were not entitled to adopt her. Neither Iowa law, nor Michigan law, nor federal law authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit simply because they may be better able to provide for her future and her education. As the Iowa Supreme Court stated: "[C]ourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers more advantages." *In re B.G.C.*, 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

My examination of the opinions in the litigation persuades me that there is no valid federal objection to the conduct or the outcome of the proceedings in the Iowa courts. Indeed, although applicants applied to Justice BLACKMUN in his capacity as Justice for the Eighth Circuit for a stay of enforcement 1303 of the judgment entered by the Iowa Supreme Court on September 23, 1992, they did not seek review of that judgment after he had denied the stay application. Rather than comply with the Iowa judgment, applicants sought a modification of that judgment in the Michigan courts. In my opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Michigan courts are obligated to give effect to the Iowa proceedings. The carefully crafted opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court contains a comprehensive and thoughtful explanation of the governing rules of law. Accordingly, the stay applications will be denied.

It is so ordered.

510 U.S. 4, 126 L.Ed.2d 6

In re George SASSOWER (Two Cases).

George SASSOWER

v.

MEAD DATA CENTRAL INC., et al.

George SASSOWER

v.

D. Michael CRITES, et al.

George SASSOWER

v.

KRIENDLER & RELKIN, et al.

George SASSOWER

v.

Lee FELTMAN, et al.

George SASSOWER

v.

PUCCINI CLOTHES, et al.

George SASSOWER

v.

A.R. FUELS, et al.

George SASSOWER

v.

Janet RENO.

George SASSOWER

v.

Robert ABRAMS, Attorney General of New York.

Nos. 92-8933, 92-8934, 92-9228, 93-5045, 93-5127 to 93-5129, 93-5252, 93-5358 and 93-5596.

Oct. 12, 1993.

On pro se petitioner's motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on ten petitions for certiorari or for extraordinary writs, the Supreme Court held that petitioner would

be barred from filing further petitions for certiorari or for extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters unless he paid docketing fee and submitted petition in compliance with rule prescribing document printing requirements.

Ordered accordingly.

Attorney and Client ⇐62

Even though Supreme Court had not previously denied pro se petitioner in forma pauperis status on ground of patently frivolous petition, petitioner would be barred from filing further petitions for certiorari or for extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters unless he paid docketing fee and submitted petition in compliance with rule prescribing document printing requirements, as petitioner had abused Court's process in noncriminal cases; petitioner currently had ten patently frivolous petitions pending before Court. U.S.Sup.Ct.Rules 33, 38, 39.8, 28 U.S.C.A.

PER CURIAM.

Pro se petitioner George Sassower requests leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Sassower is allowed until November 2, 1993, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. For the reasons explained below, we also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari nor any petitions for extraordinary[5] writs from Sassower in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.

Prior to this Term, Sassower had filed 11 petitions in this Court over the last three years. Although Sassower was granted *in forma pauperis* status to file these petitions, all were denied without recorded dissent.* During the last four months, Sassower has suddenly increased his filings. He currently has 10 petitions pending before this Court—all of them patently frivolous.

Although we have not previously denied Sassower *in forma pauperis* status pursuant to Rule 39.8, we think it appropriate to enter an order pursuant to *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). In both *In re Sindram*, 498 U.S. 177, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991) (*per curiam*), and *In re McDonald*, 489 U.S. 180, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989) (*per curiam*), we entered orders similar to this one without having previously denied petitioners' motions to proceed *in forma pauperis* under Rule 39.8. For the important reasons discussed in *Martin*, *Sindram*, and *McDonald*, we feel compelled to enter the order today barring prospective filings from Sassower.

Sassower's abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Sassower from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order, however,[6] will allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our process.

It is so ordered.

*See *Sassower v. New York*, 499 U.S. 966, 111 S.Ct. 1597, 113 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) (certiorari); *In re Sassower*, 499 U.S. 935, 111 S.Ct. 1405, 113 L.Ed.2d 460 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); *In re Sassower*, 499 U.S. 935, 111 S.Ct. 1405, 113 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); *Sassower v. Mahoney*, 498 U.S. 1108, 111 S.Ct. 1015, 112 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1991); *In re Sassower*, 499 U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1124, 113 L.Ed.2d 232 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); *In re Sassower*, 498 U.S. 1081, 111 S.Ct. 1027, 112 L.Ed.2d 1108 (1991) (habeas corpus); *In re Sassower*, 498 U.S. 1081, 111 S.Ct. 1026, 112 L.Ed.2d 1108 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); *Sassower v. United States Court of Appeals for D.C.Cir.*, 498 U.S. 1094, 111 S.Ct. 981, 112 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1991) (certiorari); *Sassower v. Brieant*, 498 U.S. 1094, 111 S.Ct. 981, 112 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1991) (certiorari); *Sassower v. Thornburgh*, 498 U.S. 1036, 111 S.Ct. 703, 112 L.Ed.2d 692 (1991) (certiorari); *Sassower v. Dillon*, 493 U.S. 979, 110 S.Ct. 508, 107 L.Ed.2d 511 (1989) (certiorari).

Justice THOMAS and Justice GINSBURG took no part in the consideration or decision of the motion in No. 93–5252.

510 U.S. 1, 126 L.Ed.2d 2

Roy A. DAY

v.

Donald P. DAY.

Roy A. DAY

v.

Vincent BEKIEMPIS, Jr.

Roy A. DAY

v.

Walter C. HEINRICH et al.

Roy A. DAY

v.

GAF BUILDING MATERIALS CORP.

Roy A. DAY

v.

William J. CLINTON, President of the United States et al.

Roy A. DAY

v.

Norman W. BLACK et al.

Roy A. DAY

v.

J. Terry DEASON et al.

Roy A. DAY

v.

Donald P. DAY.

Nos. 92–8788, 92–8792, 92–8888, 92–8905, 92–8906, 92–9018, 92–9101 and 93–5430.

Oct. 12, 1993.

Petitioner sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court held that petitioner had abused certiorari process by filing repeated frivolous petitions which warranted denial of in forma pauperis status and order directing clerk not to accept further petitions for certiorari from petitioner in noncriminal matters.

Ordered accordingly.

Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion.

Federal Courts ⇐444, 453

Petitioner's abuse of writ of certiorari by filing repeated frivolous petitions after being denied in forma pauperis status warranted refusal to accept any further petitions for certiorari in noncriminal matters. U.S.Sup.Ct.Rules 33, 38, 39, 39.8, 28 U.S.C.A.

PER CURIAM.

Pro se petitioner Roy A. Day requests leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Day is allowed until November 2, 1993, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Day in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.

Day is an abuser of this Court's certiorari process. We first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Day *in forma pauperis* status last June. See *In re Day*, 509 U.S. 902, 113 S.Ct. 2991, 125 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993). At that time he had filed 27 petitions in the past nine years. Although Day was granted *in forma pauperis* status to file these petitions, all were denied without recorded dissent. Since we first denied him *in forma pauperis* status last June, he has filed eight more petitions for certiorari with this Court—all of them demonstrably frivolous.