

POINT II of petitioner's November 6, 2005 "Conforming Brief on the Merits" (pp. 36-37): the venue provision of the disruption of Congress statute and her entitlement to removal/transfer to federal court*

ISSUE II

D.C. CODE §10-503.18 ENTITLED SASSOWER TO REMOVAL/TRANSFER TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA – WHERE, ADDITIONALLY, THE RECORD ESTABLISHES A PERVASIVE PATTERN OF EGREGIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HER FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND "PROTECTIONISM" OF THE GOVERNMENT

It does not appear that this Court – or any other -- has ever interpreted D.C. Code §10-503.18 – the section of the District of Columbia Code pertaining to prosecutions for offenses committed on "Capitol Grounds" under D.C. Code §10-503.16. In pertinent part, it states:

"(c)...Prosecution for any violation of 10-503.16(a) or for conduct which constitutes a felony under the general laws of the United States or the laws of the District of Columbia shall be in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. All other prosecutions for violations of this part **may** be in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.... (bold added for emphasis)

* This POINT II is identical to POINT II in petitioner's June 28, 2005 brief, except for an italicized addition to its footnote. The POINT replicates petitioner's argument in her April 6, 2004 petition in support of certiorari and/or certification of questions of law as to the interpretation of the venue provision of the disruption of Congress statute and her entitlement to removal/transfer to federal court.

In other words, while a prosecution for “disruption of Congress” pursuant to D.C. Code §10.503.16(b)(4), “**may** be in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia”, it is actually properly venued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

Based on the language of D.C. Code §10.503.18, Sassower was legally entitled to have the U.S. Attorney prosecute the “disruption of Congress” charge against her in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with no special showing by her required for that venue. That being said, the record of this case establishes a pervasive pattern of judicial lawlessness and “protectionism” of the government¹³, warranting removal to another venue.

[p. 37] Sassower’s rights under D.C. Code §10-503.18 were presented for the first time by her March 22, 2004 motion [A-375]. Her interpretation of D.C. Code §10-503.18 was drawn from the plain meaning of its language [A-401-2] and not denied or disputed by the prosecution’s March 23, 2004 opposition [A-464]. Judge Holeman’s March 29, 2004 order [A-466] disposed of the issue by falsely purporting that Sassower had presented “no...change in substantive law, nor citation of any legal authority supportive of the requested relief” [A-466-7].

¹³ This includes the wilful failure of supervisory authorities of the Superior Court to respond to Sassower’s February 26, February 27, and March 17, 2004 memoranda for their supervisory oversight of Judge Holeman [A-426, 435, 454], as well as this Court’s response to her April 6, 2004 mandamus/prohibition/certiorari petition and stay application – a prelude to what it did on her motions for release from incarceration pending appeal, on her perfected emergency appeal, *[and on the motions and en banc petition she filed in connection with her June 28, 2005 brief – all chronicled by her October 14, 2005 motion]*.