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January 17, 1994

Commission on Judicial Conduct
801 Second Avenue,
17th Floor
New York, NY 10017

Certified Mail
P 269 529 247

Re: WILLIAM C. THOMPSON. Associate Justice, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Dept.

Gentlemen:

I here set forth only some of the acts of misconduct of Mr. Justice Thompson, a member of your Commission, all of which are of an egregious criminal magnitude, mandating a grand jury submission, and an interim suspension, pending a due process hearing.

Upon request, further details and supporting documentation will be submitted.

Charge I.

1. Exhibit "A" is a legal notice published in the New York Times which proposes to settle a "final accounting" of LEE FELTMAN, Esq. ["Feltman"], the court-appointed receiver for PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD. ["Puccini"] -- an "accounting" which neither existed on October 30, 1986, nor any other date, before or after, a fraud which I, singularly exposed to the chagrin of, inter alia, Judge Thompson, for which he, his Court, and others unlawfully retaliated and still retaliates against me, those perceived to be associated with me, and/or those perceived to have some leverage over my activities.

2a. The published "legal notice" notwithstanding, there was no accounting, final or otherwise, for Puccini's judicial trust assets, which can be easily confirmed by requesting a copy of such 1986 final accounting, or any other accounting, for Puccini, from the NY State Attorney General, Referee DONALD DIAMOND ["Diamond"], or Feltman.

b. An "accounting" for an involuntarily dissolved corporation, must be filed "at least once a year" (22 NYCRR §202.52[e]), and includes as essential elements, the assets that existed on the date of dissolution and, inter alia, the disposition all such assets.

c. Any true accounting would clearly implicate Judge Thompson in this criminal racketeering adventure.

2a. All of Puccini's judicial trust assets were made the subject of larceny by the cronies of the judiciary, with most of Puccini's trust assets being employed to bribe and corrupt--leaving nothing for any legitimate creditor, of which I am one such creditor.

b. Such larceny, excepting wash transactions, includes the more than $4,000,000.00 debited to the Puccini bank account, without the approval of the court-appointed receiver.

c. Such larceny also includes the disposition of all of Puccini's large inventory without the approval of the court-appointed receiver, for which only $512 gross can be accounted for as being received by Puccini.

d. For concealing the above larceny, and much more, and not making any attempt at recovery, there was transferred to the law-firm of the receiver, FELTMAN, KARESH, MAJOR & FARBMAN, Esqs. [FKM&F"], a firm which considers Judge Thompson as one of their cadre of corrupt judges, almost $700,000.

e. Since FKM&F, nor anyone else, can show any effort on behalf of Puccini, there is no Judiciary Law §35-a filings for the almost $700,000 given to FKM&F.

3a. Every relevant act and/or omission by Judge Thompson, without exception, irresistibly compels the conclusion that Judge Thompson was, at all times, intentionally aiding, abetting and facilitating such criminal racketeering adventure, and acting in defiance of his judicial, administrative and ethical obligations.

b. Some of the activities of Judge Thompson, intended to aid, abet and facilitate the Puccini racketeering adventure is hereinafter set forth.

Charge II.

1a. After I had been, sua sponte, removed by Surrogate ERNEST L. SIGNORELLI ["Signorelli"], and the testator's right to have the alternate executrix serve in my stead ignored, essentially all the assets of the Estate of EUGENE PAUL KELLY ["Kelly Estate"] were unlawfully dissipated to satisfy the monetary, political and social obligations of Surrogate Signorelli and his appointee, Public Administrator ANTHONY MASTROIANNI ["Mastroianni"] -- leaving nothing for the beneficiaries.

b. Instructively, years later, on September 8th, 1985, The New York Times published the following concerning the Signorelli modus operandi (XXI, p. 1, 10):

> "John P. Cohalan, a retired Appellate Division justice ... has been serving as the chief spokesman for the Rohl campaign in criticizing Surrogate Signorelli. Mr. Cohalan has contended in speeches that until recently all of the surrogate patronage appointments have gone to 10 lawyers close to Surrogate Signorelli, in addition, Mr. Cohalan talks about the 'horror story' in Surrogate's Court, including what he termed a lack of courtesy, unnecessary delays and Surrogate Signorelli's inaccessibility to lawyers."

