

CVA's March 23, 2016 verified second supplemental complaint
in 1st citizen ~~dispute~~ action (Albany Co #1788-2014)

452. The Commission's failure to meaningfully elicit citizen input – and to address the citizen opposition to judicial salary increases and its basis that it had before it – renders its December 24, 2015 Report unconstitutional, *as a matter of law*.³⁵



AS AND FOR A FIFTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

**The Commission's Violation of Express Statutory Requirements
of Chapter 60, Part E, of the Laws of 2015 Renders
their Judicial Salary Increase Recommendations Null & Void**

453. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and reallege ¶¶1-452, with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

454. The Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation violated Chapter 60, Part E, of the Laws of 2015 in multiple respects:

- (i) in violation of §2, ¶¶1, 2(a), the Commission examined only judicial salary, not “compensation” apart from salary, and not “non-salary benefits”;
- (ii) in violation of §2, ¶¶1, 2(a), the Commission made no finding and furnished no evidence that current “compensation and non-salary benefits” or “pay levels and non-salary benefits” of New York State judges are inadequate;
- (iii) in violation of §2, ¶3, the Commission did not “take into account all appropriate factors”, such as systemic judicial corruption and citizen opposition – and made no claim that it had;
- (iv) in violation of §2, ¶3, the Commission did not “take into account three of the six enumerated “appropriate factors”.

455. Each of these statutory violations is particularized by plaintiffs' 12-page “Statement of Particulars in Further Support of Legislative Override of the ‘Force of Law’ Judicial Salary Increase Recommendations, Repeal of the Commission Statute, Etc.” (Exhibit 40), which plaintiffs January 15, 2015 letter to defendants FLANAGAN and HEASTIE furnished those defendants and

³⁵ “It is basic that an ‘act of the legislature is the voice of the People speaking through their representatives. The authority of the representatives in the legislature is a delegated authority and it is wholly derived from and dependent upon the Constitution’ (*Matter of Sherrill v O'Brien*, 188 NY 185, 199).”, *New York State Bankers Association, Inc. v. Wetzler*, 91 N.Y.2d 98, 102 (1993) (underlining added).

the chairs and ranking members of the Legislature's "appropriate committees" (Exhibit 39). Individually and collectively, these statutory violations are sufficient to void the judicial salary increase recommendations of its December 24, 2015 Report, *as a matter of law*.

456. The Commission's foregoing statutory violations do not exhaust all its statutory violations which additionally include:

(i) in violation of §2, ¶1, the Commission was not "established" "commencing June 1, 2015". Instead, the Commission's four appointing authorities delayed their appointments, with defendant Cuomo's appointments not until almost four months later, October 30, 2015. The result was that the Commission did not have the statutorily-contemplated six months to discharge its duties with respect to "judges and justices of the state-paid courts of the unified court system". Instead, it had but two months, further reduced by the holiday season;

(ii) in violation of §3, ¶2, requiring that the Commission be "governed by articles 6, 6-A and 7 of the public officers law", it failed to furnish records it was duty-bound to disclose under Public Officers Law, Article VI [Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] (see accompanying folder);

(iii) in violation of §3, ¶¶2, 5, and 6, the Commission did not utilize the significant investigative powers and resources available to it to discharge its statutory-mandate.

457. Underlying all these statutory violations was the Commissioners' bias and interest in securing the predetermined result of increasing judicial salary levels, additionally rendering its Report and recommendations unconstitutional, *as applied*.

CENTER for JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, INC.

Post Office Box 8101
White Plains, New York 10602

Tel. (914)421-1200

E-Mail: cja@judgewatch.org
Website: www.judgewatch.org

Elena Ruth Sassower, Director

January 15, 2016

**Statement of Particulars in Further Support of Legislative Override
of the “Force of Law” Judicial Salary Increase Recommendations,
Repeal of the Commission Statute, Etc.**

Contents

On its Face, the Commission’s December 24, 2015 Report Violates
Senate and Assembly Rules Pertaining to Fiscal Impact.....1

On its Face, the Commission’s December 24, 2015 Report is Statutorily-Violative.....2

