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Elena Ruth Sassower, Director

Written Testimony for the New York State Legislature's February 13, 2025 Budget Hearing on "Public Protection"

As stated by [CJA's written testimony for your February 4, 2025 budget hearing on "local government officials/general government"](#): "the state budget is a 'grand larceny of the public fisc', flagrantly 'OFF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RAILS', and rife with constitutional, statutory, and legislative rule violations...enabled by New York's sham 'public protection' entities", funded in the budget.

The "public protection" entities to which you have given pride of place at this "public protection" budget hearing and at previous "public protection" budget hearings, are the Judiciary and its monitor, the Commission on Judicial Conduct, notwithstanding the evidence of their corruption, enabling and perpetuating the corruption of the budget and the larcenous salary increases it embeds, has been the subject of CJA's oral and written testimony at your budget hearings, for years.¹ This includes by CJA's February 4, 2025 written testimony, whose hyperlinks furnished the records of CJA's two live lawsuits against you, Governor Hochul, Attorney General James, and Comptroller DiNapoli – [CJA v. JCOPE, et al.](#) and [CJA v. Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation, et al.](#) – both at the Court of Appeals, on appeals of right, the latter also against Lieutenant Governor Delgado, Chief Judge Wilson, and Chief Administrative Judge Zayas.

[The June 6, 2022 verified petition in CJA v. JCOPE, et al.](#) challenges the state budget as unconstitutional, unlawful, and larcenous, by four separate causes of action, the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth (¶¶78-105). Particularly relevant to this budget hearing is the ninth cause of action (¶¶97-105) asserting:

"It is unconstitutional – and a larceny of taxpayer monies – for taxpayers to fund ethics entities which are NOT doing the job for which they are paid – and which these entities conceal by false pretenses, including in support of their funding

¹ See, *inter alia*, (1) [CJA's written testimony for the Legislature's January 25, 2024 "public protection" budget hearing](#); (2) [CJA's written testimony for the Legislature's February 7, 2023 "public protection" budget hearing](#); (3) [CJA's written oral testimony for the Legislature's January 25, 2022 "public protection" budget hearing \(VIDEO\)](#); (4) [CJA's written oral testimony for the Legislature's February 10, 2021 budget hearing on public protection \(VIDEO\)](#); (5) [CJA's written statement for the Legislature's February 11, 2019 budget hearing on "local gov't officials/general gov't"](#); (6) [VIDEO of CJA's testimony at the Legislature's January 30, 2018 "public protection" budget hearing](#); (7) [VIDEO of CJA's testimony at the Legislature's January 30, 2017 budget hearing on "local gov't officials/general government"](#); See, also, [February 21, 2014 letter](#) "Restoring Value to Your Sham and Rigged February 5, 2014 'Public Protection' Budget Hearing...".

requests...” (at ¶103) .

The ethics entities that the ninth cause of action features as “NOT doing the job for which they are paid” are the Commission on Judicial Conduct, the Judiciary’s Attorney Grievance Committees, the Judiciary’s Inspector General, and the first three respondents in *CJA v. JCOPE, et al.* – JCOPE, the Legislative Ethics Commission, and the State Inspector General, whose statutory and other violations are the subject of the verified petition’s first five causes of action (¶¶27-80). As to all six ethics entities, the ninth cause of action states (at ¶104):

“The Senate and Assembly by their leadership, members, and pertinent committees – the Senate Committee on Ethics and Internal Governance, the Assembly Committee on Ethics and Guidance, the Senate Committee on Investigations and Government Operations, the Assembly Committee on Governmental Operations, the Assembly Committee on Oversight, Analysis, and Investigation, the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committees, the Senate and Assembly Committees on Corporations, Authorities, and Commissions, the Senate and Assembly Codes Committees – have long been knowledgeable that the New York State system of ethics oversight and enforcement is sham window-dressing, but have either refused to engage in any examination of the problem, at all – or in any examination that is not rigged, as was the case with the two Senate hearings in 2021, staged by Senate Ethics and Internal Governance Chair Alessandra Biaggi and Senate Finance Committee Chair Liz Krueger, at which petitioners were not permitted to testify (Exhibits [L-1](#), [L-2](#), [L-3](#), [L-4](#), [L-5](#), [L-6](#)) and whose [December 17, 2021 report](#) on the first hearing, thus far its only report, omitted petitioners’ written statement in support of testimony ([Exhibit L-1](#)) and written testimony ([Exhibit L-2](#)), because, as evident therefrom, they were dispositive and devastating.”