2a. In an estate which should have been concluded and closed within a few months after the Mastroianni appointment, Signorelli and Mastroianni avoided settling the estate for many years, concocting, fabricating and employing, as an excuse, the canard that I did not turn over the books and records of the Kelly Estate.

b. However, in a disciplinary proceeding, where confrontation rights were afforded, Signorelli and Mastroianni confessed that the accusations about my alleged failures, were intentionally concocted by them, and so the confirmed report of the Referee stated.

c. The Signorelli-Mastroianni testimony was sufficiently dramatic that the Grievance Committee made application to prohibit me from disclosing the Signorelli-Mastroianni testimony.

3a. Now deprived of the ability of employing their canards concerning my withholding of Kelly Estate books and records, six (6) years later, Mastroianni was compelled to initiate a proceeding to settle his account, in which he now attributed to my stewardship the losses incurred, and requesting substantial very surcharges against me.

b. Despite the natural attempts of the Acting Surrogate to give Signorelli and Mastroianni the benefit of every possible inference, they could not show the loss of a single dollar caused by any alleged mismanagement on my part.

4a. Instructively, during such accounting hearings, some newly disclosed Mastroianni records revealed that he and Signorelli had intentionally deceived the Referee in the Disciplinary Proceedings, and that they, at all times, had in their possession, the books and records of Kelly's personal accountant, as well as those turned over by me.

b. However, this new disclosure did not change the result of the Disciplinary Hearings, which had resulted in a 32-0 massacre in favor of myself and my former spouse, a result which was then and presently remains unprecedented.

5a. At the time of Mastroianni's accounting proceedings, my only legal interest in such proceeding was to defend myself against the surcharge claims of Mastroianni and to be awarded a fee for my services and disbursements. Until I reversed, my sua sponte removal as executor, I had no standing to protect the Kelly Estate or its beneficiaries.

b. Nevertheless, as part of the resoundingly slaughter of the Signorelli-Mastroianni forces in the accounting proceedings, I did expose some of the larceny and plunderings attempted by them, and the Acting Surrogate had no alternative but to reduce those claims against the Kelly Estate to a small fraction.

6a. I was an absolutely essential and indispensable party on appeal in the Thompson Court, since my fee claims had not been honored by the Acting Surrogate; the lawfulness of my sua sponte removal as executor had been preserved for appellate review; and the rejected surcharges against me were sought to be reasserted by Mastroianni in the Thompson Court.

b. Furthermore, in a post-accounting proceeding before the Acting Surrogate, in which I was not a party, and did not even know about, the federal government surcharged Mastroianni for his failure to timely pay the taxes due on the Kelly Estate.

c. Instead, of Mastroianni paying for such tax penalty surcharge out of his own funds, since it was the result of his neglect, Mastroianni and his attorneys, ex parte, and without any due process, seized the assets of GENE KELLY MOVING & STORAGE TRUSTS ["Kelly Trusts"], wherein I always have been the trustee.

d. Thus, the beneficiaries of the Kelly Trusts, were being deprived, without due process of law, of their property, because of Mastroianni's default and failures in not paying the taxes due on the Kelly Estate.

7a. For reasons here irrelevant, the only opportunity I had to object to such ex parte, without due process, post-accounting seizure of Kelly Trust assets, was in the Thompson Court.

b(1) Mastroianni. in making his presentation in the Thompson Court, did not serve me; or the attorney for most of the Kelly Estate beneficiaries who had died about six (6) prior to argument in the Thompson Court (NY Times, 7/1/88 B8, col3 [Charles Z. Abuza, Esq.]), and no proceedings had been brought for substitute counsel caused by his death.

(2) A reading of the opinion of the Thompson Court (Matter of Eugene Paul Kelly, 147 A.D.2d 564, 537 N.Y.S.2d 857 [2nd Dept.-1989]), reveals that I and the beneficiaries were essential parties to the appeal, but we were not (at 537 N.Y.S.2d 858).

c. In short, by reason of the aforementioned and other infirmities, the proceedings in the Thompson Court were void, as Judge Thompson was and is aware.

d. When I, by motion, brought such jurisdictional infirmities to the attention of the Thompson Court, and under the uncontroverted circumstances, Matter of E.P. Kelly (supra) had to be vacated, Judge Thompson denied my motion with $100 costs.