The *Facial* Violations of the Commission’s December 24, 2015 Report
are Reinforced and Proven by the Commissioners’ Own Words at their
December 7, 2015 First Deliberative Meeting, Agreeing to Violate
their Statutory Charge.....3

The Unanimity of ALL Seven Commissioners in Support of Judicial Salary
Increases at their December 7, 2015 First Deliberative Meeting was
in Face of CJA’s December 2, 2015 Supplemental Statement Detailing
that they had NO EVIDENCE upon which to Found Judicial Salary Increase
Recommendations.....6

**On its Face, the Commission’s December 24, 2015 Report Violates
Senate and Assembly Rules Pertaining to Fiscal Impact**

Whereas Senate Rule VIII, §7¹ and Assembly Rule III, §1(f)² would require that a bill to raise judicial salaries be accompanied by a “fiscal note” or “fiscal impact statement”, the Commission’s Report, whose salary recommendations have the “force of law” absent Legislative override, does not furnish the total cost of the judicial salary increases it is recommending. The Report’s only cost figure is mixed into its “Finding” as to the state’s currently “strong fiscal condition at the present time”, wherein it asserts:

“The projected additional cost to the state for the first phase of the Commission’s recommendations is approximately \$26.5 million for the next fiscal year, representing 19 one-thousandths of one percent (0.019%) of the overall state budget.” (at p. 6).

In so-representing, the Report does not identify whose cost projection this is – or clarify whether the projected dollar figure is limited to salary costs or includes the additional costs that result from non-salary benefits, such as to pensions and social security, whose costs to the state are derived from salary. There is no projection of any dollar costs of the subsequent second, third, and fourth phases of proposed salary increases – and no explanation why – and as to all four fiscal years, there is no identification as to the percentage of the judicial salary increases being recommended. Only in the Dissenting Statement are these percentages revealed: “an 11 percent salary increase in 2016, followed by at least a five percent increase in 2018” – and their contextual significance:

“far out of alignment with the fiscal restraint that has contributed to the State’s improved economic outlook. Five straight state budgets have held spending growth below two percent, and inflation for the past two years has been about one and a half percent.” (at p. 16).

Indeed, although the Report, over and again, refers to “restoring the parity between the salary of a New York Supreme Court Justice and that of a Federal District Court Judge” – beginning in Chair Birnbaum’s coverletter – the dollar meaning of this is fairly hidden, even with respect to the 95%

¹ “... The sponsor of a bill providing for an increase or decrease in state revenues or in the appropriation or expenditure of state moneys, without stating the amount thereof, must, before such bill is reported from the Finance Committee or other committee to which referred, file with the Finance Committee and such other committee a fiscal note which shall state, so far as possible, the amount in dollars whereby such state moneys, revenues or appropriations would be affected by such bill, together with a similar estimate, if the same is possible, for future fiscal years. Such an estimate must be secured by the sponsor from the Division of the Budget or the department or agency of state government charged with the fiscal duties, functions or powers provided in such bill and the name of such department or agency.”

² “There shall be appended to every bill introduced in the Assembly, an introducer’s memorandum setting forth... a statement of its fiscal impact on the state.... Whenever a bill is amended by its sponsor, it shall be the duty of the sponsor to file an amended memorandum setting forth the same material as required in the original memorandum. In addition, whenever a bill is reported by a committee as amended, it shall be the duty of the committee to submit an amended memorandum.”

parity being recommended for New York Supreme Court justices in fiscal year 2016-2017. It is not in Chair Birnbaum's coverletter, nor in the Report's "Introduction and Summary of Recommendations". Not until page 12 of the barely 14-page Report does the information appear³: "The first phase of this Commission's recommendations will fix the pay of Supreme Court Justices at 95% of the pay of a Federal District Judge – or \$193,000 – on April 1, 2016". As for the recommendation of 100% parity in two years' time, its dollar meaning "\$203,100 in 2018 (and possibly higher if the federal judiciary receives COLAs in 2017 and 2018)", it is also on page 12. And, unlike the August 29, 2011 Report of the Commission on Judicial Compensation (at pp. 9-10), which presented a chart laying out what the dollar salaries would be for the higher and lower judges in each of the relevant fiscal years, pursuant to its recommendations, there is no such chart in the December 24, 2015 Report even as to fiscal year 2016-2017.