On July 8, 2022, as a result of the Judiciary’s self-interested obliteration of all cognizable judicial process in *CJA v. JCOPE, et al.*² to avoid granting CJA the TRO and preliminary injunction to which it was entitled, JCOPE was replaced by the Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government (COELIG). COELIG thereupon demonstrated it was just as corrupt as JCOPE, upon CJA’s filing of its “DAY 1” [July 8, 2022 eight-in-one complaint – the eighth being against Attorney General James](#) for corrupting the judicial process in *CJA v. JCOPE et al.*

For years, you have refused to hold oversight hearings at which the public could testify about how ethics and other “public protection” entities have handled their complaints, virtually all dumped, without investigation, or simply ignored. Likewise, for years, you have refused to enact legislation so as to audit the complaints these entities receive, whose necessity was underscored by the above-linked July 9, 2021 “written statement in support of testimony ([Exhibit L-1](#))”, stating:

² To date, CJA has filed two judicial misconduct complaints with the Commission on Judicial Conduct against the Supreme Court judge and Appellate Division, Third Department justices, on [February 23, 2023](#) and [November 9, 2024 complaint](#), respectively.

“In 1989, then State Comptroller Edward Regan sought to investigate whether the Commission on Judicial Conduct was doing the ethics oversight and enforcement job over the Judiciary for which it was established and for which taxpayers pay it. He recognized that no assessment was possible without examining how the Commission was handling complaints. However, the Commission would not give him access to complaints, citing statutory confidentiality. As a result, Comptroller Regan wrote a report entitled [Not Accountable to the Public: Resolving Charges Against Judges is Cloaked in Secrecy](#), with an accompanying press release just as blunt entitled ‘[Commission on Judicial Conduct Needs Oversight](#)’. That was 32 years ago – and the Legislature never took the simple action that Comptroller Regan said was the *sine qua non* for any assessment of the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s functioning – a statutory amendment to provide for independent examination/auditing of its records of complaints.”

CJA’s records of its own complaints to these “public protection” entities, spanning decades, illustrate the situation – and CJA has furnished them to you, repeatedly, including on designated webpages in support of testimony, as, for instance, [here](#) and [here](#). These are dispositive of your duty to withhold funding from them until culpable staff are removed and then to exponentially increase funding so that a proper, honest job can be done. A menu webpage of CJA’s complaints, including to such further “public protection” entities as the Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct, Attorney General James’ Public Integrity Bureau, Comptroller DiNapoli’s Division of Investigations and Inspector General, and New York’s 62 District Attorneys, is [here](#). Virtually all CJA’s complaints since 2013 – the year of CJA’s first eye-opening experience with how the Legislature conducts itself with respect to the state budget – have involved its larceny, fraud, unlawfulness and unconstitutionality.³

Unlike last year, when CJA included in its [written testimony for the Legislature’s January 25, 2024 “public protection” budget hearing](#) (at p. 4) commentary on the testimony of Chief Administrative Judge Zayas and Commission on Judicial Conduct Administrator Tembeckjian at that hearing and the legislators’ responses, CJA will provide *separate* commentary as to their testimony and the responses at today’s hearing.