8a. Thus, as a result of Judge Thompson's intentional misconduct, where his Court did not have jurisdiction or even a modicum of discretion, the beneficiaries of the Kelly Trusts have been deprived of all their property in order to satisfy a federal tax penalty which arose solely and only because of the Mastroianni neglect; the beneficiaries of the Kelly Estate were deprived of their property because of the larceny and plundering by Signorelli and Mastroianni; and other rights, without due process, forfeited.

b. Judge Thompson activities, under pretense of law, in the Kelly matters, are of a criminal magnitude, and should be treated as such.

Charge III.

1a. In an attempt to prevent my further resistance to the criminal activities in the Puccini matter, Judge Thompson and his conspirators, assigned and/or permitted ROBERT H. STRAUS, Esq. ["Straus"], an "at-will" employee of the Thompson Court, to become transactionally involved as the supervising architect for my disbarment.

b. Straus' official title, and those holding similar positions, are false, deceptive and misleading, since they are hired by the Appellate Division, not the Grievance Committee, and serve at the will and pleasure of the Appellate Division, not the Grievance Committee.

2a. In 1984, I was being threatened with disbarment unless I ceased exposing and resisting the corruption involved in the Puccini matter, and there were statements being made about "instructions" by some unidentified official as to the mechanics to be employed toward that end.

b. On September 18, 1984, DONALD F. SCHNEIDER, Esq. ["Schneider"], a partner in FKM&F, refused to identify such unidentified official, and he did not respond to my written demand of September 26, 1984 for such information.

c. Consequently, a summons, was served whose title read as follows:

"SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
----------x
GEORGE SASSOWER,
Plaintiff,
-against-
DONALD F. SCHNEIDER and FELTMAN, KARESH & MAJOR and "JOHN DOE", person intended to be one purportedly gave defendants `instructions'
Defendants.
----------x

Index No. 25452-1984

d. On October 19th, 1984, I moved the Court, per Mr. Justice MARTIN EVANS ["Evans"], for the disclosure of the identity of "JOHN DOE".

e. After ex parte intervention by Administrator XAVIER C. RICCOBONO ["Riccobono"], Mr. Justice THOMAS J. HUGHES ["Hughes"], on December 7, signed an ex parte FKM&F submitted Order to Show Cause, with a temporary restraining Order which, inter alia:

> "permanently enjoining and staying prosecution of the actions entitled ... "George Sassower v. Donald F. Schneider, Feltman, Karesh & Major, et al."

f. Obviously, Mr. Justice Hughes had no authority and/or jurisdiction to enjoin and/or stay an action that was before Mr. Justice Evans, but in April 1984, Mr. Justice Evans had rejected the "fixing" activities of Administrator Riccobono, who was being financially rewarded by FKM&F.

g. Thereafter, I received a written complaint from Straus, and responded by letter of December 14, 1984, which read, in part, as follows:

> "Mr. Schneider, assuming the role of an apostle for your committee, has openly advised members of the judiciary that someone in your organization has `instructed' him to advise its various members to have a court stenographer present, as proof of my presence and/or participation.
>
> Mr. Schneider does not merely request the presence of a court stenographer, which is his entitlement, but publicly announces that "the Grievance Committee has requested that he make the request" on its behalf! ...
>
> When Mr. Schneider refused to divulge the identity of the person in your committee who purportedly gave him such "instructions", I moved the Court for such relief, which is presently, sub judice."

h. On December 19, 1984, the return date of the Order to Show Cause of Mr. Justice Hughes, was before Mr. Justice IRA GAMMERMAN ["Gammerman"], and the court's decision was clear and precise, as revealed by the transcript, which reads in part, as follows (SM7-8):

> "THE COURT: I'm going to stay all the actions against the lawfirms. That's my intention. I'll listen to Mr. Sassower, but after reading all the papers, it was my intention to stay actions against the lawfirms, let litigation proceed against the non-lawfirm defendants, if there is any basis for the lawfirm actions, an application may be made by Mr. Sassower to vacate the stay and I think you should make a motion to dismiss the actions against the officer." [emphasis supplied]

i. The decision of December 19, 1984, as aforestated, left Straus and Schneider vulnerable in my money damage lawsuit, which was still before Mr. Justice Evans.

j. Although Riccobono was a money damage defendant, in the state and federal courts, at the ex parte instance of FKM&R and KREINDLER & RELKIN, P.C. ["K&R"], Riccobono, ex parte, communicated with Judge Gammerman, and induced him to sign an Order, dated January 23, 1994, which was radically different from the decision of December 19, 1983, and which order included staying the action against Straus, which was still before Judge Evans.

