Re: Judicial Conduct Complaint
Docket No. 90-8561

This is a petition to the Judicial Council to review the decision of Acting Chief Judge THOMAS J. MESKILL ["Meskill"], dated March 16, 1992, rendered with respect to an 18 U.S.C. §372[c] complaint filed eighteen (18) months ago.

1a. Civilized men and intelligent institutions accepts, indeed encourages, complaints with appreciation, particularly when their making necessitates the non-remunerative expenditure of time and monies.

b. At the other end of the spectrum are those, such as Judge Meskill, who resort to ad hominem attacks at the messenger, and in an attempt to conceal egregious and criminal behavior, perverts the facts and resorts to obvious sophistry.

2a. The instant complaint sets forth a single instance, in a charted course of criminal conduct by U.S. District Court Judge WILLIAM J. CONNER ["Conner"], in aiding and abetting the criminal racketeering adventures of MOB and their cronies.

b. "MOB" is the acronym for N.Y. Appellate Division Presiding Justice FRANCIS T. MURPHY ["Murphy"], Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge JAMES L. OAKES ["Oakes"], and Chief U.S. District Court Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT ["Brieant"] -- the "hard core" jurists involved in the Conner episode.

3a. Only the blind, the fools and/or the arrogant could possibly avoid comprehending the invulnerability of my position and the criminal implications of the conduct and opinions of Judge Meskill.

b. Conclusive documentary evidence confirms the larceny of (1) all of the judicial trust assets of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. ["Puccini"] -- "the judicial fortune cookie"; (2) the diversion of substantial monies payable "to the federal court" to private pockets; (3) the "extortion" of "millions of dollars" from HYMAN RAFFE ["Raffe"] in favor of the MOB cronies, to avoid incarceration under trialess convictions; and (4) other racketeering crimes.

(1) No combination of words or judicial opinions can conceal the fact that despite the "approval" of a "final accounting" by Referee DONALD DIAMOND ["Diamond"] for the court-appointed receiver of Puccini, such "accounting" does not exist -- the "accounting" is `phantom'.

Indeed, since Puccini was involuntarily dissolved almost twelve (12) years ago, not a single filed accounting exists, as court records and responsible media representatives have confirmed, although the statutory mandate is for the filing of an

accounting "at least once a year". This was a situation wherein MOB and Judge Conner were essential actors.

(2) A substantial, indeed essential, contributor to the diversion of monies payable "to the federal court" to the pockets of the judicial cronies, was Judge Meskill.

Judge Oakes attempted to conceal the contribution of Judge Meskill, and Judge Meskill attempted to conceal the contribution of Judge Oakes.

The Oakes-Meskill attempt to conceal a manifestly unconstitutional conviction, along with the diversion of monies from the federal government to the judicial cronies, simply imports an additional component of evil.

(3) All the judicial opinions that Judge Meskill can muster cannot do battle with the independently investigated, published words of Mr. JONATHAN FERZIGER ["Ferziger"] of UNITED PRESS, INTERNATIONAL ["UPI"]:

> "By signing three extraordinary agreements in 1985, however, Raffe agreed to foot all legal costs incurred by Feltman's firm and Citibank's lawyers, Kreindler & Relkin, for defending against Sassower. In exchange, the court agreed to let him go free. The tab so far has come to more than $2.5 million, paid to both the Feltman and Kreindler firms. Raffe continues to pay with checks from his A.R. Fuels Co. business."

As long as Raffe keeps paying, and so the written agreement reads, he will not be incarcerated.

The written agreements also provide that Raffe will consent to the "approval" of a `phantom' "accounting", and execute releases to the state and federal judiciary.

(4) Defending these privately motivated activities, which do not comport with the legitimate interests of the federal government, and without a "scope certification", without a "scope adjudication" and without a United States substitution (28 U.S.C. §2679[d]), at federal cost and expense, are various U.S. attorneys, although there is no authority for such private representation (cf. 28 U.S.C. §547).