Finally, with respect to [the Legislature’s own proposed budget](#) and the legislative portion of [Governor Hochul’s Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.3001/A.3001](#) – as to which, as in past years, you are holding no hearing – CJA here presents, as it has so many times previously, questions for Temporary Senate President Stewart-Cousins and Assembly Speaker Heastie to answer, from which

³ The exception is [CJA’s October 25, 2023 complaint](#) against judges and attorneys to the Commission on Judicial Conduct, Attorney Grievance Committees, and the Judiciary’s Inspector General pertaining to the Monroe County Family Court case about which CJA testified before the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation at its October 13, 2023 hearing on judicial compensation, highlighted at pp. 3-4 of [CJA’s written testimony for the Legislature’s January 25, 2024 “public protection” budget hearing](#), in a paragraph also hyperlinking to CJA’s [written testimony](#) for the Senate’s November 1, 2023 purported oversight hearing of Family Court.

the unconstitutionality, fraud, and larceny of both documents are obvious. The questions are annexed.

I attest to the truth of this written statement under penalties of perjury – and am available to answer questions and give testimony under oath.

Thank you.

s/Elena Ruth Sassower

**Questions for Temporary Senate President Stewart-Cousins &
Assembly Speaker Heastie to Answer about their FY2025-26 Legislative Budget
& about Governor Hochul’s Legislative/Judiciary Appropriation Bill #S.3001/A.3001 –
and for Legislators & their “Appropriate Committees” to Ask Them**

- (1) [Article VII, §1 of the New York State Constitution](#) requires that “Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature, certified by the presiding officer of each house” be transmitted to the Governor before December 1st of each year, is that correct?
- (2) By a [one-sentence December 1, 2024 coverletter to Governor Hochul](#), on a letterhead of the “New York State Legislature” and bearing your printed names, titles, and signatures, you stated:

“Attached hereto is a copy of the Legislature’s Budget for the 2025-2026 fiscal year, pursuant to Article VII, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution.”

In so doing, you did not purport that your “[a]ttached...Legislature’s Budget” was “Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature”, or that you were certifying it right?

- (3) Your [attached budget consisted of 16 pages](#): a four-page budget narrative, with a fifth page of “Budget Highlights – Joint Entities”, plus a sixth page chart entitled “ALL FUNDS REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LEGISLATURE”, followed by 10 pages bearing no title, but which, prior to the FY2020-21 legislative budget, had been titled “Schedule of Appropriations”. Was that title inadvertently dropped from your [FY2025-26 legislative budget](#) – and from your prior five legislative budgets for [FY2024-25](#), [FY2023-24](#), [FY2022-23](#), [FY2021-22](#), and [FY2020-21](#)? Or was there some other reason?
- (4) Would you agree that the 16 pages of your FY2025-26 legislative budget do not include a certification, make no reference to “itemized estimates” of the Legislature’s “financial needs”, and do not refer to Article VII, §1?
- (5) Isn’t the reason you did not certify the Legislature’s budget to be “Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature” is because it is not?
- (6) Where are the Legislature’s FY2025-26 “general state charges”, *to wit*, the “fringe benefits” that are pension contributions, social security, health, dental, vision and life insurance, etc. for legislators and legislative branch employees? How much are they – and did you certify them to be “itemized estimates” of the Legislature’s “financial needs” with respect thereto?
- (7) Shouldn’t the Legislature’s “general state charges” be part of its budget – just as the Judiciary’s “general state charges” are part of the [Judiciary’s budget](#), “approved by the court

of appeals and certified by the chief judge of the court of appeals”, as Article VII, §1 requires.