3. There were other intervening events which served as a death-knell to the plans of Straus, who was the "John Doe" in my complaint.

a. After a voluminous submission by the K&R-FKM&F co-conspirators, over a period of more than one year, Mr. Justice Evans, by Order entered January 4, 1985, failed to find me guilty of non-summary criminal contempt, thus triggering constitutional double-jeopardy prohibitions, a lethal blow to the Straus-Schneider conspiracy.

b. This was followed by the Order of Mme. Justice ETHEL DANZIG ["Danzig"], rendering another decisive whammy to Straus-Schneider.

c. On March 21, 1985, after voluminous submissions by the FKM&F-K&R conspirators, Mr. Justice KENNETH L. SHORTER ["Shorter"], effectively nullified the Diamond-Gammerman edicts, including that of January 23, 1985.

4a. Obviously, Mr. Justice Gammerman had no jurisdiction to stay an action that was before Mr. Justice Evans, but Riccobono was being "paid off" by FKM&F-K&R criminals, and it was Riccobono's desires that were being followed, however unlawful, not normal procedures.

b. It was also clear that "John Doe" was "Robert H. Straus", and he was acting not on behalf of the Grievance Committee, but on instructions of the judiciary, including members of the Thompson Court.

5a. Notwithstanding the Judge Evans Order of January 4, 1985, the Judge Danzig Order of January 7, 1985, three weeks thereafter, FKM&F acting in concert with Straus, K&R, and others, FKM&F instituted new contempt proceedings, based on the same accusations which were before Judge Evans, and now prohibited by reason of "double jeopardy".

b. This time however, Riccobono employed his "clout" of his administrative office, and compelled Judge Evans and Mr. Justice MICHAEL DONTZIN ["Dontzin"] to refer same to Referee Diamond who with Riccobono, were money damage defendants in the state and federal courts.

c(1) In Reports issued by Referee Diamond, issued without a trial, without the opportunity for a trial, without any confrontation rights, in absentia, without due process, without the right of allocution, without any live testimony in support thereof, and without any constitutional or legal waiver, with fines and/or terms of incarceration, he found me guilty of 63 counts of non-summary criminal contempt, and found HYMAN RAFFE ["Raffe"] guilty of 71 counts, and recommended terms of incarceration and substantial fines.

(2) In those Diamond Reports, the buffoonery, ad nauseam, appears:

> "A plea of `not-guilty' in a criminal proceeding, is tantamount to a general denial in a civil action, and raises no triable issue of fact."

6a. In addition to the Diamond Reports, Raffe, SAM POLUR, Esq.["Polur"], and I were also charged, and found guilty, of non-summary criminal contempt by U.S. District Court Judge EUGENE H. NICKERSON, Acting Supreme Court Justice DAVID B. SAXE ["Saxe"] and Justice ALVIN F. KLEIN ["Klein"], in which Straus also participated, albeit secretly.

b(1) Each conviction had the common characteristic in that it was obtained without a trial, without the opportunity for a trial, without any confrontation rights, in absentia, without due process, without the right of allocution, without any live testimony in support thereof, and without any constitutional or legal waiver, with fines and/or terms of incarceration, despite the constitutional mandates contained in Crosby v. U.S. (506 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 748 [1993]), Bloom v. Illinois (391 U.S. 194 [1968]), Klapprott v. U.S. (335 U.S. 601 [1949]) and Nye v. U.S. (313 U.S. 33 [1941]).

(2) Parenthetically, it should be noted, even the Ku Klux Klan, in their heyday of power, afforded their victims a "drumhead" trial before sentence was imposed (Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 340 [1983]).

c. These manifestly invalid convictions, which every judge, including Judge Thompson, knows to be void, became the basis of the Thompson-Straus disciplinary complaint, and deserves some review.

7a. Before a disciplinary proceeding can be commenced in the Second Department, an ex parte presentation is made by its employee, such as Straus.

b. Straus makes such presentation against attorneys who the Appellate Division desires, and/or has no objection in inflicting disciplinary punishment, therefore invariably resulting in a finding of guilt.

c. Obviously, Straus would not make a presentation against the ilk of K&R and FKM&F, or others who rob, steal, perjure, corrupt, and/or "pay-off" the judiciary or act as their "bag-men".

d. It is the honest, ethical attorney, who expose the criminal activities of those like K&R and FKM&F, with their "pay-off" activities, who are made the subject of a disciplinary proceeding in the Thompson-Straus realm.

