

## Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc. (CJA)

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**From:** Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc. (CJA) <elena@judgewatch.org>  
**Sent:** Monday, October 15, 2018 2:12 PM  
**To:** 'Jane Landes'; 'ecarey@nycourts.gov'; 'ad3clerksoffice@nycourts.gov'; 'Janet.Sabel@ag.ny.gov'; 'Kent.Stauffer@ag.ny.gov'; 'Meg.Levine@ag.ny.gov'; 'Jeffrey Dvorin'; 'Brian.Mahanna@ag.ny.gov'; 'Alvin.Bragg@ag.ny.gov'; 'marty.mack@ag.ny.gov'; 'Matthew.Colangelo@ag.ny.gov'; 'Margaret.Garnett@ag.ny.gov'; 'manisha.sheth@ag.ny.gov'; 'Adrienne Kerwin'; 'Helena.Lynch@ag.ny.gov'  
**Cc:** 'Brodie, Frederick'; 'Barbara.Underwood@ag.ny.gov'; 'Paladino, Victor'  
**Subject:** CJA v. Cuomo Citizen-Taxpayer Action Appeal: #527081 -- Demanding a "Surreply" from Attorney General Underwood, Personally as to the CPLR 5015(a)(4) Vacatur Relief Sought by Appellants' Fully-Submitted OSC

### **TO: Appellate Division, Third Department Attorney Jane Landes and Chief Motion Attorney Ed Carey**

This responds to Assistant Solicitor General Brodie's below October 12<sup>th</sup> e-mail to me, to which he copied you, as likewise his direct supervisor Assistant Solicitor General Paladino and his top supervisor Attorney General Underwood.

I was already at the law library, further researching the law, when I received same – and ALL the additional cases I examined further reinforce the flagrant fraud that Mr. Brodie committed by “pages 2-3 of respondents’ September 24, 2018 opposition memorandum” – to which his October 12<sup>th</sup> e-mail adheres in purporting that they “dispose of the questions presented by [my] e-mail”.

Among the cases I examined, this Court's 2015 decision in *Kilmer v. Moseman*, 124 A.D.3d 1195, 1198, authored by now Presiding Justice Garry on behalf of a four-judge panel that included Associate Justice Devine, citing to and following the recognized standard for assessing disqualification for financial interest under Judiciary Law §14, articulated by the Appellate Division, First Department in its 1911 decision in *People v. Whitridge*, 144 A.D. 493, 498:

“The interest which will disqualify a judge to sit in a cause need not be large, but it must be real. It must be certain, and not merely possible or contingent; it must be one which is visible, demonstrable, and capable of precise proof.”

At bar, the financial interests of each of the panel's four judges in the citizen-taxpayer appeal is “large”, “real”, “certain”, “visible, demonstrable, and capable of precise proof”, so-particularized by ¶15 of my July 24, 2018 moving affidavit in support of appellants' original order to show cause – the accuracy of which was undenied and undisputed by Assistant Solicitor General Brodie in his opposition to both the original order to show cause and the instant order to show cause.

The panel judges were, therefore, absolutely disqualified by Judiciary Law §14 and without jurisdiction to sit and take part in any decision in the case – and *Whitridge* makes this evident, as does the Court of Appeals' 1850 decision in *Oakley v. Aspinwall*, 3 N.Y. 547, on which it relies – and an abundance of other cases, including this Court's 2008 decision in *People v. Alteri*, 47 A.D.3d 1070:

“A statutory disqualification under Judiciary Law §14 will deprive a judge of jurisdiction (see *Wilcox v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum*, 210 N.Y. 370, 377, 104 N.E. 624 [1914]; see also *Matter of Harkness Apt. Owners Corp. v. Abdus-Salaam*, 232 A.D.2d 309, 310, 648 N.Y.S.2d 586 [1996] ) and void any prior action taken by such judge in that case before the recusal (see *People v. Golston*, 13 A.D.3d 887, 889, 787 N.Y.S.2d 185 [2004], lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 789, 801 N.Y.S.2d 810, 835 N.E.2d 670 [2005]; *Matter of*