On its Face, the Commission's December 24, 2015 Report is Statutorily-Violative

Although the Commission's Report makes it appear that the Commission has complied with Part E of Chapter 60 of the Laws of 2015 by its repeated invocations of the statute, including in Chair Birnbaum's coverletter and by its inclusion of a section entitled "Statutory Mandate", its violations of the statute's §2, which defines its mandate, are evident from the face of the Report.

§2 consists of three paragraphs. The first requires that the Commission "examine, evaluate and make recommendations with respect to adequate levels of compensation and non-salary benefits". This charge is actually redundant as the definition of compensation is salary and non-salary benefits. However, by repeating "non-salary benefits", the statute reinforces – and leaves no doubt – that the Commission's mandate is two-fold: salary and "non-salary benefits". This two-fold mandate is carried through to the second paragraph of §2, whose subdivision (a) requires the Commission to "examine...the prevailing adequacy of pay levels and non-salary benefits". The third paragraph of §2 then specifies that the Commission "shall take into account all appropriate factors, including, but not limited to" six financial factors. Three of these six include "compensation and non-salary benefits", *to wit*:

- "the levels of compensation and non-salary benefits received by executive branch officials and legislators of other states and of the federal government";
- "the levels of compensation and non-salary benefits received by professionals in government, academia and private and nonprofit enterprise"; and
- "the state's ability to fund increases in compensation and non-salary benefits."

Yet notwithstanding all this clear, unambiguous statutory language, the Commission's Report does not "examine and "evaluate" "non-salary benefits" – which it does not even mention, other than acknowledging that they are part of its statutory charge⁴. As for "compensation", the Report

³ This is reflected, as well, by the Dissenting Statement (at pp. 15-16).

⁴ The Report's section entitled "Statutory Mandate" (pp. 3-4) quotes the statute as requiring the

identifies none of its components except for salary – thereby reinforcing that the term is being used as if synonymous with salary, which it is not. Even as to judicial salary, the Report makes no finding that existing salary levels are inadequate, including in its section entitled “Findings” . Nor does it identify ANY EVIDENCE from which such finding might be made. Thus, although the Report repetitively speaks of the importance of attracting highly-qualified candidates to the bench – and retaining the judges already sitting – it makes no claim that the current salary levels have created a problem in attracting a sufficient pool of qualified candidates seeking to be judges – or that even a single judge has stepped down because of the current salary.

As the Report does not reveal that the statute requires the Commission to “take into account all appropriate factors”, it makes no claim that the Commission has done so.⁵ It does not even purport that the Commission has taken into account the factors the statute itemizes – and it plainly has not with respect to the three factors that include “non-salary benefits”. Indeed, although reciting that the statutory factors include “levels of compensation and non-salary benefits received by professionals in government, academia and private and nonprofit enterprise” – which it does in the “Statutory Mandate” section of the Report (at p. 3) – the comparison identified in its “Findings” section (at p. 6) on which it bases a finding that “New York State judges are underpaid relative to the compensation of the various categories of lawyers and professionals reviewed” cannot support such finding as it is NOT compensation data but “salary data for, among others, lawyers including lawyers working in private practice and the public sector throughout New York State, executives in the non-profit sector, professionals in academia and public education, and government officials in New York City.”

**The Facial Violations of the Commission’s December 24, 2015 Report
are Reinforced and Proven by the Commissioners’ Own Words at their
December 7, 2015 First Deliberative Meeting, Agreeing to Violate their Statutory Charge**

Beyond the blatant statutory violations evident from the face of the Commission’s Report, mandating that its judicial salary recommendations be overridden by the Legislature, are the Commissioners’ own words at their first deliberative meeting on December 7, 2015 wherein, without dissent, they unanimously agreed to violate their statutory charge to “examine, evaluate and make recommendations with respect to adequate levels of compensation and non-salary benefits”. The colloquy was as follows:

December 7, 2015 Meeting (video at 1:10:39; transcript pp. 44-45)

Comm’r Hedges: One thing we haven’t talked about that is part of the charge,
 but I would like to make clear that, from my point of view, I

Commission to: ““examine, evaluate and make recommendations with respect to adequate levels of compensation and non-salary benefits” (at p. 3, underlining added).

