"The legislative history of section 183-a of the Judiciary Law lends ample support to its reasonableness. It was promulgated to remove the salary differential of the District Attorney from local political considerations, to maintain the security and independence of District Attorneys, and to assure that persons of high standing and integrity remain in their position (Governor's bill jacket, L 1972, ch 946, pp 8-9). The Legislature recognized that it was not equitable to require full-time District Attorneys to forego private practice while at the same time having their salaries frozen at inadequate levels (Governor's bill jacket, at p 10). By providing minimum salaries equivalent to Judges of the County Court, the office of District Attorney would attract the best available attorneys (Governor's bill jacket, at p 22), and diminish the exodus of District Attorneys to the County Court Bench. Section 183-a directly promotes this interest in an equitable and reasonable manner. In our view, the legislation passes the reasonableness test, and the court may not substitute its judgment for the method chosen by the Legislature (Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N. Y., 46 N.Y.2d 358, 370).
         No one disputes that the State has a significant interest in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of District Attorneys. The compensation requirement in section 183-a is reasonably connected to the State's interest in maintaining competent District Attorneys, and, therefore, the constitutional challenge must fail."

Has Judiciary Law 183-a been successful in doing this?   

"to maintain the...independence of District Attorneys" -- premise that if D.A. salary is not dependent on county government for its salary, the D.A.s can more freely investigate allegations involving county government -- public integrity issues. 

                      Question: Where is the evidence?  Does the D.A. have a public integrity unit?  How does he handle public corruption complaints;

"persons of high standing and integrity remain in this position"  
                     
                      Question:  Where is the evidence?  What oversight is there of the D.A.?  How does he handle integrity issues, ie conflict of interest

"would attract the best attorneys, and diminish the exodus of District Attorneys to the County Court bench..."

                     Question: Where is the evidence?  How many "best attorneys" are attracted to the job?   Are elections competitive?  And has the "exodus" of DAs to the County Court bench been diminished?

RELEVANT CASES

*****   Harvey v. Finnick,111 Misc. 2d 197 (1981) -- Supreme Court  (Ontario County) 
struck down Judiciary Law 183-a

           "By section 183-a of the Judiciary Law, which was passed in 1972 and amended in 1974 to include District Attorneys which had been designated as full time pursuant to the provisions of subdivision 8 of section 700 of the County Law, the Legislature established the compensation of full-time District Attorneys as equivalent to that of either Supreme Court or County Court Judges, depending on the size of the county. In
essence, section 183-a of the Judiciary Law with its reference to subdivision 8 of section 700 of the County Law, established three classes: (1) counties with a population in excess of 500,000, exclusive of New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens, and Richmond Counties, whose District Attorneys' salaries are equivalent to that of a Supreme Court Justice; (2) counties with a population of more than 100,000 and less than 500,000, exclusive of Richmond County, whose District Attorneys receive compensation equal to that of the County Court Judge; and (3) counties with a population of more than 40,000 but less than 100,000 that have designated their District Attorneys as full time whose District Attorneys receive compensation equivalent to that of a County Court Judge. [fn 4]
                [fn 4: A possible fourth class has been added due to the 1978 amendment of subdivision 8 of section 700 of the County Law, wherein the District Attorney of Essex County was specifically designated as full time. The salary of the Essex County District Attorney would be equivalent to that of a County Court Judge.]
                ...While the Legislature may usurp the power of the county to establish the District Attorney's salary by general law, the compensation provisions of that law must have a reasonable basis. There is a presumption that every statute is constitutional and that the Legislature has
investigated the subject and acted with reason. (Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41; Matter of Malpica-Orsini, 36 NY2d 568; I.L.F.Y. Co. v Temporary State Housing Rent Comm., 10 NY2d 263, app dsmd 369 U.S. 795.) While the compensation plan of paying certain District Attorneys the same as County Court Judges may have been reasonable when section 183-a of the Judiciary Law was passed, subsequent changes in the court structure have rendered that compensation plan unreasonable.
                 At the time section 183-a of the Judiciary Law was passed, County Court Judges were under the jurisdiction of the county. The County Court Judge's salary was established by section 182-a of the Judiciary Law which provided that the County Court Judge for Ontario County was to receive a salary of $25,000 per year together with such additional compensation as the respective boards of supervisors of the county might provide by local law. [fn.5]   The county was responsible for the payment of the salaries of the County Court Judge and the District Attorney.  Section 182-a of the Judiciary Law took effect on January 1, 1966. It was later repealed, effective June 3, 1975, by section 183 of the Judiciary Law. Section 220 of the Judiciary Law subsequently repealed and replaced section 183 of the Judiciary Law. Section 220 of the Judiciary Law took effect April 1, 1979 with retroactive effect.
            On April 1, 1977 the Uniform Court Budget Act took effect providing that County Court Judges would thereafter be State employees with their compensation paid by the State. (Judiciary Law, § 220; L 1976, ch 966.)...
            The compensation scheme of section 183-a of the Judiciary Law cannot be upheld as it does not give consideration to the differing duties and responsibilities of County Court Judges and District Attorneys nor does it allow for any meaningful accommodation of each county's particular situation.  In reaching the decision that all County Court Judges in the State are entitled to the same compensation, the Cass [ v State of New York (109 Misc 2d 107)] opinion (supra, p 113) noted that 'in a unified court system where Judges are routinely transferred outside their districts for up to six months at a time, and artificial local boundaries are to be ignored with respect to the allocation of money, it serves no legitimate governmental purpose for Judges of the same courts with identical constitutional jurisdiction and duties to be paid unequally.' This same rationale does not apply to District Attorneys.
              District Attorneys are not required to travel and their functions are performed within the limited arenas of their respective counties. The duties, responsibilities and case-loads of a District Attorney vary from those of a Judge and from those of his counterparts in other counties. While a District Attorney is an officer of the court and has a responsibility to enforce the laws of the State and to comport himself in a manner befitting that position, a District Attorney is not under the same restrictions nor does he maintain the same status as that of a Judge. For instance, a Judge is required to refrain from participation in political affairs, a restriction which is not placed on District Attorneys. The ultimate decisions must be made by the Judge and that responsibility and position should not be equated legislatively, through salary requirements or otherwise, to that of the person presenting a case to him. In summary, the judicial position is unique, as is the position of District Attorney, and there is no rational basis for referencing the compensation of District Attorneys to that of Judges, especially under the conditions of the Unified Court System.
              The changes wrought by the Unified Court System also render any local input and adjustments for local conditions and requirements virtually meaningless. While the statute still allows the locality to pay compensation in addition to that required by statute, the imposition of a $60,900 per year minimum salary as opposed to the $25,000 per year minimum salary which existed when the salary requirement is so high, little room is left for adjustment between the salary of the District Attorney in a county of 40,000 and the District Attorney who represents a populace of just under 500,000 -- both of whom receive the same base pay. [fn 6]
            In conclusion, the compensation provisions of section 183-a of the Judiciary Law which equate the salaries of certain District Attorneys to those of a County Court Judge lack a rational basis and must be declared unconstitutional. Therefore, the respondent county is not obliged to pay the petitioner in accordance with the salary provisions of that section and section 221-d of the Judiciary Law."
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                                                                       COMPARE THE SUPERFICIAL, NON-RESPONSIVE DECISIONS REVERSING --