- (8) Can you explain why neither the [Senate](#) nor [Assembly](#) websites post the Legislature’s budgets that you and your predecessors have transmitted to the Governor, pursuant to Article VII, §1 – unlike the Judiciary which has a [webpage](#) for the “approved...and certified” “itemized estimates of [its] financial needs” transmitted to the Governor pursuant to Article VII, §1?
- (9) Do you agree that Article VII, §1 does not vest you with the power to determine the “Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature”, but only to certify same?
- (10) Do you agree that the logical reason why Article VII, §1 requires that the Judiciary’s “certified” “itemized estimates” of its “financial needs” be transmitted to “the appropriate committees of the legislature” – in addition to the Governor – but does not require that the Legislature’s “certified” “itemized estimates” of its “financial needs” be transmitted to “the appropriate committees of the legislature” is because “the appropriate committees of the legislature are presumed to have formulated and/or approved the “itemized estimates” that the “presiding officer of each house” certify?
- (11) Do you agree that the Senate Committee on Investigations and Government Operations and Assembly Committee on Governmental Operations would be the “appropriate committees” of the Legislature to formulate or approve the Legislature’s budget – or are there other “appropriate committees”, as, for instance, the Senate Rules Committee; the Assembly Rules Committee, the Senate Committee on Ethics and Internal Governance, the Assembly Committee on Ethics and Guidance, the Assembly Committee on Oversight, Analysis, and Investigation?
- (12) Describe the “process”, if any, by which the Legislature’s budget for fiscal year 2025-2026 was compiled.
- (13) Wouldn’t the process of compiling “Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature” require soliciting the Legislature’s 213 members – and its committees, commissions, and task forces through which your budget narrative (at p. 2) purports the Senate and Assembly operate, stating:

“The Senate conducts its legislative business by operating 46 Standing Committees, Commissions, and Task Forces.”;

“The Assembly conducts its legislative business through the operation of 37 standing committees.”
- (14) By the way, is 37 the correct number of Assembly standing committees? [Assembly Rule IV, §1\(a\)](#) lists 39, with 39 also reflected on the [Assembly webpage of “Committees & More”](#).

- (15) Were legislators and legislative committees, commissions, and task forces solicited as to their “itemized estimates” of their “financial needs”?
- (16) Can you explain why the Assembly Ways and Means Committee is the only legislative committee for which appropriations are included in the Legislature’s budget (at pp. 3, 6, 9-10). Why aren’t appropriations for the Senate Finance Committee comparably included – and are they the same amount: \$7,387,296? What about all the other Senate and Assembly committees? Don’t they require adequate funding and staffing to operate professionally, discharging their lawmaking and oversight functions?
- (17) Why does the Legislature’s budget not include as “joint entities” the commissions listed by [Legislative Law Article 5-A](#), whose memberships consist exclusively of Senate and Assembly members who you appoint. And what about the single commission established by [Legislative Law Article 5-B: the administrative regulations review commission](#), whose membership, exclusively of Senate and Assembly members, is also appointed by you? What is your definition of “joint entities”?
- (18) Other “joint entities” that you have included in the Legislature’s budget are the [Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment](#), codified by [Legislative Law Article 5-A, §83-m](#), and the [Legislative Ethics Commission](#), codified by [Legislative Law Article 5 \(§80\)](#). Both have memberships NOT exclusively of Senate and Assembly members, although all appointed by you, correct?
- (19) What is the reason you did not include, as a “joint entity” the [Law Revision Commission](#), codified by [Legislative Law Article 4-A](#)? Is it because, although the four chairs of the Senate and Assembly Judiciary and Codes Committees are *ex officio* members, five members are appointed by the Governor? If so, why does the Legislature’s budget not reflect a split in costs with the Governor, just as is done with the Office of Lieutenant Governor, so-identified by your budget narrative (at pp. 1, 2).
- (20) Can you explain why, considering the omission from the Legislature’s budget of most “joint entities”— indeed, of most of the components of the Legislature – you include the Legislative Health Service, the Legislative Library, and the Legislative Messenger Service, as if these are significant, as, likewise, the dues for the National Conference of State Legislatures.
- (21) As for the Legislative Ethics Commission, one of your included “joint entities”, can you explain why your budget narrative (at p. 3) makes it appear that it is operating with “four legislators and five non-legislative members”, when, as you know, it has not been operating with [a non-legislative ninth member](#) since its inception.
- (22) Why, in the same budget narrative pertaining to the Legislative Ethics Commission (at p. 3), do you refer to the “Joint Commission on Public Ethics”, when you eliminated it, *via* the

budget, in 2022, by your behind-closed-doors, “three people in the room” insertion of [Part QQ to Education, Labor, Housing and Family Assistance Budget Bill #S.8006-C/A.9006-C – the “ethics commission reform act of 2022”](#) (at pp. 151-201), replacing it with the Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government. Is there nobody on your staff who proofed the Legislature’s budget for such inaccuracies?

