COMPLAINT FORM

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDICIAL OFFICER UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)

INSTRUCTIONS:

- (a) ,All questions on this form must be answered.
- (b) A separate complaint form must be filled out for each judicial officer complained against.
- (c) Submit the correct number of copies of this form and the statement of facts. For a complaint against:

a court of appeals judge -- 3 copies a district court judge or magistrate -- 4 copies a bankruptcy judge -- 5 copies

(For further information see Rule 2(e)).

- (d) Service on the judicial officer will be made by the Clerk's office. (For further information See Rule 3(a)(1)).
- (e) Mail this form, the statement of facts and the appropriate number of copies to the Clerk, United States Court of Appeals, United States Courthouse, Foley Square, New York, New York 10007.

GEORGE

1. Complainant's name:

Address:

pins

Arreel

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Daytime telephone (with area code): (914) 949-2

LAKE.

2. Judge or magistrate complained about:

ChARles L. BRIEAN Name: Southern. COURS 55. Court: 1

3. Does this complaint concern the behavior of the judge or magistrate in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?

[]Yes [X]NO

If "yes," give the following information about each lawsuit (use the reverse side if there is more than one):

Court:

Docket number:

Docket numbers of any appeals to the Second Circuit:

Did a lawyer represent you?

[]Yes [X]NO

If "yes" give the name, address, and telephone number of your lawyer:

N/A.

4. Have you previously filed any complaints of judicial misconduct or disability against any judge or magistrate?

[V] Yes [] No

If "Yes," give the docket number of each complaint.

90-8557 (87-5103, 90-RSSE)

5. You should attach a statement of facts on which your complaint is based, see rule 2(b), and

EITHER

(1) check the box and sign the form. You do not need a notary public if you check this box.

[K] I declare under penalty of perjury that:

(1) I have read rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, and

(2) The statements made in this complaint and attached statement of facts are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(signature) George. SARJOWER Executed on Oct. 29, 1990. (date)

OR

(2) check the box below and sign this form in the presence of a notary public;

[] I swear (affirm) that--

(1) I have read rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, and

(2) The statements made in this complaint and attached statement of facts are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(signature) Executed on

(date)

Sworn and subscribed to before me

(Notary Public) My commission expires:

"[Complainant's action] had the effect, and probably the purpose of disrupting the orderly judicial decisional process of the district court." (Chief U.S. District Judge Charles L. Brieant, December 10, 1990)

Chief Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT 28 U.S.C. §372[c]

1a. This is my second 28 U.S.C. §372[c] complaint against Chief Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT ["Brieant"], and relates only to the administrative practices of the Chief Judge.

b. The complaint dated October 10, 1990 (Docket #90-8557) emphasized the "no due process" procedures of Chief Judge Brieant, which resemble the ukases of the worst of Russian czars, rather than an American judicial system.

2a. The headed comment was made by Chief Judge Brieant based upon the false, contrived and concocted charge that complainant had added U.S. District Judge CHARLES S. HEIGHT, JR. ["Height"] as a party defendant in a civil action pending before Judge Height, when the court-filed documents reveals otherwise.

b. The charge of intentionally "disrupting the orderly judicial decisional process" is serious, and anyone culpable should have been punished by Chief Judge Brieant.

c. To the extent that punishment was warranted finds complainant in accord with the Chief Judge.

d. Complainant finds disagreement with the Chief Judge as to (1) the lack of due process employed by the Chief Judge in imposing punishment; (2) the intrusion into the "decisional process" of Judge Height; and (3) punishing the victim, rather than the culprit.

Administrative Charge 1:

3a. The "Bill to Terry" Memorandum of October 21, 1987 (Exhibit "A"), correctly states that it relates to a "criminal contempt" charge against the complainant, which was pending before Judge Height for adjudication.

b. The more exacting and impeccable nature of the "decisional process" in a criminal contempt proceeding is well established.

c. Upon the receipt of a copy of Exhibit "A", and the exhibit itself reveals that a copy was sent directly to Chief Judge Brieant by U.S. District Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER

["Conner"], the Chief Judge's administrative mandate was for immediate remedial action.

d. The Chief Judge, unconcerned about the "decisional process", even when of constitutional magnitude, took absolutely no administrative action at all.

e. "Fixing", by recused jurists, is obviously acceptable, even promoted, in the Chief Judge Brieant forums.

Administrative Charge 2:

4a. Thereafter, only after the complainant had amended his complaint in the civil action pending before Judge Height, as "of course", by naming Judge Conner as a <u>Dennis v. Sparks</u> (449 U.S. 24 [1980]) "fixing" co-defendant, did Chief Judge Brieant react.

b. Clearly, Chief Judge Brieant, by his intrusive intervention in complainant's civil proceeding by, inter alia, dismissing the complaint, without any due process procedures whatsoever, was not interested in any "orderly judicial decisional process of the district court".

Administrative Charge 3:

5a. A mere scintilla of reasoning power irresistibly compels the conclusion that the Judge Conner Memorandum (Exhibit "A") was a fraud and a hoax.

b. The charge made by complainant is that Chief Judge Brieant had <u>actual knowledge</u> that the Judge Conner Memorandum was a treacherous fraud and intended to advance a criminal racketeering adventure in which the Chief Judge also had an interest.