⁵ The Report’s “Statutory Mandate” section does not identify the statutory language that “the commission shall take into account all appropriate factors including, but not limited to”, substituting the paraphrase: “Chapter 60 sets forth a number of factors to guide the Commission’s work of determining appropriate judicial salary levels, including, but not limited to...”.

don't want to address except to say we are doing the right thing already, is other benefits. Pension benefits, health care benefits and the like are very costly things and in many compensation systems they are traded off one against the other.

I think that the state system of benefits is a pretty good one. I haven't heard anyone, whether a state employee, legislative employee, executive commissioners, or judges say we should have something different from that, and I guess I'd like to put that in the context of could we all agree on at least that and have that be part of the package, but done already.

Chair Birnbaum: If I understand what you're saying is that there – I didn't think there was going to be any discussion, but then whatever the benefits are, they are.

Comm'r Hedges: But the statutory charge is that we actually consider that.

Chair Birnbaum: Changing the benefits in some way?

Comm'r Hedges: It didn't say 'change'. It said consider compensation including, you know, benefits, and to my way of thinking in the normal compensation system, they are all in the mix and the employer says this cost me 'X' and the union, as it were, says No. Well, we've got to make sure – and that becomes part of the discussion– an explicit tradeoff. I don't want to have that part of the discussion. I want to assume it.

Chair Birnbaum: Is there any disagreement with Roman –

Comm'r Hedges: I don't think there is...

Chair Birnbaum: – that this is not part of our discussion, that we are really only focusing on salaries? And whatever the rest of the system is as to benefits, we are not discussing that and that will remain whatever they are. I think we have unanimity here....

This shocking unanimity was in the context of discussion of benchmarking the salaries of supreme court judges to those of federal district court judges at maximum levels of 95-100%:

December 7, 2015 meeting (video at 1:18:45, transcript at p. 49)

Comm'r Hedges: I would like to limit our discussion, this is my

recommendation, to a someplace between 95% of the federal number and 100% of the federal number. And for purposes of argument because I want to phase it in, I would say in year four. By the way, if we were to say in year one, 95%, what would that look like compared to other states? It would look like the highest nominal salary of any judge in the other states, according to the chart that the court system gave us –

Chair Birnbaum: Yes. Again –

Comm’r Hedges: which is \$193,000 –

Chair Birnbaum: – we don’t know if there are any. We haven’t looked at the other compensation in those states. We are just looking at salaries in those states.

Comm’r Hedges: Just looking at salaries. And as a ‘by the way’, in my world, I would like the current other than salary considerations to be what they currently are, which is the state pension system, the state health system, and the like.

Comm’r Reiter: Right. I’d be surprised if any state were more generous than we are in those areas –

Comm’r Hedges: Me too.

Comm’r Reiter: – and we could certainly find out, I guess, and that data probably exists somewhere, but generally speaking, our benefit packages in this state have been pretty rich and in fact is, I think, one of the reasons quality people go into the Judiciary even though the salary isn’t as high as we might think it ought to be. So, I’d be surprised if we were lagging behind any other state in that regard.

In other words, with knowledge that “pension benefits, health care benefits and the like are very costly things”; that New York’s non-salary benefits are “pretty rich” and perhaps unequalled by other states, all seven Commissioners intentionally violated their statutory duty to “examine” and “evaluate” “non-salary benefits” – whose obvious statutory purpose is, as in a “normal compensation system” to offset salary increases.

The same December 7, 2015 meeting also furnishes revealing colloquy as to the hardscrabble life of lawyers outside the metropolitan New York City area, giving perspective to the absence of any finding in the Commission’s Report as to the inadequacy of current salary levels:

December 7, 2015 meeting (video at 1:37:00; transcript at p. 62)

Comm'r Reiter: My town judge is my electrician. Went to law school, decided he could make more money upstate being an electrician than he could being a lawyer –

Chair Birnbaum: He's probably right.