- (23) Do you agree that more than half of the Legislature’s 16-page budget is devoted to the handful of “joint entities” it features as if they were all “joint entities” and whose cumulative appropriations, listed on the page 6 chart, is \$25,630,684 – in other words, less than 10% of the \$298,641,752 “GENERAL FUND TOTAL”, also listed on that chart.
- (24) Do you agree that most of the over 90% balance of legislative appropriations are under the headings “The Senate” and “The Assembly” – and that with the exception of “salaries” and “allowances” for Senate and Assembly members, they lack sufficient itemization for intelligent, meaningful review?
- (25) Can you explain why the second item of “Personal Service” for the Senate (at p. 7) reads:

“For payment of allowances to members designated by the temporary president, pursuant to the schedule of such allowances set forth in section 5-a of the legislative law....\$1,289,500”

and the second item of “Personal Service” for the Assembly (at p. 8) reads:

“For payment of allowances to members designated by the speaker pursuant to the provisions of section 5-a of the legislative law.....\$1,592,500”

when the [December 10, 2018 Report of the Committee on Legislative and Executive Compensation](#) superseded [Legislative Law §5-a](#) and eliminated all but 15 of the Legislative Law §5-a allowances.¹ Shouldn’t the listed figures have been \$185,000 for the Senate and \$239,500 for the Assembly?

¹ These are the six allowances in the Senate, whose total cost is \$185,000: (1) for the Temporary Senate President (\$41,500); (2) for the Deputy Majority Leader (\$34,000); (3) for the Minority Leader (\$34,500); (4) for the Deputy Minority Leader (\$20,500); (5) for the Finance Committee Chair (\$34,000); and (6) for the Finance Committee Ranking Member (\$20,500). And the nine allowances in the Assembly, whose total cost is \$239,500: (1) for the Assembly Speaker (\$41,500); (2) for the Assembly Majority Leader (\$34,500); (3) for the Speaker *Pro Tempore* (\$25,000); (4) for the Minority Leader (\$34,500); (5) for the Minority Leader *Pro Tempore* (\$20,500); (6) for the Ways & Means Committee Chair (\$34,000); (7) for the Ways & Means Committee Ranking Member (\$20,500); (8) for the Codes Committee Chair (\$18,000); (9) for the Codes Committee Ranking Member (\$11,000).

(26) The first sentence of “Legislative Budget Highlights”, at page 1, states

“The recommended General Fund appropriation of \$298,641,752 for FY 2025-26 for the Legislature, represents an increase of \$5,717,819 from the amount appropriated in FY 2024-25. The Independent Redistricting Commission was reduced based on their expected needs for the coming fiscal year and the recommendation for most other entities is an increase of 3%. The overall increase to the General Fund is 2%.” (underlining added).²

How can the “overall increase to the General Fund” be 2% when, as the chart on page 6 shows, the reduction for the Independent Redistricting Commission is only \$2,950,000 – and, as reflected by the “Budget Highlights” for the Lieutenant Governor (p. 2), the Senate (p. 2), the Assembly (p. 2), the Ways and Means Committee (p. 3), and the “Joint Entities” (p. 5), all were increased by 3%, except for the Legislative Ethics Commission, which was 3.5%?

(27) Can you explain why the Legislative Ethics Commission is the only joint entity whose appropriation was increased by 3.5%?

