit "A"), which resulted in the decision of Barr v. Sassower (121 A.D.2d 324, 503 N.Y.S.2d 392 [1986]), on page 277 is an exhibit signed by HYMAN RAFFE which states that GEORGE SASSOWER and SAM POLUR were discharged as the attorneys for HYMAN RAFFE (Exhibit "B"):

TELAISIN "A"

"in all Puccini related cases effective [approximately] July 15, 1985" [emphasis supplied]; and it further appears

that in the same Record on Appeal, on page 391-392, there is reproduced a Stipulation executed by HYMAN RAFFE, Pro Se, FELTMAN, KARESH & MAJOR, Esqs., and Senior Assistant N.Y. State Attorney General DAVID S. COOK, dated October 2, 1985 (Exhibit "C"), which stipulation is recited and incorporated in Raffe v. Abrams (114 A.D.2d 773, 495 N.Y.S.2d 140 [1st Dept.-1985] which judicial opinion reads, in part, as follows:

"It is further unanimously ordered that the appeals taken by Hyman Raffe in Proceeding #1 and Proceeding #2 are withdrawn in accordance with the stipulation of the parties dated October 3 [sic], 1985."; and it further appears

that the aforementioned documents clearly reveal that before Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER rendered Raffe v. Doe (619 F. Supp. 891 [SDNY-1985]), on October 11, 1985, and by reason of his discharge, the petitioner, GEORGE SASSOWER, had no further standing in that action, qua attorney for HYMAN RAFFE or otherwise; and it further appears that in view of the equitable stock and creditor interests of petitioner, GEORGE SASSOWER, in PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., which included a contractually based, constitutionally protected, money judgment against PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. (Exhibit "D"), Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER did not have the constitutional power to "impair" such the private contractual obligation due petitioner (Article 1 \$10[1], Amendment V of the U.S. Constitution), or otherwise impair any of his assets, real or inchoate, without due process of law, which was never afforded petitioner; and it further appears that Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER,

personal jurisdictional infirmities over the from aside petitioner, Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER did not have the legal power to relieve the respondent, LEE FELTMAN, Esq., the court-appointed receiver, an arm of the court, from his obligation to "account" for his stewardship of his judicial trust, particularly where the uncontroverted allegations and evidence was that the judicial trust assets of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., had been made the subject of larceny and unlawful plundering; and it further appears that Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER did not have the legal power to immunize those who had made the judicial trust assets of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. the subject of larceny and/or plundering or intended to do so; and it further appears that Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER, did not have the constitutional power to modify or impair Article III \$2[1] of the Constitution of the United States, which provides an available federal judicial forum for "all" cases or controversies involving a federal issue; and it further appears that even with the invocation of the collateral bar rule, petitioner has never been found guilty of criminal contempt for violating the injunction of Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER, as set forth in the Order of October 11, 1985, although repeatedly charged with such crime, triggering constitutional prior jeopardy prohibitions and the legal conclusion that the Order of Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER in Raffe v. Doe (supra) is a transparent nullity, not entitled to any direct or collateral respect in any judicial forum; and it further appears that the financial burden for the defense of the state defendants in Raffe v. Doe (supra), as a threshold matter, was placed upon the State of New York, despite the prohibitions

of Amendment Eleventh of the U.S. Constitution, which Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER knew was jurisdictional to his power and authority, but nevertheless Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER accepted such jurisdiction; and it further appears that Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER knew that a court-appointed receiver had to account "at least once a year" (22 NYCRR 202.52[e]), but since the appointment of LEE FELTMAN, Esq., as court-appointed receiver for PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., he had never accounted for his stewardship; and it further appears that Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER knew that Attorney General ROBERT ABRAMS, qua statutory fiduciary, as a nondiscretionary "duty" to make judicial application for the receiver to account after the expiration of 18 months from his appointment (Bus. Corp. Law \$1216[a], but intentionally had never made such application, because he was aware of the larceny and judicial improprieties therein; and it further appears that Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER, ex parte, entered into arrangements with some of the defendants in Raffe v. Doe (supra), U.S. District Court Judge EUGENE H. NICKERSON, Chief U.S. District Court Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT, and Presiding Justice FRANCIS T. MURPHY of the Appellate Division, that he would stonewall all pre-trial disclosure and discovery desired by petitioner and HYMAN RAFFE, and other relief desired by them, while those Raffe v. Doe (supra) defendants, Judge EUGENE H. NICKERSON, Chief Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT and Presiding Justice FRANCIS T. MURPHY compelled petitioner, SAM POLUR and HYMAN RAFFE to succumb and submit; and it further appears that pursuant to such agreement, all with the knowledge of Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER, petitioner was