Comm'r Reiter: – and I'm pretty sure, based upon what he charged me, that he's absolutely correct.

Comm'r Lack: I know some plumbers doing the exact same thing.

The Unanimity of ALL Seven Commissioners in Support of Judicial Salary Increases at their December 7, 2015 First Deliberative Meeting was in Face of CJA's December 2, 2015 Supplemental Statement Detailing that they had NO EVIDENCE upon which to Found Judicial Salary Increase Recommendations

At the Commission's December 7, 2015 meeting, Chair Birnbaum stated that the "first issue" was "if there is going to be an increase, what should that increase be, and when should it take place" – and presented the following juxtaposition in opening discussion:

"Number 1, there are those who testified that there should be no pay increases for any judiciary members. Number 2, there are those that testified and gave us reports and papers on the fact there should be an increase and it should be to the federal district court increase." (video, at 0:2:40; transcript, p. 3, underlining added).

In other words, she was purporting that those opposing pay raises had not supported their position with "reports and papers", whereas those in favor had. This was false – and the video of my testimony before all seven commissioners at the November 30, 2015 hearing shows the HUGE volume of "reports and papers" I was furnishing to them in support of my testimony and which I described by my testimony and before leaving the witness table:

- (1) another full copy of CJA's October 27, 2011 Opposition Report – identical to the full copy I had furnished Chairman Birnbaum on November 3, 2015 at the conclusion of the Commission's first organizational meeting;
- (2) the verified complaints, with exhibits, in CJA's three lawsuits arising from the October 27, 2011 Opposition Report, including the supplemental verified complaint in the citizen-taxpayer action;
- (3) CJA's last court papers submitted in the citizen-taxpayer action, reflecting the state of the record therein entitling plaintiffs to the granting of their cross-motion for summary judgment;

(4) my written testimony, with attached exhibits

As to these, I stated that the Commission could readily determine that the August 29, 2011 Report of the Commission on Judicial Compensation was fraudulent, statutorily-violative, and unconstitutional,

“thereby requiring that this Commission’s recommendations – having ‘the force of law’ – be for the nullification/voiding of the [Commission on Judicial Compensation’s] August 29, 2011 Report AND a ‘claw-back’ of the \$150-million-plus dollars that the judges unlawfully received pursuant thereto.” (written statement, at p. 4, capitalization in the original; video at 2:08:26; transcript, at p. 79).

Three days later, on December 2, 2015, to ensure that the Commission fully understood that pursuant to its statutory charge – and quite apart from anything having to do with the Commission on Judicial Compensation’s August 29, 2011 Report – it had NO EVIDENCE on which to found any recommendation to raise judicial salary levels, I furnished a supplemental submission, whose first half was devoted to that issue. Picking up on my last words to the Commissioners at the November 30, 2015 hearing, I stated:

“This supplemental submission is necessitated by the Commission’s shameful performance at its one and only November 30, 2015 public hearing, at which not a single Commissioner asked a single question of a single witness. This notwithstanding each Commissioner is presumed to know – from the statute defining the Commission’s charge – that the oral and written presentations of the Judiciary and other judicial pay raise advocates were misleading and unsupported by probative evidence. This, I tried to communicate to you at the conclusion of my testimony, only to be abused by Chairwoman Birnbaum and Commissioner Reiter, without a single Commissioner taking exception:

Sassower: You have no evidentiary presentation –

Chair Birnbaum: Ms. Sassower, we’re done. Please. We have –

Sassower: by judicial pay raise advocates –

Comm’r Reiter: You are done.

Chair Birnbaum: We have other people. Please.