6a. Neither on October 21, 1987, nor anytime before or after, was Judge Height a "target" of the complainant, as Judge Conner falsely charged in order to trigger a bias against the complainant.

b. Judge Height was simply a jurist who, a mere sixteen (16) days before, by a random selection method, had been assigned a civil action in which the complainant was the plaintiff.

c. The Judge Conner written false and inflammatory remark, which he circulated to five (5) other jurists and two (2) clerks of the court, "[w]elcome to the ever-growing group of Sassower targets", called for an administrative response by Judge Brieant, and Judge Brieant failed to act.

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Administrative Charge 4:

7a. During 1987 the instances of professional misconduct by KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. ["K&R"], FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. ["FKM&F"], and their entourage, in the forums administratively controlled by Chief Judge Brieant reached vertiginous heights as partially shown herein.

b. Complainant's letter to Chief Judge Brieant of June 21, 1987, reads partially as follows:

"Supplementing my Rule 4 complaint of June 9, 1987, with respect to the above law firm, which Your Honor has <u>not</u> yet acknowledged, I wish to state that I was informed on Friday, June 19, 1987, by Mr. Hyman Raffe himself, that he is still making 'extortion' and 'blackmail' payments to Feltman, Karesh, Major, & Farbman, Esgs.

In the words of Mr. Raffe, 'I now wished I had gone to jail rather than made payments to the above firm and to Kreindler & Relkin, P.C. in order to avoid such incarcerations'.

'Why do you just not stop making such payments, since they are clearly illegal and unenforceable', I asked Mr. Raffe?

'Because', he said, 'the legal question of their illegality would be determined by corrupt judges controlled by the Feltman firm, or judges who give obedience to the desires of corrupt judges'.

As to the threat of Ira Postel, Esq., the lap-dog of Feltman, Karesh, Major & Farbman, Esqs., that they [the Feltman firm] would 'keep bleeding Raffe to death' and that 'they were going to retaliate against my children unless I stopped', I consulted, thus far, one of my three children, as I said I would.

My youngest daughter, the one I consulted, said that they were 'dumb' because then they would then have four (4) full time adversaries rather than one (1).

In view of the aforementioned comment, I did not believe it necessary to consult my other two (2) daughters, before telling the above law firm, by this letter, to 'go to hell'!"

c. Complainant's letter to Chief Judge Brieant of June 25, 1987, read partially as follows:

"Mr. Raffe is being compelled to underwrite the appeal of the Feltman firm from the Order of Hon. DAVID N. EDELSTEIN (<u>Sassower v. Sheriff</u>, 651 F. Supp. 128), although it does not inure to his benefit.

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Mr. Raffe is being compelled to underwrite the Feltman litigation before Hon. GERARD L. GOETTEL (87 Civ. 1450), although he has no interest in same.

Mr. Raffe is being compelled to underwrite the expenses of the Feltman firm in the litigation pending before Hon. HOWARD SCHWARTZBERG (86 Bkcy 20500) to the point that all actions taken therein are adverse to his own personal interests.

Mr. Raffe was compelled to underwrite the expenses of the Feltman firm in their attempt to defeat his \$2254 writ before other judges in the Southern District.

In no civilized society are the condemned, whether correctly or not, compelled to "dig their own graves" before they are executed.

I will not permit any federal judge, including Your Honor, Judge GOETTEL, or Judge SCHWARTZBERG, the luxury of closing their eyes, covering their ears, and holding their breath, in order to avoid their concomitant responsibility of assuring that their courts are not made the subject of fraud, corruption, and extortion. ...

Your Honor need only look at the documents, for they clearly state that either Mr. Raffe does and pays what the Feltman firm desire or Mr. Raffe is incarcerated, pursuant to trial-less convictions or Reports. ...

Mr. Raffe was told, and so the documents show, that if he executes releases in favor of corrupt judges, including Referee Donald Diamond and Mr. Justice Alvin F. Klein, and pays and otherwise obeys the instructions of the Feltman firm, which he has thus far, he will not be incarcerated. ...

Judicial corruption, pay-offs, trial-less incarcerations, are not 'the coins of the judicial realm', in this or any other circuit, and I, 'Captain Ahab fashion' intend to eradicate such

practices by the Feltman and Kreindler firms, at all costs."

d. Nothing was done and consequently FKM&F felt free to thereafter engage, once again, Judge Conner in order to corrupt, this time their target was Judge Height.

Administrative Charge 5:

8a. Only a few days ago, on October 19, 1990, Judge Brieant in an Order wherein the Chief Judge granted the complainant permission to file a petition in bankruptcy, Chief Judge Brieant stated that the matter was to be adjudicated in the Bowling Green Courthouse, rather than at White Plains (Exhibit "B"), the existence of a Chief Judge for the Bankruptcy Court notwithstanding.

b. 28 U.S.C. §154[b] provides:

"The chief judge of the bankruptcy judge court shall ensure that the rules of the bankruptcy court and of the district court are observed, and that the business of the bankruptcy court is handled effectively and expeditiously."

c. The statutory obligation to "ensure" compliance of the "rules" has been placed by Congress upon Chief Judge BURTON R. LIFLAND ["Lifland"], not Chief Judge Brieant.

d. The "orderly judicial decisional process" is being intentionally and deliberately being transmogrified by Chief Judge Brieant, not the complainant, in order to advance a criminal racketeering adventure in which the Chief Judge is inextricably involved.

Conclusion:

9a. Obviously, it is Chief Judge Brieant, not the complainant, who is "disrupting the orderly judicial decisional process".

b. In December 1987 complainant, in judicially submitted papers, declared the Judge Brieant forums "Unfit for Human Litigation".

c. It was an apt, honestly expressed, statement which the complainant finds no reason to reconsider or change.

Dated: October 29, 1990

GEORGE SASSOWER