repeatedly adjudicated to be in non-summary criminal contempt, a constitutionally protected crime, with fines and/or terms of incarceration imposed thereon, all such convictions being without a trial, without the opportunity for a trial, without any confrontation rights, in absentia, without due process, without the right of allocution, without any live testimony in support thereof, and without any constitutional or legal waiver, with fines and/or terms of incarceration imposed thereon; and it further appears the Report of N.Y. Supreme Court Referee DONALD DIAMOND of May 1, 1985 concerning petitioner and his Report of July 15, 1985 concerning HYMAN RAFFE were the results of the aforementioned trialess scenarios, all of which was known by Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER prior to October 11, 1985; and it further appears that under the trialess convictions, in one document, by N.Y. State Supreme Court Justice ALVIN F. KLEIN, of petitioner, SAM POLUR and HYMAN RAFFE, petitioner and SAM POLUR were incarcerated, but not HYMAN RAFFE, a fact also known by Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER; and it further appears that faced with incarceration under the Judge ALVIN F. KLEIN conviction and incarceration under the Report of DONALD DIAMOND of July 15, 1986, HYMAN RAFFE agreed to succumb and submit, also known to Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER prior to October 11, 1985; and it further appears that in consideration of not being incarcerated HYMAN RAFFE agreed to pay "extortion" monies to KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C., its clients, and FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs., which presently "exceeds \$2,000,00", agreed to effectively surrender his stock and creditor interests in PUCCINI CLOTHES,

LTD., agreed to agree to the settlement of a 'phantom' "final accounting" for PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., agreed to execute releases to, inter alia, the judges of the federal and state courts and Attorney General ROBERT ABRAMS, and other unconstitutional and illegal considerations, all known by Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER before October 11, 1985; and it further appears that Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER did not have the legal power to immunize his Dennis v. Sparks (449 U.S. 24 [1980]) co-conspirators including KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C., CITIBANK, N.A., and/or FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs.; and it further appears that former Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge JAMES L. OAKES judicially admitted in Sassower v. Abrams (SDNY, 92-08515 (PKL)) the following:

"13. You have been and are aware that the decision of U.S. District Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER ['Conner'] in Raffe v. Doe (619 F. Supp. 891 [SDNY-1985]) was the result of fraud and corruption, whose object was to conceal the larceny of the judicial trust assets of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. ['Puccini'] and other criminal activities.

- decision and Order you, as Chief Judge, have permitted to be employed and unremedied in order to advance a criminal racketeering adventure involving K&R, FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. ['FKM&F'] and members of the judiciary. ...
- 19. Although you are aware that Sassower v. Sheriff (824 F.2d 184 [2d Cir.-1987]) is a manifest constitutional and/or jurisdictional nullity, you have allowed such decision, as well as Raffe v. Doe (supra), to remain in effect in order to aid in the corruption of courts throughout the United States.
- You have 'fixed' and 'corrupted' federal judges in other circuits, in order to advance your own criminal racketeering activities."; it is

ORDERED that this application for a preliminary injunction be and the same is hereby granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, the defendants, their attorneys and privies are enjoined from prosecuting and/or threatening to prosecute petitioner for non-summary criminal contempt for violating the Injunction contained in Raffe v. Doe (619 F. Supp. 891 [SDNY-1985]) by virtue of the "prior jeopardy" provision contained in Amendment V of the U.S. Constitution, unless such constitutional protection is waived by petitioner; and it is further

ORDERED, pending final adjudication of this matter, as to petitioner, everything stated or ordered in <u>Raffe</u>

<u>v. Doe</u> (619 F. Supp. 891 [SDNY-1985]), be and the same is stayed;

and it is further

ORDERED, that a copy of this Order shall be published and distributed by MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC. and WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, whose activities are fairly attributable to the judicial branch of government, automatically along with any future republication or distribution of Raffe v. Doe (619 F. Supp. 891 [SDNY-1985]).

SO ORDERED

Dated: July 1993

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Supreme Court of the State of New York Appellate Division-First Judicial Department

In the Matter of the Application of JEROME H. BARR and CITI-BANK, N.A., as Executors of the Will of Milton Kaufman, Holders of One-Quarter of All Outstanding Shares of Puccini Clothes, Ltd. Entitled to Vote in an Election of Directors,

Petitioners,

For the Dissolution of Puccini Clothes, Ltd. LEE FELTMAN, As Permanent Receiver for PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD.,

Appellant,

-and-

GEORGE SASSOWER,

Respondent.

RECORD ON APPEAL

FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN Attorneys for Appellant Lee Feltman, as Permanent Receiver for Puccini Clothes, Ltd.