Sassower: – as to the inadequacies of current salaries–

Chair Birnbaum: Will you give up the microphone –

Sassower: —as to any problem in attracting qualified candidates to the bench or —

The Commission’s charge is to ‘examine, evaluate and make recommendations with respect to adequate levels of compensation and non-salary benefits’ (§2.1) and ‘the prevailing adequacy of pay levels and other non-salary benefits’ (§2.2a(2)). None of the judges and other pay raise advocates testifying before you identified this. Instead, they misled you with rhetoric that the levels you should be setting are the ones they view as ‘fair’, ‘equitable’, and commensurate with their self-serving notions of the dignity and respect to be accorded the judiciary, furnishing NO EVIDENCE as to the inadequacy of current judicial salary levels – bumped up \$40,000 by the Commission on Judicial Compensation’s August 29, 2011 Report. They did not even assert that current salary levels are inadequate, let alone after the addition of non-salary benefits. In fact, and repeating their fraud at the Commission on Judicial Compensation’s July 20, 2011 hearing, they made no mention of non-salary benefits – or their monetary value – a concealment also characterized by their written submissions before you.

In face of this, and making your non-questioning of them the more egregious, as likewise your disrespectful treatment of me, is that CJA’s October 27, 2011 Opposition Report – which I furnished you nearly four full weeks before the hearing – highlighted (at pp. 1, 17-18, 22, 31) that among the key respects in which the Commission on Judicial Compensation’s August 29, 2011 Report was statutorily-violative and fraudulent is that its salary increase recommendations were ‘unsupported by any finding that current ‘pay levels and non-salary benefits’ [were] inadequate’ – reflective of the fact that the judges and judicial pay raise advocates had not furnished probative evidence from which such finding could be made. Such finding, moreover, would require an articulated standard for determining adequacy, such as had been enunciated nearly 30 years earlier by the Temporary State Commission on Judicial Compensation, chaired by William T. Dentzer:

“the judgment as to what level of pay is adequate should be based on whether a reasonable supply of well-qualified attorneys will make themselves available to become or remain judges in the courts concerned. The lowest pay which produces an adequate supply of well-qualified candidates for the various courts is the only pay level which is fair to State taxpayers; any higher pay would require unnecessarily high taxes.” (Opposition Report, at p. 22).

This is the same Commission as had wisely stated:

‘...there are significant differences in the cost of living in various areas of the State; and [] it makes much more sense to adjust the salaries of judges who reside where it is more expensive to live to reflect that fact, rather than to establish a single salary for each office,

which, while perhaps adequate in part of the State, might be inadequate or excessive in the rest of the State.^{fn} (Opposition Report, at p. 30).

The judges who testified before you at this past Monday's hearing surely consider themselves well-qualified. Yet, not one stated that he/she would be resigning from the bench, if no salary increase was forthcoming. Indeed, it was most telling that Supreme Court Justice William Condon identified that he sits in Long Island and had been elected in 2008. That was nine years into the so-called 'salary freeze', hitting hardest judges in the high-cost-of-living metropolitan New York City area, where he would be. Yet, he plainly had not considered it cause for not joining the bench. Likewise, First Department Appellate Division Justice Paul Feinman, who identified that he had come to the bench in 1997. This was before the 1999 judicial pay raises, in other words, during a prior 'salary freeze' period. Yet, that also did not seem to dampen his judicial aspirations – and he sought re-election, twice, in 2006 and also 2007 – which were subsequent 'salary freeze' years.

Any legitimate inquiry by this Commission would rapidly disclose that there is no shortage of experienced, well-qualified New York lawyers who would make superlative judges – and who would embrace the current \$174,000 Supreme Court salary level as a HUGE step up from what they are currently making. For that matter, there is also no shortage of experienced, well-qualified lawyers who would embrace the prior \$136,700 Supreme Court salary level as a HUGE step up. Certainly, had the Commission questioned Adriene Holder, Attorney-in-Charge for Civil Practice at the Legal Aid Society, about her support for judicial salary increases, it would have learned that the \$136,700 prior salary level is more than \$20,000 beyond the maximum salary paid to Legal Aid's TOP, most senior attorneys, which is what I learned upon questioning her following her testimony. Indeed, Exhibit L to CJA's October 27, 2011 Opposition Report furnishes relevant figures from 2009 as to what attorneys make in each of New York's 62 counties from which it is evident that neither the current \$174,000 Supreme Court salary level or the prior \$136,700 Supreme Court level are remotely inadequate for most of the state, and especially when considered with the non-salary benefits, as to which there has been no disclosure as to their cost to the taxpayers. Presumably, you would have learned a lot more about salaries and costs-of-living in the vast areas of upstate and western New York had you held hearings in those parts, which you did not do.