*Harkness Apt. Owners Corp. v. Abdus– Salaam*, 232 A.D.2d at 310, 648 N.Y.S.2d 586). In fact, “a judge disqualified under a statute cannot act even with the consent of the parties interested, because the law was not designed merely for the protection of the parties to the suit, but for the general interests of justice’ ( *Matter of Beer Garden v. New York State Liq. Auth.*, 79 N.Y.2d 266, 278–279, 582 N.Y.S.2d 65, 590 N.E.2d 1193 [1992], quoting *Matter of City of Rochester*, 208 N.Y. 188, 192, 101 N.E. 875 [1913])”.

See, also, this Court’s 2008 decision in *Kampfer v. Rase*, 56 A.D.3d 926, identifying, in addition to “a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law §14”, that “[r]ecusal, as a matter of due process, is required [] where there exists a direct, personal, substantial or pecuniary interest in reaching a particular conclusion”, citing to *People v. Alomar*, 93 N.Y.2d 239 (1999) – plainly the situation at bar particularized by my aforesaid ¶15.

The only way for the four panel judges to have overcome the jurisdictional bar of Judiciary Law §14 and the due process protection it affords is by the “narrow exception” that is “the Rule of Necessity”, *General Motors Corp. v. Rosa*, 82 N.Y.2d 183, 188 (1993). The August 7, 2018 decision did not invoke “the Rule of Necessity” – and for that reason is void, *on its face*.

The treatise authority that my below October 12<sup>th</sup> e-mail cites from New York Jurisprudence – emanating from *Oakley v. Aspinwall* and reflected in *Whitridge* – is that the four-judge panel, having been without jurisdiction to have rendered the August 7, 2018 decision, based on Judiciary Law §14, is without jurisdiction to void it. As such, appellants’ fully-submitted order to show cause cannot be submitted to the panel. Rather, it must be submitted to another panel of the Court which, upon invoking “the Rule of Necessity”, will immediately void it – or, if too actually biased and interested to void it, as is its duty, *as a matter of law*, will promptly transfer it to a different appellate division, or to the Court of Appeals, to be voided – with all branches of the original order to show cause thereafter determined by such tribunal, as well as its requested TRO, upon the granting of oral argument therefor.

Should the Court deem transfer to another appellate division, rather than to the Court of Appeals, the appropriate course, I request the transfer be to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department – as I believe the impact of its financial interests and relationships are slightly less overpowering than they are in the other three departments.

Needless to say, appellants have no objection to the Court requesting “a surreply” from Attorney General Underwood. In fact, based on the outright fraud and deceit particularized by my October 9, 2018 reply affidavit, especially its ¶¶9-13 – on which Assistant Solicitor General Brodie would have the Court continue to rely -- I believe she must be directed to do so, personally.

Thank you.

Elena Sassower, unrepresented plaintiff-appellant

On her own behalf, on behalf of the Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc.,

and on behalf of the People of the State of New York and the Public Interest

914-421-1200

**From:** Brodie, Frederick <Frederick.Brodie@ag.ny.gov>

**Sent:** Friday, October 12, 2018 12:31 PM

**To:** Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc. (CJA) <elena@judgewatch.org>

**Cc:** 'Jane Landes' <jlandes@nycourts.gov>; ecarey@nycourts.gov; Paladino, Victor <Victor.Paladino@ag.ny.gov>;

Underwood, Barbara <Barbara.Underwood@ag.ny.gov>

**Subject:** RE: CJA v. Cuomo Citizen-Taxpayer Action Appeal: #527081 -- ON-HOLD: Appellants' Fully-Submitted OSC to Disqualify the Court for Demonstrated Actual Bias, Etc.