(28) Isn’t it deceptive for the Legislature to state that there is an “increase of \$5,717,819 from the amount appropriated in FY2024-25”, without revealing that the appropriated amount is \$5,717,819 higher than the Legislature’s FY2024-25 request – the result of [behind-closed-doors amending, on April 19, 2024, by the “three-men-in-a-room”](#) of FY2024-25 [Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.8301/A.8801](#), which then became [#S.8301-A/A.8801-A](#), and thereupon passed by the Legislature.

(29) What was the basis of that \$5,717,819 increase from last year’s unamended Legislative/Judiciary budget bill to the enacted amended bill?³ Was it the result of “itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature certified by the presiding officer of each house”?⁴

² Likewise, the [Assembly Minority’s “Green Book”](#) – the only “colorbook” with a section identifying the Legislative budget – states (at p. 188) the Legislature’s budget is “a 2% increase over last year”, but then states that it is “increased by 3% over last year”.

³ The Assembly’s May 2024 [“Summary of Recommended Changes to the Executive Budget”](#) does not furnish any basis in stating (at 73:1) with respect to [#S.8301-A/A.8801-A](#): “The Legislature provides an All Funds appropriation of \$295 million, a \$5.6 million increase over the Executive proposal.”

⁴ Comparison of the unamended and enacted amended budget bill reveals \$5,554,691 in increases, as follows:

- [OFFICE OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR](#) (pp. 1-2): The appropriation that had been \$334,537 became \$341,096 – an increase of \$6,559.

- (30) Comparing the increase of the Legislature’s \$298,641,752 “General Fund Total” request for FY2025-25 to its [FY2024-25](#) “General Fund Total” request of \$289,409,242 – shows an increase of \$9,232,510, isn’t that correct?
- (31) The [FY2025-26 legislative budget that your December 1, 2024 coverletter transmitted to the Governor](#) contained no legislative reappropriations, correct?
- (32) Do you agree that when Governor Hochul combined the Legislature’s FY2025-26 budget with the Judiciary’s FY2025-26 budget in her [January 21, 2025 Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.3001/A.3001](#), she was able to conceal 41 pages of legislative reappropriations (pp. 35-75) that were not part of your December 1, 2024 transmittal to her?

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- THE SENATE: (pp. 2-3): The appropriation that had been \$116,351,090 became \$118,632,484 – an increase of \$2,281,394.
 - THE ASSEMBLY (pp. 3-4): The appropriation that had been \$135,166,173 was now \$137,816,490 – an increase of \$2,650,317.
 - ASSEMBLY WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE (p. 4) that had been \$7,034,206 was now \$7,172,132 – an increase of \$137,926.
 - LEGISLATIVE ETHICS COMMISSION (p. 4): The appropriation that had been \$459,163 was now \$468,166 – an increase of \$9,003.
 - NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (pp. 4-5): The appropriation that had been \$454,908 was now \$463,828 – an increase of \$8,920.
 - LEGISLATIVE HEALTH SERVICE (p. 5): The appropriation that had been \$257,345 was now \$262,391 – an increase of \$5,046.
 - LEGISLATIVE LIBRARY (pp. 5-6): The appropriation that had been \$972,321 was now \$991,386 – an increase of \$19,065.
 - LEGISLATIVE MESSENGER SERVICE (p. 6): The appropriation that had been \$1,105,836 was now \$1,127,519 – an increase of \$21,683.
 - LEGISLATIVE BILL DRAFTING COMMISSION (p. 6): The appropriation that had been \$18,906,973 was now \$19,277,698 – an increase of \$370,725.
 - LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH AND REAPPORTIONMENT (pp. 7-8): The appropriation that had been \$2,246,690 was now \$2,290,743 – an increase of \$44,053.