The reality is that judicial turnover is not great. Overwhelmingly New York's judges seek re-election and re-appointment, if not to the same judicial positions, than to higher ones. The Judiciary could certainly have provided the statistics – but has not, presumably because the statistics would not show any significant departure from the bench, let alone attributable to pay. And apart from statistics, the Judiciary does not even furnish the names of judges who have stepped down for the self-described reason of salary, thereby precluding any examination as to whether their departure is

a loss.

An example of a judge who New York is best rid of is Commissioner Barry Cozier, who stepped down from the Appellate Division, Second Department in 2006. To the best of my knowledge, the Judiciary and judicial pay raise advocates never identified him in their 2011 advocacy before the Commission on Judicial Compensation as a judge who left the bench due to inadequate pay. Nevertheless, the Unified Court System's June 30, 2015 press announcement that Chief Judge Lippman had appointed him to this Commission stated that after two decades as a judge, serving 'with distinction', he had 'decided to leave the bench in large measure due to the lengthy pay freeze — from 1999 through 2011 — endured by New York State's judges' — thereby making him 'acutely aware of the importance of setting a fair judicial pay scale to reduce turnover and ensure New York's citizens access to a high quality bench.'

Apart from the fact that "a fair judicial pay scale" is not this Commission's charge — but one that is 'adequate' — and that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned if — as purported — he left the bench 'in large measure due to the lengthy pay freeze', his departure is to be celebrated, not mourned. He was a corrupt judge who perpetuated the systemic judicial corruption, involving the court-controlled attorney disciplinary system and Commission on Judicial Conduct...."

It was with this massive presentation of fact and evidence before them that not a single Commissioner discussed, or even mentioned, the opposition to judicial pay raises — nor, for that matter, the threshold issues of the disqualification of Commissioners Lack, Cozier and Birnbaum for actual bias and interest, whose evidence-supported particulars were furnished by the second half of the December 2, 2015 supplemental statement.

Chair Birnbaum's words, at the December 7, 2015 meeting, after a half-hour discussion, were as follows:

Chair Birnbaum: All right. Everybody has at least spoken once. And if I can just try to get us to the next step, I think there's unanimity that there should be an increase. And we can take the fact that there shouldn't be any increases at all off the table, if I'm wrong in that, please let me know. So, if that's the case, I think the issues as we are hearing them expressed is the commissioners are in favor of an increase for the judiciary. The question is how fast and to what amount..." (video at 0:36:48; transcript at p. 23).

At no point thereafter, either at the December 7, 2015 meeting or at the December 14, 2015 meeting, was there the slightest mention of the opposition to judicial pay raises that had been presented. Nor is there any mention of the opposition in the Commission's December 24, 2015 Report, whose

coverletter, signed by Chair Birnbaum, states:

“The Commission carefully reviewed the public testimony and extensive written submissions received in connection with the question of appropriate compensation for New York State judges.”

Suffice to say, the only testimony and submissions whose review is evidenced by the December 24, 2015 Report are those supportive of judicial salary increases. Those alone are cited to by the Report, primarily in the footnotes to its so-called “Findings”⁶ (pp. 5-8). These “Findings”, of which there are nine, are essentially bald conclusions that are irrelevant and diversionary, where not outrightly fraudulent. There is not one that “levels of compensation and non-salary benefits” are inadequate or that the Commission had taken into account “all appropriate factors” – as to which, on December 21, 2015, I had sent the Commission yet a further submission, highlighting the statutory requirement of both, including by its title:

“Assisting the Commission in discharging its statutory duty of ‘tak[ing] into account all appropriate factors’ as to ‘adequate levels of compensation and non-salary benefits’”.

⁶ The submissions cited are of the Chief Administrative Judge at footnotes 4, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17 and the Associations of Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and the City of New York at footnotes 8, 16. “[T]he business community” is cited in the body of finding #7.