8a. Even as "offenses" (Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 [1966]), Straus knew these trialess convictions were constitutionally void, and in making his ex parte presentation to the Thompson Court, he escalated these convictions, ex post facto, from "offenses" to "serious" crimes, knowing beforehand that despite their constitutional and jurisdictional infirmities, a disciplinary proceeding would be approved by the Thompson Court.

b. Once approved, the Thompson court then designated Straus, its "at-will" employee, although it could, and should, appoint the District Attorney, who is also authorized by law to prosecute, and selects a referee who is compensated on a per diem basis.

c. The referee selected knows he has been selected because his prior determinations comported themselves with the desires of the Appellate Division, and future compensated designations are dependent on similar favorable results.

d. Thus Straus, the prosecutor, who has an pecuniary interest in retaining his "at will" employment, and the per diem compensated referee, both have substantial monetary interests in a finding of guilt.

e. Disciplinary proceedings, under such a scenario, as Thompson and Straus knew, were clearly void (Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 [1935]).

9a. At bar, it should further be noted, Straus became a transactional participant no later than September 1984, became a money damage defendant in October 1984, and it was more than eight (8) months later that he and his conspirators were able to obtain their first conviction, under their aforementioned trialess circumstances.

b. Furthermore, a "hard core" judicial entourage, having a decisive influence on Thompson and his Court, was being "paid-off" by K&R and FKM&F", presented another constitutionally disqualifying factor.

10a. Thompson, in publishing my convictions, which intentionally and deliberately concealed the constitutional and jurisdictional infirmities, as aforestated, and the fact that they were void, employed his office and the legal media, to perpetrate a fraud upon the public, in order to conceal and advance a criminal racketeering adventure, in which he and Straus were participants (Grievance Comm. v. G. Sassower, 125 A.D.2d 52, 512 N.Y.S.2d 203 [2d Dept.-1977]).

b. While Thompson does not hesitate in inflicting draconian disciplinary penalties on attorneys who issue "false reports and omitting material information" (Matter of Gutman, 160 A.D.2d 1, 559 N.Y.S.2d 367 [2nd Dept.-1990]), he has no hesitancy in engaging in the same activities, in order to advance and conceal a criminal racketeering adventure, as in Grievance Comm. v. G. Sassower, supra (18 U.S.C. §1001; Penal Law 210.45).

11. These non-summary criminal contempt proceedings, as brought by Straus, and which he aided in engineering, are themselves instructive.

a(1) U.S. District Court Judge Nickerson, on June 7, 1985, under the aforementioned trialess circumstances, found Raffe and me guilty of non-summary criminal contempt, and imposed substantial fines payable "to the federal court".

(2) These monies which were payable "to the federal court" were diverted to K&R and it clients, and the federal court received nothing.

(3) Any judge or lawyer, such as Thompson, K&R and/or Straus, involved in diverting monies payable to the federal court to private pockets, or aiding, abetting or remaining silent about such criminal act, must be removed from judicial office and/or disbarred.

b(1) Judge Saxe, in 1983, unlawfully diverted monies from Puccini to FKM&F. These diversions, as a matter of non-discretionary prohibitions, were unlawful.

(2) For such ministerial misconduct, of a criminal magnitude I, as an attorney, commenced an action on September 13, 1984, with Raffe, individually and on behalf of Puccini, as the plaintiff against Saxe, Riccobono, and others, in their individual and official capacities, on September 13, 1984 (Raffe v. Saxe, Sup. NY, Index No. 25337-1984).

(3) Significantly, since FKM&F did not perform any legal work on behalf of Puccini, or intended to benefit such judicial trust, Judge Saxe never filed his mandatory Judiciary Law §35-a Statement, which had to certify:

> "that the fee, commission, allowance or other compensation fixed or approved is a reasonable award for the services rendered by the appointee ..."

