

March 23, 1993

Commission on Judicial Conduct
801 Second Avenue,
17th Floor
New York, NY 10017

Re: Judge Matthew T. Crosson

Gentlemen:

I set forth only some, of the many, charges of misconduct, of egregious criminal magnitude, that can be lodged against Judge Matthew T. Crosson.

Charge I. - Judge Crosson is being sued in his personal, not official, capacity, for monetary tort damages, wherein my complaint and other papers specifically and emphatically disclaim any state liability (Sassower v. Abrams [92-08515 SDNY]).

Nevertheless, Judge Crosson in such personal capacity action is being represented at state cost and expense, and defrauding the state treasury thereby (see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 358 [1991]; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [1985]).

Charge II - Unquestionably, Judge Crosson, as well as his attorney, Attorney General Robert Abrams, are aware that the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, precludes a defense representation in a money damage tort action, at state cost and expense (Puerto Rico v. Metcalf, 506 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 684 [1993]).

The state, its agencies and employees, invariably object to any action against them in the federal forum as being in violation of the United States Constitution.

However, in Sassower v. Abrams (supra) in order to advance, privately motivated, criminal racketeering activities, neither Judge Crosson nor his attorney, Robert Abrams, have interposed such subject matter jurisdictional objection.

For months, I have contended that such state expenditures is a subject matter jurisdictional violation of the United States Constitution, which neither Judge Crosson or Attorney General disputes, nevertheless they continue on this lawless course of misconduct.

Charge III - Attorney General Abrams is the statutory fiduciary of all involuntary dissolved corporations, with extensive discretionary powers and some mandatory duties (e.g. Business Corporation Law §1214[a], §1216[a]).

The Attorney General function, insofar as involuntary dissolved corporations are involved, is to police the courts, its judges, and its appointees, such as court-appointed receivers.

Having the statutory fiduciary of a trust, such as Abrams, serve as the attorney for those who are engaged in the larceny of judicial trust assets or aiding and abetting same, such as Judge Crosson, is "rock bottom" on everyone's ethical and legal scale.

Charge IV - As a mandatory statutory "duty" the Attorney General must compel a court-appointed to file an accounting if not performed within eighteen (18) months (Business Corporation Law §1216[a]). Under a mirrored scheme, a court-appointed receiver must file an accounting "at least once a year" (22 NYCRR §202.52[e]).

Puccini Clothes, Ltd. was involuntarily dissolved on June 4, 1980, or almost thirteen (13) years ago, and not a single accounting has been filed.

All of Puccini's judicial trust assets were made the subject of larceny and plundering by members of the judiciary and its cronies, leaving nothing for any of its legitimate creditors.

Although Referee Donald Diamond "approved" the "final accounting" for Lee Feltman, the court-appointed receiver, there is no accounting in existence. The "final accounting", as Judge Crosson knows, is 'phantom' and 'non-existent'.

Nor is there any Judiciary Law §35-a statements filed by the corrupt jurists involved, as Judge Crosson also knows.

In short, this criminal racketeering scheme, and similar schemes, could not exist except for the active cooperation of Judge Crosson.

Most Respectfully,

GEORGE SASSOWER

cc: Chief Administrator Matthew T. Crosson
Ass't Atty. Gen. Angela M. Cartmill