The public taxpayer understands the difference between "perks" and "larceny", and having the "Oakes-Brieant Evil Judicial Empires" defended at federal cost and expense for diverting monies payable "to the federal court" to private pockets, is an outright fraud on the federal purse.

4a. The Report of Judge Meskill states:

> "To the extent complainant alleges ex parte contacts with a law firm, either by the judge sending the transmittal memorandum or meeting with members of the firm, there is no evidence to support these claims." [emphasis supplied]

b. The signed "Bill to Terry" "fixing memorandum" in the possession of U.S. District Court Judge CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR. ["Haight"], with the immediate response given to same by Judge Haight, without more, is clear evidence that such "fixing memorandum" was "transmitted" by or on behalf of Judge Conner.

c. Had Judge Meskill desired further evidence of "the transmittal" of this "fixing memorandum", from Judge Conner to Judge Haight, or of any other point, in the eighteen (18) months this matter was pending, there was ample opportunity for Judge Meskill and/or this Court to request same.

5a. Nor did Judge Meskill request, during this eighteen (18) month period, of the evidence of Judge Conner's "ex parte contacts with a law firm" or "meeting with members of the firm".

b. This "fix" by Judge Conner of Judge Haight was initiated by the "ex parte [personal] contact" of EDWARD WEISSMAN, Esq. ["Weissman"] formerly with KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. ["K&R"], thereafter, and at the time, with FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. ["FKM&F"].

c. The existence of such "fix" was transmitted by FKM&F and K&R to most of the attorneys involved in Sassower v. Sapir, et al. (87 Civ. 7135 [CHS]), the existence of such "fix" was openly flaunted by FKM&F and K&R, effectively confessed to be true by Judge Conner, by Judge Haight and by Chief Judge Brieant, and supported by Court filed documents.

6a. After the decision of Young v. U.Y. ex rel Vuitton (481 U.S. 787 [1987]), the criminal contempt proceeding had no chance of success, since it took away from K&R-FKM&F -- "the criminals with law degrees" -- the power to prosecute.

b. "The criminals with law degrees" were however interested in aborting Sassower v. Sapir (supra), and they needed not only the Conner "fix", but also the Conner "deceit".

c(1) By its expressed language Raffe v. Doe (619 F. Supp. 891 [SDNY-1985]), only attempted to immunize pre-1985 misconduct, assuming arguendo, Judge Conner had the subject matter power to immunize misconduct which had never been adjudicated or personal jurisdiction.

(2) In haec verba, Raffe v. Doe (supra) states (at p. 897):

> "However, these complaints also allege certain improprieties by state court judges in connection with respect to Puccini proceedings after the date of Judge Nickerson's decision ... . Since these alleged misdeeds after Judge Nickerson's decision, they were not and could not have been litigated in that action. However, all of these alleged improprieties apparently could have been, and perhaps still can be, reviewed by appeal in the state courts, it would be wholly inappropriate for this Court to consider them here. Accordingly, the Court on its own motion hereby dismisses the complaints in .... ." [emphasis supplied]

(3) However, all the misconduct complained about in Sassower v. Sapir (supra) took place in a bankruptcy proceeding which was filed in October of 1986, or at least one (1) year afterward.

7a. The deceit perpetrated by Judge Conner upon Judge Haight by this "Bill to Terry" ex parte transmittal becomes apparent when Judge Haight's reaction is examined upon the receipt of same.

b. Again it must be remembered that there was nothing in Sassower v. Sapir (supra) which violated, or could have violated, the Conner injunction, assuming arguendo, it was valid, the pending motions by "the criminals with law degrees" before Judge Haight, to the contrary notwithstanding.

c. Immediately, upon receipt of this "Bill to Terry" "fixing memorandum", Judge Haight, sua sponte, issued an Order which read as follows:

> "ORDERED, that all motions filed to date by plaintiff Sassower are hereby held in abeyance until a final determination on defendants' motions to dismiss [based on the Conner injunction] by this Court; and it further
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> ORDERED, that plaintiff is hereby enjoined from filing any further motions in this proceedings until a final determination on defendants' motions to dismiss [based on the Conner injunction] is made; and it is further
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> ORDERED, that any defendants who have not filed motions to dismiss but who wish to be heard on issues raised currently filed by other defendants must file papers by December 1, 1987; ..."

d. The validity of the Conner injunction in Sassower v. Sapir (supra) was never adjudicated.