(4) Nine months later, when I moved to declare CPLR §5222[b] unconstitutional, insofar as it authorized a restraint of "twice" the amount of a judgment, and its violation actionable, a result clearly warranted by, inter alia, Lugar v. Edmondson (457 U.S. 922 [1982]), Judge Saxe dragooned the matter which was before another jurist, to himself, and under the aforementioned trialess circumstances, found me guilty of non-summary criminal contempt, imposed a fine upon me, and sentenced me to be incarcerated for ten (10) days.

c(1) After having caught Administrator Riccobono and Referee Diamond "fixing" cases on behalf of K&R and FKM&R, I prepared a summons, and when, that afternoon, I was served with papers by K&R and FKM&F, I personally served them copies of such summons.

(2) Mr. Justice Klein, in one document, under the aforementioned trialess circumstances, found (a) Raffe, (b) Polur, and (c) me each guilty of non-summary criminal contempt, imposed fines and sentenced each of us to thirty (30) days incarceration.

(3) I served my full sentence, less good time allowance.

Polur, who never served such summons on FKM&F, as falsely alleged in their papers, also served his full sentence, less good time allowance.

Raffe, agreed to pay "extortion" monies to K&R and FKM&F, by check payments, which according to his unsolicited affidavit, "exceeds $2,000,000"; agreed to discharge me, as his attorney; agreed to execute releases to, inter alia, state and federal judges, and agreed to give other unlawful considerations, and was never incarcerated. Years later, in Raffe's own words, "They are bleeding me to death, I wish I have gone to jail."

d(1) Since after serving, with honor, my terms of incarceration, I refused to succumb to the criminal demands of "the criminals with law degrees", my convictions were elevated to "serious" crimes by Straus and Thompson, and I was disbarred.

(2) Polur left the Puccini scene, and after release from incarceration, for many years, no further action was taken against him, since he remained silent about the fraud involved. When, as part of a federal action, Polur began to expose the judicial fraud involved in the Puccini matter, he was, eight (8) years later, suspended for three (3) years, based almost exclusively on such trialess conviction, wherein it was falsely alleged that he served the Riccobono summons on FKM&F, which no one controverts, he did not (Depart. Disc. Comm. v. Polur, 173 A.D.2d 82, 579 N.Y.S.2d 3 [1st Dept.-1/14/92]; leave den. 79 N.Y.2d 756, 583 N.Y.S.2d 192, 592 N.E.2d 800 [1992]; Intervention denied 80 N.Y.2d 891, 587 N.Y.S.2d 901, 600 N.E.2d 628 [1992]).

(3) Obviously, Polur had to be incarcerated so that the "criminals with law degrees", Referee Diamond, and others could negotiate with Raffe, in the absence of his attorneys of record, and compel him to submit and succumb, and agree to make "extortion" payments to the FKM&F-K&R criminal entourage.

(4) Such negotiations with Raffe, without the permission and consent of his attorneys of record are void, according to the Thompson court (Moustakas v. Bouloukos, 112 A.D.2d 981, 492 N.Y.S.2d 793 [2d Dept.- 1985]).

12a. As was thereafter disclosed, Raffe was compelled to falsely testify against me, at pains of incarceration for any refusal or failure, all with the knowledge and participation of Straus.

b. Also with the knowledge of Straus, for the time expended by FKM&F and others in disciplinary proceedings, Raffe paid for same, although contrary to his legitimate interests.

13. Even if no monies were directly received by Judge Thompson, his actions, vel non, in the matter, constitutes "bribery", an impeachable offense.

Charge IV.

1. My "forthwith" disbarment, after a long delay, following the close of the disciplinary hearings, was triggered by my filing of a bankruptcy petition, which vested my assets in the U.S. District Court (28 U.S.C. §1334), including my contractually based, constitutionally protected money judgment, against Puccini, thus aborting the "approval" of a `phantom' accounting on October 30, 1986 by Referee Diamond (Exhibit "A").

2a. Consequently, at the eve of trial of DENNIS F. VILELLA ["Vilella"], without notice to him, and without giving any recognition to any of his rights, including his constitutionally protected, contractual based rights he had to my services (Judiciary Law §474), I was prevented from defending him for attempted murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree "with a tire iron".

b. One does not need the credentials of Judge Thompson to know, beyond any question of doubt, that no woman can be "repeatedly" struck, about 20 times, "violently", on her head, "with a tire iron", to know that the event, as described in the indictment, never occurred, if the hospital X-Ray and CAT Scan reports are negative.

c. No rational person, including Judge Thompson, has ever been willing to publicly assert that upon an examination of the full, uncorroborated testimony of the victim, could possibly be true, in view of the hospital reports (Exhibit "B"), which hospital reports, albeit in evidence, the prosecutor and trial judge concealed from the jury.

d. As Judge Thompson, knew and knows, a corpus delicti is an essential element of a criminal convictions, and the hospital reports reveal the absence of such elements.