- (33) Do you agree that these 41 pages of legislative reappropriations are – as reflected by the [table of contents for Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.3001/A.3001 \(p. 76\)](#) – in an out-of-sequence section at the back of the bill? And shouldn't the first page of these 41 pages (p. 35) be prominently marked "Reappropriations", just as the first page of the Judiciary's "Reappropriations" is (p. 25)?
- (34) Can you explain where the 41 pages of legislative reappropriations (pp. 35-75) came from?
- (a) When and in what fashion were they transmitted to the Governor?;
 - (b) Did you certify the dollar amounts of these legislative reappropriations and, additionally, that they were suitable for designation as reappropriations?;
 - (c) Are the purported "reappropriations" in fact suitable for reappropriation considering the definition of "reappropriation" posted on the [Division of the Budget's website](#): "a legislative enactment that continues all or part of the undisbursed balance of an [appropriation](#) that would otherwise lapse (see [lapsed appropriation](#)). Reappropriations are commonly used in the case of federally funded programs and capital projects, where the funding amount is intended to support activities that may span several fiscal years."
 - (d) What is the cumulative total of these 41 pages of legislative reappropriations?
 - (e) What is the tally of each section of legislative reappropriations – and why was this amount not deducted from the corresponding appropriations for each entity and/or why did the availability of reappropriations not obviate the need for any of the mostly 3% increases from FY2024-25:
 - (i) Senate: pp. 35-38;
 - (ii) Assembly: pp. 38-41;
 - (iii) Ways & Means (pp. 41-43);
 - (iv) Senate & Assembly Joint Entities (pp. 43-72):
 - Legislative Ethics Commission (pp. 43-47);
 - Legislative Health Service (pp. 47-50);
 - Legislative Library (pp. 50-54);
 - Legislative Messenger Service (pp. 54-58);
 - Legislative Bill Drafting Commission (pp. 58-60);
 - Demographic Research/Reapportionment Task Force (pp. 60-72);
 - Independent Redistricting Commission (pp. 72-73);
 - Commission on LI Power Authority (p. 73-74).
 - (v) Special Revenue Funds-Other (pp. 74-75);
 - Computer Services Fund (pp. 74-75);
 - Recyclable Materials; Info Services & Conference (p. 75).

- (35) Can you explain why [Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.3001/A.3001](#) (pp. 43-47) has reappropriations for the Legislative Ethics Commission, but, by comparison, [State Operations Budget Bill #S.3000/A.3000](#) has NO reappropriations for
- (i) the Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government (pp. 215-216);
 - (ii) the State Inspector General (pp. 467-469);
 - (iii) the Commission on Judicial Conduct (p. 471);
 - (iv) the Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct (p. 595).
- (36) Governor Hochul’s [Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.3001/A.3001](#) contains no cumulative tally for its monetary allocations for the Legislature, is that correct? What is the dollar amount? Is it the addition of appropriations in its §1 (pp. 1-10) and reappropriations in its §4 (pp. 35-75)?
- (37) Is it concerning to you that none of the glaring deficiencies, inconsistencies, and inaccuracies of the Legislature’s FY2025-26 budget, such as hereinabove summarized, were made the subject of “recommendations” by Governor Hochul, pursuant to [Article VII, §1 of the New York State Constitution](#), requiring that the “Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature, certified by the presiding officer of each house” be included in the state budget “without revision but with such recommendations as the governor may deem appropriate”.
- (38) Can you explain why the Senate and Assembly “colorbook” analyses of the FY2025-26 budget either contain no inclusion, at all, of the Legislature’s budget, or no analysis thereof?⁵
- (39) Would you be willing to publicly give your answers to the above questions pertaining to your [FY2025-26 legislative budget](#) and [Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill #S.3001/A.3001](#) at a legislative hearing on the Legislature’s own budget and, if not, why?

⁵ The [Senate Majority “Blue Book”](#), [Senate Minority “White Book”](#), and [Assembly Majority’s “Yellow Book”](#) do not mention the Legislature’s budget, at all. The [Assembly Minority’s “Green Book”](#) is the only one to include the Legislature in its table of contents, combined with the Judiciary, with skeletal information furnished in a one-page section (p. 188).