(1) Upon obtaining a copy of the "Bill to Terry" "fixing memorandum" and based this document and on other information, I amended my complaint, as "of course", adding Judge Conner as a Dennis v. Sparks (449 U.S. 24 [1980]) co-defendant.

(2) Whereupon, Chief Judge Brieant intruded himself upon the Judge Haight bailiwick, and without even a pretense of jurisdiction or due process, sua sponte, dismissed an action which was then and always before Judge Haight.

(3) As part of such sua sponte, without due process dismissal, Chief Judge Brieant fabricated, concocted and contrived the assertion that Judge Haight had been added as a co-defendant, and barred the filing by plaintiff of any further papers, which has included any motion to vacate such invalid dismissal or any Rule 60(b) independent action.

(4) Thereafter, in a third, sua sponte, without any due process or jurisdiction, Chief Judge Brieant physically barred me from the Courthouse in White Plains.

e. Thus, for Judge Meskill to assert that I have been barred from filing papers, without disclosing the patent invalidity of such Chief Judge Brieant edicts, is misleading and deceptive.

8a. However, it is the recent decision in Matter of Polur (173 A.D.2d 82, 579 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept.-1992]), which exposes the modus operandi of this criminal operation.

b(1) The Court-appointed receiver, unable to account, by virtue of the larceny that had occurred, corrupted the state judiciary, to enjoin any proceeding, inter alia, to compel an accounting.

(2) As stated in Matter of Polur (supra, at 83, 4):

> "on or about January 23, 1985, ... Sassower and/or Raffe, or any person acting in their behalf from, inter alia, filing any complaint or proceeding concerning Puccini, its shareholders, the conduct of the receiver for Puccini or its legal representation by the law firm of Feltman, Karesh & Major"

(3) Thereafter, after corrupting Judge Conner and other federal judges, "the criminals with law degrees" obtained a similar injunction in Raffe v. Doe (supra).

(4) I, Polur, and Raffe, without a trial, without the opportunity for a trial, without any confrontation rights, or live testimony in support thereof, were convicted by Mr. Justice ALVIN

F. KLEIN ["Klein"], and in one document, each sentenced to serve 30 days.

(5) Polur and I served our terms of incarceration, and based upon three (3) manifestly unconstitutional convictions, which I was not permitted to controvert, these "offenses" (Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 [1966]) was escalated to "serious" crimes (cf. Blanton v. City of No. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 [1989]), and I was disbarred.

(6) No disciplinary action was taken against Polur however, who had abandoned the Puccini scene, until years thereafter, when Polur began to expose the misconduct of "the criminals with law degrees" in the federal courts (Polur v. Raffe, et al, 727 F. Supp. 810 [SDNY-1989]).

(7) Thus, as stated in Matter of Polur (supra, at 83, 4):

> "On or about April 25, 1989, the DDC [Departmental Disciplinary Committee] served respondent [Polur] with a Notice of, and a Statement of Charges ..."

(8) It is manifestly evident that Polur was suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years, not for his trialess conviction, but because he sought to vindicate his rights in the federal courts in the Second Circuit.

9a. The bottom line -- my obligation as a citizen, has fated this criminal judicial misadventure and its participants, which will not be arrested by the diatribes of Judge Meskill, Judge Conner or anyone else.

b. Man's long hard march from the cave, will not compel me to return to that environment, or accept the "goose stepping" mentality which compelled me to witness, from Normandy to Germany, in 1944-1945, all that cannot, and should not, be forgotten.

Dated: April 8, 1992

Respectfully,

GEORGE SASSOWER