3a. Nevertheless, in affirming such Vilella conviction, for crimes that were never committed, Judge Thompson, as did the prosecutor and Trial Judge, deliberately concealed the Hospital Reports and that the crimes alleged were never committed by Vilella or anyone else (People v. Vilella, 147 A.D.2d 666, 538 N.Y.S.2d 66 [2nd Dept.-1989]).

b. In affirming the Vilella conviction, the Thompson panel stated:

> "The defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree ["with a tire iron"], based on his vicious attack upon the victim. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People, we find that it was legally sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of the crimes charged. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict, based largely upon the testimony of the complainant, was not against the weight of the evidence" [emphasis supplied].

c. This "vicious" "tire iron assault", never happened, as the concealed Hospital Reports, unquestionably confirms.

4a. Consequently, Vilella has been incarcerated for more than six (6) years, at taxpayers expense, for crimes that never occurred, in a futile attempt to exchange his freedom for my silence.

b. Judge Thompson and his co-conspirators are depraved, have and are ready to abandon, under color of law, every civilized concept since man emerged from the cave.

Charge V.

1a. In his personal, not official, capacity, I have sued Judge Thompson several times, and each time, he has been defended at state cost and expense, thus defrauding the state purse.

b. I have not sued, for money damages, the State of New York or any department thereof, only its rogue jurists and officials, such as Judge Thompson, who for their own personal purposes, debauch the machinery of government.

2. In the federal courts, in addition to defrauding tho state purse, Judge Thompson is also perpetrating a fraud upon the federal courts, since Judge Thompson knows that burdening the state treasury for federal litigation, is a subject matter XI Amendment jurisdictional infirmity, which the litigants cannot waive.

3. Since the Attorney General is not billing Judge Thompson for his services in such litigation, Judge Thompson is obviously not reporting what is "taxable income", or paying his taxes due thereon (26 U.S.C. §120[c]), which are also disbarable transgressions.

Charge VI.

1a. Finally, for the purpose of this complaint, a judge, no less than an attorney, has the abiding obligation to report misconduct.

b. Indeed, in Matter of Dowd (160 A.D.2d 78, 559 N.Y.S.2d 365 [2nd Dept.-1990]), an attorney was suspended for not reporting official misconduct.

2a. However, as shown herein, where attorneys have the "inside track" with Mr. Justice Thompson, which includes "paying-off" judges, they are permitted to continue their course of misconduct with impunity, and disbarment and suspension is reserved for those who expose and report same.

b. All an attorney needs to avoid professional disciplinary proceedings is the services of a corrupt judge, such as Judge Gammerman, who for "pay-offs" to Riccobono, will sign an Order, such as that of January 23, 1985, which in part, reads as follows:

> "ORDERED, that Hyman Raffe and George Sassower, acting singly, together or in conjunction with any person or entity or acting at the behest, direction or instigation of any person or entity, and all others acting in concert or cooperation with or acting at the behest, direction, or instigation of either or both Hyman Raffe or George Sassower, are permanently enjoined and restrained from: filing or serving, or attempting to intervene in or initiate in any court, tribunal, agency or other forum of this State, any ... proceeding, investigation or other adversary matter, and from making or filing a complaint, grievance or correspondence with a professional disciplinary or grievance committee ... [emphasis supplied]
>
> ORDERED, that any motion to vacate, reargue, renew, modify this Order or which seeks any other relief within the purview of CPLR 2221, shall be deemed a nullity unless such motion shall be made by Order to Show Cause to be presented to only the Justice who signed this Order or to the Administrative Justice of this Court; and it is further" [emphasis supplied]

3. Also necessary for these miscreants of the legal profession is the cooperative assistance of those such as Judge Thompson, who will recognize such transparently infirm, "out of orbit", orders.

4. On my part, I accept, and have accepted, each incarceration and disbarment, with singular honor.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE SASSOWER

cc: Mr. Justice William C. Thompson