Park Avenue Plaza 55 East 52nd Street New York, New York 10055 (212) 371-8630

IRA POSTEL, ESQ. Attorney for Puccini shareholder Hyman Raffe 725 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10003 Tel: (212) 355-3838

GEORGE SASSOWER, ESQ. Respondent Pro Se 51 Davis Avenue White Plains, New York 10605 (914) 949-2169

NACHAMIE, KIRSCHNER, LEVINE, SPIZZ & GOLDBERG, P.C. Attorneys for Puccini shareholders Eugene Dann and Robert Sorrentino 342 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10173 (212) 682-9580

KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. Attorneys for Petitioners, Puccini shareholders Jerome H. Barr and Citibank, N.A., as Executors 500 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10010 (212) 719-1600

EXMINIT E: LETTER FROM IRA POSTEL TO DONALD RELKIN (277)

iew york, wew york

October 2, 1985

Donald B. Felkin, Esq. Kreindles & Felkin, P.C. 500 Fifth Avenue Sew York, Fekking 10110

Re: Ryman Raffe

Dear Mr. Relkin:

This letter is sent to induce you to continue and conclude negotiations with Hyman Raffe, 2134 Pacific Blvd. Atlantic Beach, New York, for a settlement of the Puccini related cases.

I am writing to confirm that I am, and have been since of 15, 1985 the attorney of record for Hyman Raffe in all Puccini related cases, including but not limited to those on the annexed schedules, and to further confirm that Mr. Raffe has discharged George Sassower, Esq. and Sam Polur, Esq. as his attorneys in all Puccini related cases, effective Collins 1985.

I further confirm to you that we have requested stipulations of substitution, but have not been able to obtain same from Sassower and Polur. I represent to you that Mr. Raffe has discharged Sassower and Polur, effective as attack. It is least to have any authority to act on his least or represent him in any Puccini related matter. I behalf or represent him in any Puccini related matter. I further confirm the efficacy of Mr. Raffe's discharge of further confirm the efficacy of Mr. Raffe's discharge of Mr. Rasses. Sassower and Polur and retention of me as counsel in all Puccini related cases, notwithstanding the failure of any party to have heretofor executed a substitution of counsel.

I further authorize you to submit this letter, or a copy thereof, to any court in order to advise any judge thereof as to the aforementioned facts.

Very traly yours,

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST DEPARTMENT

Respull 80

In the Matter of the Application of HYMAN RAFFE and GEORGE SASSOWER, individually and on behalf of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD.,

Petitioners-Appellants,

Proceeding #1

-against-

ROBERT ABRAMS, as Attorney General of the State of New York,

Respondent-Respondent.

For an Order pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR.

STIPULATION DISCONTINUING APPEALS

In the Matter of the Application of Jerome H. Barr and Citibank, N.A., as Executors of the Will of Milton Kaufman, Holders of One-Quarter of All Outstanding Shares of Puccini Clothes, Ltd. Entitled to Vote in an Election of Directors,

Proceeding #2 (2675)

Petitioners-Respondent,

For the Dissolution of Puccini Clothes, Ltd.

HYMAN RAFFE,

Appellant.

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the undersigned that the appeals by Appellant Hyman Raffe in

proceedings #1 and #2, from the Judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, dated and filed March 6, 1985, from the Order of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York dated June 29, 1983 and from the Order of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, entered July 13, 1984, individually and on behalf of Puccini Clothes, Ltd., are hereby withdrawn with prejudice.

Dated: New York, New York
September 2, 1985
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HYMAN RAFFE, IXX Appellant Provse

FELTHAN, KARESH & MAJOR!

Respondent Pro Se and Attorney
for the court-appointed
permanent Receiver for
Puccini Clothes, Ltd.

ROBERT ABRAMS

Respondent Pro Se

By hasistant ittorney Central

David Cook

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Eph.b.)"

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

On June 23, 1993 I served a true copy of this Notice of Settlement and Proposed Preliminary Injunction by mailing same in a sealed envelope, first Proposed Preliminary Injunction by mailing same in a sealed envelope, first Proposed Preliminary Injunction by mailing same in a sealed envelope, first Of NY, One St. Andrew's Plaza, New York, NY 10007; Attorney General District of NY, One St. Andrew's Plaza, New York, NY 10007; Attorney General District of NY, One St. Andrew's Plaza, New York, NY 10204; Kreindler & Relkin, P.C., 350 Robert Abrams, The Capitol, Albany, NY 12224; Kreindler & Relkin, P.C., 350 Robert Abrams, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., 152 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, Karesh, NY 10007; Attached & Leach Avenue, New York, NY 10118; Feltman, NY 10118

Dated: June 23, 1993

SEORGE SASSOWER